

**WHY PRESIDENT TRUMP MUST NOT
RE-CERTIFY IRANIAN JCPOA
COMPLIANCE**

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KEY FINDINGS

- It is imperative that President Trump not recertify the Iranian regime as compliant with the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) when the next deadline comes due in October 2017
- Tehran is explicitly and demonstrably out of compliance with the JCPOA on numerous specific counts
- The nature of the Iranian regime is self-avowedly jihadist per its own constitution, which declares the objective of the regime is global conquest by an Islamic State under rule of Islamic Law (shariah) – thus, its nuclear weapons program is a means to achieve that objective
- The Iranian regime is signatory to a host of international conventions and treaties but has a documented record of violations that lends little credence to its JCPOA pledges
- The Iranian regime most notably violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for at least 14 years before getting caught and publicly revealed with a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2002
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented a long list of so-called Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) related to the Iranian nuclear program in November 2011 that strongly suggest its assessment that Iran had an advanced nuclear weapons program and possibly nuclear warheads at that time
- More recent revelations demonstrate that the Iranian regime continues to work on nuclear warheads and explosive charges to initiate the implosion sequence of a nuclear bomb at clandestine sites off-limits to IAEA inspections
- Even after the July 2015 JCPOA, the Iranian regime has been confronted with credible information that it is operating more advanced centrifuges than permitted, exceeding limits on production of heavy water, and covertly procuring nuclear and missile technology outside of JCPOA-approved channels: these are all material breaches of the JCPOA
- The Iranian regime's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile 'Joint Venture' with North Korea dates back at least to the 1990s and continues currently with especial concern about the sharing of expertise on warhead miniaturization and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) technology
- Denial of recertification of Iranian compliance with the JCPOA must be the first step in a complete review of the nuclear and ballistic missile threats from both Iran and North Korea

INTRODUCTION

On 18 July 2017, the Trump administration certified to Congress for the second time that Iran has continued to meet the required conditions of the nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Acknowledging however, that Iran was “unquestionably in default of the spirit of the JCPOA,” as one official put it, the administration has indicated unwillingness to certify Iran again when the next deadline comes due in October 2017.

There are multiple reasons why President Trump will be justified in refusing recertification, which will be outlined in this paper. None of them has to do with disappointment that Iran continues to support international terrorism and develop long-range ballistic missiles—because the explicit terms of the JCPOA do not ban such activities. Nor even must non-recertification refer to the secret side deals to the JCPOA, not all of which have been made public, even to this day. Rather, the key justifications for refusing recertification lie with the publicly-expressed nature of the Iranian regime, its commitment to a millennialist Shi’ite Islamic doctrine, the known existence of a clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program from at least 1988-2002, the systematic violation of myriad treaties and conventions by this regime, ongoing collaboration with North Korea on both nuclear warhead and ballistic missile R&D, and abundant open source information about current, explicit, material Iranian regime violations of JCPOA provisions.

NATURE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME

The JCPOA ignores the essential Islamic nature of the Tehran regime, which is aggressively jihadist and committed to imposing universal domination of Islamic Law (shariah) under rule of a global Islamic state (caliphate or imamate). The Iranian constitution is quite explicit about this. In it, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is termed “An Ideological Army,” whose mission is not merely defending the country’s borders, but citing directly from Qur’an 8:60, also jihad to “strike terror into the hearts of the enemy.” This characterization is readily available in the online English language text of the Iranian constitution. (See here for the text: <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf>)

Various recent public statements by senior Iranian regime officials provide explicit manifestation of the currency of such passages. For example, on 11 March 2017, IRGC commander Ali Ja’fari asserted that “We are on the path that leads to the rule of Islam worldwide.” On 1 March 2017, IRGC Qods Force deputy commander Esmail Qaani stated that “...The main aim is global rule...”

(Source: <https://www.memri.org/reports/irgc-commanders-our-main-aim-global-islamic-rule>)

Understanding the Islamic identity of the Iranian regime is also to realize that, according to Sharia, Muslims are obligated to lie to non-believers; thus, the entire negotiating process with Iran is based on trusting a party obligated by faith to be deceitful. (See ‘Umdat al-Salik – Reliance of the Traveller, Section r8.0 LYING, pg. 744-45, and available here: <https://www.amazon.com/Reliance-Traveller-Classic-Manual-Islamic/dp/0915957728>)

Applying such principles to the issue of Iran’s nuclear negotiations, in September 2012, Iranian Vice President Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, who headed the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization from

2011-2013, told the London-based daily *Al-Hayat* that deception was employed to advance and protect Iran's nuclear weapons program, saying "Sometimes we pretended to be weaker than we really were, and sometimes we showed strength that was not really in our hands." (Source:

<http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-admits-it-deceived-the-west-over-nuclear-program/>)

Worse yet, a January 2014 report by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board is less than encouraging about American intelligence agencies' capability to detect such deceit on the part of Iran or other foreign powers that may be developing nuclear weapons clandestinely. The 100-page report found that U.S. detection abilities are "either inadequate, or more often, do not exist." It is not likely that significant improvement in such abilities was developed in the subsequent three years of the Obama administration.

(Source: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/politics/us-efforts-to-detect-nuclear-programs-are-inadequate-pentagon-study-finds.html>)

For the purpose of this paper's assessment about Iranian compliance with the terms of the JCPOA, the relevance of the Iranian regime's commitment to the Sharia imperative to world conquest by jihad (including deceit) lies in understanding that Tehran's leadership views its nuclear weapons program as a means to achieving its aggressive ideological objectives.

EARLIER AGREEMENTS & VIOLATIONS

Iran's prior record of non-adherence to various treaties and multilateral agreements to which it is a signatory only reinforces the appropriateness of the Pentagon's pessimism and underlines the folly of the U.S. continuing to feel bound by an agreement no one signed, the Senate did not ratify, is not legally binding, and which does nothing to keep Iran from developing, deploying, and perhaps one day delivering, nuclear weapons. A few examples will suffice:

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ratified by Iran 5 March 1970: For years, Iran violated the terms of the NPT by illicitly developing its nuclear program without the required consultations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). When discovered and outed in 2002, Iran eventually declared those parts of its nuclear program that had been publicly revealed but blocked IAEA access to requested sites, refused to provide information about its past nuclear activities, and repeatedly failed to meet critical, mutually-agreed deadlines with the IAEA.
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, ratified by Iran 3 November 1997. Iran claimed to have terminated its chemical weapons program after the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, but U.S. intelligence maintains that Iran has not only kept its chemical agents but accelerated its program and aided the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in the development and criminal use of Damascus' CW arsenal against civilian targets in the ongoing civil war there that began in 2011.
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ratified by Iran 14 August 1956: One of the crimes under this treaty is "direct and public incitement to genocide."

The Tehran regime leadership routinely and explicitly has violated this treaty by calling for wiping Israel off the face of the map as well as by arming, funding, sponsoring, and training terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that have the intent, motivation, and ability to cause mass casualties among Israeli citizens.

As noted above, the Iranian regime's non-compliance with binding provisions of international agreements to which it is a signatory demonstrates a flagrant disregard for its treaty commitments. This is not a track record that should inspire confidence in Iran's likelihood of abiding by the provisions of the JCPOA either. That Iran has not been held to account for such violations only reinforces its leadership's contempt for the United States, the IAEA, and the United Nations, especially the UN Security Council (UNSC), given that relevant provisions of the UNSC resolutions regarding the Iranian nuclear program were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)

On behalf of the UNSC, the IAEA bears primary responsibility for the monitoring (albeit not enforcement) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the case of Iran, the quarterly reports by the IAEA Board of Governors on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran used to provide key indicators of Iran's non-compliance with its treaty obligations. The quarterly report of 8 November 2011 is especially revelatory regarding the IAEA's "serious concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program." (Source: <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf>)

In that report, the IAEA noted the following issues that pointed directly, in its judgment, to the likelihood that Iran's nuclear program was in fact a nuclear weapons program:

- Nuclear warhead R & D
- Fitting the warhead onto the nose cone of a nuclear-capable missile by re-engineering the missile payload chamber to accommodate a nuclear warhead
- Computer modeling of nuclear explosions
- Experiments through at least 2010 on nuclear triggers (or nuclear initiators), also termed bridgewire detonators, to perfect the process by which shock waves from conventional explosives compress the spherical fuel at the core of a nuclear device to initiate the implosion sequence of a nuclear explosion
- Hydrodynamic experiments that, according to the IAEA report "are strong indicators of possible weapon development"
- Iran cast and shaped uranium metal into hemispheres for a nuclear implosion device, which is a sophisticated nuclear weapon design
- Iran verified the design of a nuclear weapon with non-fissile explosive testing in a containment chamber (Parchin)

- Iran developed and tested exploding bridgewire detonators, necessary to an implosion nuclear weapon
- Iran manufactured neutron initiators which are used to start a fission chain-reaction in a nuclear weapon
- Iran drafted 14 different workable designs for a nuclear weapon to fit inside the re-entry vehicle for the high-explosive (HE) warhead of Iran's Shahab-3 medium-range missile
- Iran developed fusing systems for a nuclear missile warhead to perform a ground-burst or high-altitude burst above 3,000 meters
- The Congressional EMP Commission found in 2002 that Iran apparently performed at least 5 fusing tests of the Shahab-3 at high-altitudes — explicable only as practicing nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks
- Foreign assistance to Iran's nuclear program, specifically a Russian nuclear expert who worked in Iran from 1996-2002 and provided assistance to Iran's high explosives initiation system and its development of the high speed diagnostic confirmation used to monitor related experiments
- Additional source material from Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security is found at the link below. Dr. Pry served on the Congressional EMP Commission, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and with the CIA.
<http://www.newsmax.com/PeterPry/atomic-bomb-jcpoa-reagan/2017/08/11/id/807153/>

In other words, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had an extensive and very advanced nuclear weapons development program at least until the end of 2003. Unfortunately, under tremendous pressure from Iran, the U.S. government, and other parties to the JCPOA, the IAEA essentially caved and on 26 February 2016, released a report that claimed Iran was basically in compliance with its JCPOA commitments. Notably, the IAEA made no reference to the fact that the majority of the so-called PMDs (possible military dimensions) so clearly described in its earlier reporting had never been resolved, but only ignored in order to allow the JCPOA to move forward.

THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION (JCPOA)

PDF Text: <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2165388/iran-deal-text.pdf>

As noted above, there is nothing explicitly enumerated among JCPOA provisions that obligates the Iranian regime to improve its human rights record, cease support to international Islamic terrorism, halt work on ballistic missiles, or refrain from collaboration with Kim Jong Un and the North Korean regime. Nor is there any provision binding on Iran to permit IAEA inspection access to any site it chooses not to open up—only an extensive process by which the IAEA may make requests for such access. These things are simply not in the JCPOA and thus Tehran cannot be cited for failing to abide by any of them.

Clearly, these all are major failures of the agreement. But there is an even more egregious omission that is not usually mentioned. In Section T of the JCPOA's 'Annex I – Nuclear-related measures', the document lists four specific activities "which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device." The text reads that "Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device" – and then lists items 82.1-82.4, some of which refer back directly to unresolved IAEA PMDs.

"T. ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

82. Iran will not engage in the following activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device:

82.1 Designing, developing, acquiring, or using computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices.

82.2 Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point explosive detonation systems suitable for a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.3 Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.

82.4 Designing, developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron sources."

Strikingly, however, and distinctly unlike Sections A-S that preceded it, Section T assigns no tasking to any named party for inspection, monitoring or even requests about adherence to these provisions. This omission is not likely to have been accidental.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN (NCRI) REPORTING

Website: <http://ncr-iran.org/en/>

Here we come to the crux of the issue: Iran has been developing nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile systems with which to deliver them since the late 1980s. That is when, in the depths of the Iran-Iraq war, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ordered his IRGC to "get the bomb." The IRGC went straight to Pakistan, where it concluded a deal to work with Abdul Qadeer Khan (A.Q. Khan), also known as the "father of the Pakistani bomb." China, North Korea, Russia and an international network of suppliers all assisted Tehran to acquire the necessary elements for a nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles. (See this 2006 BBC report about Khomeini's 1988 letter to his IRGC commanders that included 'atomic weapons' among requirements needed to defend Iran (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5392584.stm))

The Iranian nuclear weapons program somehow remained clandestine, hidden from IAEA and public knowledge, until August 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the large, democratic Iranian opposition group in exile, blew the lid off Iran's secrecy. In simultaneous press conferences held in Paris and Washington, D.C., NCRI spokesmen revealed the existence of Iranian nuclear sites which have now become familiar: Natanz, Isfahan, the Kalaye Electric Plant—and subsequently, many more. Understandably, the Iranian regime went to panic stations and, in the case of at least one site (at Lavizan-Shian), decided to raze the entire facility to the ground rather than allow the IAEA to inspect it.

Iran did not, however, give up its nuclear weapons ambitions or its extensive, and by that time, well-advanced program. Instead, the Iranian Ministry of Defense (MOD) and IRGC, which have primary responsibility for the regime's nuclear development, began to move things underground, burying entire plants in bunkers and tunnels under mountains. Even as UN and U.S. sanctions began to clamp down harder and harder, IAEA reports document that the Iranian regime in fact only accelerated both its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

In February 2011, when the Obama administration was already initiating its as-yet-behind-the-scenes nuclear negotiations with Tehran, the Iranian MOD established a new element, the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND is the Farsi acronym), which would henceforth be responsible for the regime's nuclear weapons development. The SPND did not escape the notice of the Department of State and was sanctioned by it in August 2014 for engaging in nuclear weapons R & D. In 2007, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (aka Dr. Hassan Mohseni), the founder and director of the SPND and an IRGC veteran with the rank of Brigadier General, was designated individually under UNSC Resolution 1747 and by the U.S in July 2008 for involvement in Iran's proscribed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) activities. Despite all of this, in July 2015 (seven months after formal Implementation day), the JCPOA lifted sanctions against SPND.

THE SPND AND IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM: ON COURSE, UNDERGROUND, UNINSPECTED

See this April 24, 2017 article published by the Center for Security Policy for additional details, some cited below, about the SPND:

<https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/04/24/irans-nuclear-weapons-program-on-course-underground-uninspected/>

Explicit violations of the Section T provisions of the JCPOA are ongoing at the Parchin military site under the supervision of the SPND. Parchin houses the Center for Research and Expansion of Technologies on Explosions and Impact (METFAZ is the Farsi acronym), which is just one of seven sites subordinate to SPND where work continues on nuclear warheads, triggers, and explosives. Parchin Chemical Industries, an element of Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO), was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2008 for importing "a chemical precursor for solid propellant

oxidizer, possibly to be used for ballistic missiles.” The Parchin site is where the IAEA long suspected Iran was conducting test explosions for nuclear detonators. In October 2014, Iran even admitted to using a blast containment vessel at Parchin for tests of exploding bridge wires—but claimed they had nothing to do with weapons development. Equally incredibly, one of the secret side deals with the IAEA later allowed Iran to collect its own samples at Parchin—in which the IAEA in fact did find evidence of enriched uranium. But the JCPOA lifted sanctions against Parchin Chemical Industries anyway.

Within Parchin are twelve separate military and missile complexes. Within one of these called “Plan 6” near the center of the overall Parchin military site, METFAZ has established a new, secret, and heavily secured location referred to simply as the “Research Academy” in SPND internal communications. Neither the IAEA nor the U.S. national security leadership knows exactly what goes on there, but based on the known profile of METFAZ and SPND, as well as the secrecy surrounding these activities, it is clearly in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the JCPOA.

ADDITIONAL VIOLATIONS OF THE JCPOA BY IRAN

Fred Fleitz, the Senior Vice President for Policy and Programs at the Center for Security Policy, has done tremendous work documenting Iran’s violations of the JCPOA. Writing regularly for the *National Review*, Fleitz has noted the following:

- Iran is operating more advanced uranium-enrichment centrifuges than is permitted and announcing the capability to initiate mass production of centrifuges
- Iran is exceeding limits on production and storage of heavy water, a substance needed to operate plutonium-producing heavy-water nuclear reactors
- As reported by German intelligence, there is credible evidence that Iran is covertly procuring nuclear and missile technology outside of JCPOA-approved channels
- The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) likewise notes “Iran’s on-going commitment to illicitly procuring sensitive goods for its missile and military programs, combined with a long history of illicit nuclear and nuclear-related procurements...The United States should recognize this Iranian practice of seeking goods as inconsistent with the JCPOA and likely intended as a scheme to aid in the violation of the JCPOA and UNSC resolution 2231.”
- Sources here:
 - <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/449490/iran-nuclear-deal-noncompliance>
 - <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/449636/iran-nuclear-deal-recertification>
 - http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/JCPOA_Procurement_Channel_Post_Implementation_Day_1_6Aug2017update.pdf

THE IRAN-NORTH KOREA JOINT VENTURE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES

Abundant open source information attests to the close working relationship between the Iranian regime and North Korea. Tehran and Pyongyang, while very different sorts of regimes, yet “share a common strategic interest in creating strong missile and nuclear forces,” according to Anthony H. Cordesman, writing in *Tablet* on June 26, 2017. The motivation for both is to threaten U.S. and Western national security interests and those of our allies in the respective regions of the Middle East and East Asia. (<http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238409/north-korea-and-iran-weapons-of-mass-destruction>)

The Iranians clearly paid close attention to the limp U.S. and international community response to North Korea’s brazen behavior as Pyongyang played the Bill Clinton administration for fools and bought more time for its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Speaking in 2007, Ali Larijani (then Iran’s top nuclear negotiator) revealed how closely the Iranian strategy was modeled on the North Korean one when he said, “Pay attention to North Korea’s conduct. What has come of two years of negotiation with North Korea? It led to [the West’s] acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear technologies in the field of uranium enrichment. So now, they [the West] will accept ours.”

(http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=44367&hp=1)

On February 28, 2017, the BESA Center, a conservative Israeli think tank, published a detailed article entitled “Iran Is Progressing Towards Nuclear Weapons Via North Korea,” by Lt. Col. (ret.), Dr. Refael Ofek, and Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham.

(<https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/iran-progressing-nuclear-weapons-via-north-korea/>)

The authors assert that “from the 1990s onwards, dozens—perhaps hundreds—of NK scientists and technicians apparently worked in Iran in nuclear and ballistic facilities,” with a special mission to achieve miniaturization of a nuclear implosion device to fit on the nosecone of a Shehab-3 re-entry vehicle. An important September 2012 formal agreement between Iran and North Korea “was probably intended to mask an evolving Iranian-NK cryptic interface”, they continued. Multiple reciprocal delegation visits between Iran and North Korea have been reported, with officials covertly present at Iranian nuclear sites and North Korean nuclear and missile tests.

With the early August 2017 announcement that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assesses North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized warhead that can fit its ballistic missile delivery systems, it would appear that the Iran-North Korean collaboration has achieved an important stage in the ability of both to deliver nuclear weapons. This intelligence assessment originally was made known to the Obama administration in 2013, which, however, took the decision to do nothing about it.

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.0fecadbef4f5)

It should be understood, as noted by Dr. Peter Pry, that “North Korea is a pawn in a geostrategic chess game being played by China and Russia against the United States.” Together, these three powers (among others) have also aided and abetted the Iranian quest for deliverable nuclear weapons. Advice to just “learn to live” with a nuclear-armed Iran and North Korea (as proposed by President Obama’s national security advisor, Susan Rice) is sheer folly. Neither of these rogue regimes can be deterred easily by the Cold War era policy of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction)—the former because of its millennialist eschatology and the latter because of the unstable psyche of its leader, Kim Jong Un. Tehran and Pyongyang must be denied the ability to deliver nuclear weapons.

[\(http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/24/r-james-woolsey-peter-vincent-ry-obama-wrong-on-n/\)](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/24/r-james-woolsey-peter-vincent-ry-obama-wrong-on-n/)

Refusal to re-certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA is not only fully justified by Tehran’s ongoing collaboration with North Korea in nuclear warhead development, but should also be understood as the first step in an overall U.S. policy program to secure the U.S. civilian electric grid, strengthen U.S. missile defenses, and put an end to the possibility either Pyongyang or Tehran could ever threaten the U.S., our allies or national security with deliverable nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSIONS

While credible indications of multiple Iranian violations of the JCPOA provide all the justification needed for President Trump to refuse to make yet another re-certification of that regime’s compliance with the deal, the most obvious reason not to certify is that Iran more than likely already has the bomb. According to Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, while all ten other nuclear weapons states developed their atomic bombs in three to twelve years, the Iranians have been working on theirs for almost thirty years—with the assistance of already-established nuclear powers like China, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. As detailed above, the November 2011 IAEA report practically admitted that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and probably nuclear weapons, too.

<http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/detail/iran-the-worst-deal>

Given the extreme vulnerability of the U.S. civilian electric grid to an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapon—or solar flare, which exerts the same effect—because it has never been secured against such threats, the credible information that the Russians “accidentally” transferred design information for Russia’s Super-EMP nuclear warhead to North Korea must arouse serious concern among our national security leadership. As an EMP weapon is detonated in the high atmosphere above a target, there is no need for a re-entry vehicle able to withstand atmospheric stresses. In 2006, North Korea tested a low-yield nuclear device consistent with the design of a Super-EMP warhead. North Korean ballistic missile tests, as well as the two satellites Pyongyang has placed in orbit over the U.S. (December 2012 and February 2016), demonstrate not only its ability to loft a payload to the required heights, but an understanding that the U.S. currently has no land-based missile defense systems on the Atlantic or Gulf coasts. This is why the two North Korean satellites follow a south polar trajectory, coming up at the U.S. from the south, instead of the north, where missile defense systems are concentrated. Further, the varying orbits of these two satellites at times cover both the East and West coasts of the U.S. simultaneously. It is

not known publicly what the two North Korean satellites contain, but it is possible that one or both has a nuclear weapon on board. It is also possible that, were there an EMP weapon in one or both of those satellites, North Korea could explode it remotely with a radio signal at a time of its choosing. (<https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/08/03/america-get-in-the-fight-to-secure-the-grid-heres-how/> - and - <http://www.breitbart.com/jerusalem/2017/05/08/exclusive-congressional-expert-north-korea-prepping-emp-warfare-aimed-u-s-homefront/>)

The overwhelming likelihood that North Korea's EMP warhead design data has been shared with Iran only further amplifies the urgency of declaring Iran in violation of the JCPOA, based on Section T provisions. In 1994, President Bill Clinton announced the Agreed Framework with North Korea, assuring Americans that it would end the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, North Korea was lying. It cheated, too. The whole thing collapsed in 2002, when President George W. Bush confronted North Korea with evidence it had been pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program. The financial bonanza that the JCPOA provided to Iran only ensures that the regime has the financial resources to spare no expense in its quest for a deliverable nuclear weapons capability.

The U.S. must not procrastinate in declaring Iran in material breach of the JCPOA when the next re-certification deadline arrives in October 2017. There is simply too much sound information about Iranian cheating on its worthless nuclear promises. The danger to the U.S. and our friends and allies is too critical to disregard any longer in the forlorn hope that maybe this time more negotiations can achieve results. A regime like Iran's that is obligated by doctrine and faith to lie to us; has failed in the past to abide by any of the treaty obligations to which it is a signatory; demonstrably ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program for more than a dozen years before getting caught; refuses to allow the IAEA to inspect all suspect sites; collaborates with North Korea in what amounts to a joint venture operation to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; and most importantly, is currently working on myriad relevant, sophisticated technological aspects of a nuclear bomb. It cannot by the wildest stretch of the imagination be deemed in compliance with the JCPOA.

The only viable choice is for President Trump to refuse to recertify Iranian compliance with the JCPOA in October 2017. America is ready and able to meet the challenges that will ensue from such a decision, but decertification is the necessary first step.