

Case Study: Hamas' October 7, 2023 Attack on Israel

The following is the result of a discussion between Center for Security Policy experts Dr. David Wurmser, Dr. J. Michael Waller, Dr. Andrei Illarionov, and Kyle Shideler.

Edited by Morgan Wirthlin



CASE STUDY: HAMAS' OCTOBER 7, 2023 ATTACK ON ISRAEL

**By Dr. David Wurmser, Dr. J. Michael Waller,
Dr. Andrei Illarionov, and Kyle Shideler**

Edited by Morgan Wirthlin

SUMMARY

Hostile adversaries are exploiting the widening internal divisions within the United States. Those adversaries seek to overwhelm the U.S., and West at large, through a series of interrelated threats, supporting each other's strategic efforts. This full spectrum warfare includes large scale conventional attacks for which the West is not militarily or psychologically prepared, and a variety of asymmetric capabilities, including cyberwarfare, political warfare, and subversion. The starkest example of such a nation under attack is Israel, and the parallels are instructive to understand what is happening here at home.

Lack of consensus about external enemies and polarizing political divisions make the United States an unreliable ally. Having unilaterally surrendered its power and prestige to a rising Communist China, Putin's Russia and smaller, more creative and resourceful regional powers like Iran and Qatar, Washington can no longer command the world stage. The best thing for U.S. security is to free up allies

to operate as they need to, which will prevent their conflicts from becoming a divisive issue domestically. If the U.S. attempts to centrally direct and control each of its allies in the conflict, it will be unable to keep up, it will intensify political polarization at home, embolden and strengthen foreign adversaries, and will make Americans more vulnerable to direct physical conflict.

While Russia, China, and Iran may all have unique imperial aims, they are united in their desire to eliminate the Western global order, which itself is also under attack from within.

HAMAS' OCTOBER 7, 2023 ATTACK ON ISRAEL

The low-cost, high-impact Hamas attack on Israel on October 2023, was a superb example of asymmetrical warfare that produced dramatic effects, with ramifications felt worldwide.

In the early morning of October 7, and with state

backing from Iran and Qatar, Hamas launched a surprise attack in southern Israel from Gaza. The attack began with a [barrage](#) of 2,500 rockets, followed by cyberattacks and drones to [disable](#) Israeli military communications and warning systems. This allowed between 3,000-5,000 Hamas combatants to cross into Israel through 30 breaches in the border via paragliders, motorcycles, and on foot. Individual Hamas units killed Israeli civilians and soldiers in [military outposts](#).

After the first wave of Hamas combatants crossed, Gazan civilians poured over the border and [looted](#) the homes of murdered Israelis. Some also reportedly took [Israelis hostage](#). Subsequently captured operational and intelligence documents reveal that Hamas had planned for another wave of combatants to cross the border to take the nuclear reactor in Dimona, penetrate to Tel Aviv, and capture the security prisons in the south to free Palestinian prisoners. Hamas leader Sinwar [ordered](#) the second wave to proceed at noon, but the fighters were obstructed because Israeli forces had begun to mobilize and had already established successful blocking lines near Nevatim. Hamas units were also further delayed by the [Gazan civilians](#) looting Israeli property.

Intelligence failures caught Israel unprepared, forcing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to spend most of October 7th reestablishing control of the invasion space, and taking 18 hours to clear out most of the remnants of the invasion force. However, multiple Hamas units went to ground inside Israel, forcing Israel into a defensive posture that took [five or six weeks](#) before the last enemy combatants were killed or captured. One squad captured in late February had melted into the Bedouin population in the Negev.

The IDF's ground response in Gaza started three

or four weeks after the initial attack, delayed in part by the American government's need to reinforce its troops stationed across the region. U.S. assets in the Middle East suffered [over 200 attacks](#) from Iranian proxy forces in the months following October 7, resulting in three fatalities and [183 injured](#), including 130 traumatic brain injuries.

The attacks, and the weak U.S. response to them, effectively surrendered American and British insurance of freedom of the seas. This failure on the American and British side diverted all maritime commerce between Europe, north Africa, and Asia out of the key Red Sea/Suez Canal route to and from the Mediterranean, to take the much longer route around South Africa.

The prestige of the United States and British navies diminished, the maritime power and influence of Iran and the Chinese Communist Party grew in the region, and the Houthi proxies of Yemen unimaginably became regional players.

Closer to the conflict, Egypt, a major Western ally at peace with Israel and under constant subversive attack by Hamas allies from within, saw its economy – already reeling from a ruined tourist industry over fears of jihadist attacks – sharply plummet further with the sudden loss of revenue from Suez Canal tolls and American and European pressure on it to accept large numbers of Palestinian refugees (and with them Hamas operatives).

HAMAS' OBJECTIVE

Hamas had three primary objectives in launching the October 7th attack, two of them strategic, and the other psychological. Hamas saw the attack as an opportunity to inflict a gruesome blow to the foundation of the Jewish state by challenging its promise that “never

again” would the Jewish people face slaughter without defending themselves. The attack also sought to boost Hamas’ morale, nourishing a political and ideological fantasy of mass sadism in the spilling of Jewish blood.

More practically, Hamas sought first to use the attack to trigger a larger war. Taher El-Nounou, a Hamas media adviser, told the [New York Times](#), “I hope that the state of war with Israel will become permanent on all borders, and that the Arab world will stand with us.” Khalil al-Hayya, another Hamas leader, told the [Times](#) it was necessary to “change the entire equation and not just have a clash.” The [original plan](#) was for Hizballah to enter the war as soon as word came that Dimona and Tel-Aviv had been penetrated, but that never materialized in the first hours. October 7 was, then, a strategic attack.

Secondly, Hamas and the larger global Muslim Brotherhood movement of which it is part, wanted to gain prestige as the group that took out Israel, the “strong horse” of the region. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamadan [said](#), “I believe the greatest achievement of this operation was not just the damage inflicted to the Israeli military and its true image, but also the fact that the operation ended Israel’s ambitions to become a natural entity in the region at the expense of the Palestinian nation.” Indeed, October 7 shattered Israel’s hard-won reputation of invincibility.

Tactically, Hamas planned to invade, and deliberately provoke a counterattack from the IDF. The terror group would then hide within in their expansive [underground tunnel](#) network with Israeli hostages and under the cover of Gazan civilian human shields. The plan hinged on the ability to manipulate the international community, and especially the United States, into restraining Israel from invading and

destroying Hamas.

BATTLEPLAN

Hamas planned for an [extended invasion](#) through Israel up to the West Bank. Maps found on the bodies of terrorists suggest the limit of advance was around Kiryat Gat, 10 km from the West Bank, at which point they would link up with units in the West Bank and slice Israel in half.[\[1\]](#)

Hamas benefited from high quality intelligence, including extremely detailed maps of sensitive Israeli bases, and pictures of officers in command in the South. This intelligence gathering was likely done through assets among the 18,500 Palestinian workers from Gaza allowed to enter Israel daily, a program created in part, under pressure from the United States and [Qatar](#).

WHY HAMAS ATTACKED WHEN IT DID

Other than exploiting the fact that it was one of the holiest of days in the Jewish calendar, there are three reasons Hamas may have chosen October 7th, two of which were primarily political considerations. While documents captured by the IDF indicate planning and preparations for the attack had been underway for several years, Hamas clearly took advantage of the fact that the Biden presidency offered it a window of opportunity. In the past decade, large segments of the Democrat party base had grown increasingly hostile to Israel. From 2009-2017, the Obama-Biden administration expressed [serious animosity](#) toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, [spending taxpayer](#) dollars in a political warfare campaign to oust the Israeli leader in 2016. From 2017-2021, Israel rode high under the friendly Trump administration and became a stabilizing partner with Gulf Arab

states like Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia – all at the expense of Qatar, the chief state sponsor of Hamas.

Since 2021, the Biden-Harris administration has been uniquely hostile to the Israeli government and has renewed policies developed under the Obama administration with many of the Obama officials again in charge. This tension became a rift that spilled out into the public in [March 2023](#). Hamas realized Democrats could be counted on to pressure Biden to restrain Israel, particularly leading up to the 2024 presidential election. Hamas recognized that a change in administration could result in a more overtly pro-Israel policy, as well as the strengthening of Arab opponents of Qatar and Iran, which would hamstring its political strategy.

Second, Israel has been politically divided over proposed judicial reforms. In 2022, the new governing coalition announced plans to reform Israel's judiciary, which set off protests for most of 2023. In particular, the anti-reform campaign made a public effort to suggest a [lack of military support](#) for the government, heavily publicizing claims that IDF reservists would refuse to report for service.^[2] Hizballah-affiliated news outlets, [Iranian media](#), and [Ayatollah Khamenei](#) himself all publicly noted Israel's political discord.

It is also possible the specific date was driven by opportunity. It is possible that Hamas saw 3,500 people gathered at the Supernova Sukkot Gathering music festival and realized it would be a soft target. Ha'aretz [reported](#) that senior Israeli security officials believed Hamas did not plan to attack the festival. None of the maps found on the bodies of the killed terrorists included the festival but did include targets close to the event. The festival location had been changed just two days before the event. Hamas combatants may

have discovered the festival as they entered Israel. The terrorists [killed 364](#) people at the festival and took at least 40 hostages.

IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT

Hamas began to plan [this operation](#) with the Iranians under General Qasam Soleimani about five years ago. In the last two or three years, it accelerated.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has [funded, armed, and trained](#) Hamas since the early 1990s. In 1992, Israel deported hundreds of Hamas leaders to Lebanon, where they received [training](#) from Hizballah and the IRGC. In 2021, the IRGC, Hizballah, and Hamas established a [joint war room](#) during an escalation in fighting. In 2023, Iran had [increased funding](#) for Hamas from \$100 million a year to \$350 million a year.

On October 8, 2023, the *Wall Street Journal* [reported](#) Iranian officials helped plan the attack and gave the green light for it. Senior members of Hamas and Hizballah told the *Journal* that they had worked with the IRGC in Beirut for months. Hundreds of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants, who also participated in the attack, [trained](#) in Tehran with the Quds force in September. Extensive amounts of [Iranian-made weaponry](#) were found in Gaza, according to the [IDF](#).

There is reason to believe that Iranian operatives were on the ground, in Israel, during the attack. Some videos, captured from Hamas GoPro and CCTV footage^[3], show individuals speaking what appears to be Farsi. Other videos show terrorists apparently commanding a great deal of deference but are not seen speaking Arabic. Iranian opposition sources report Iranians operating in Gaza at the time of the attack. According to those reports, the IRGC was concerned

that members killed by Israel would be identified and they put forth a tremendous effort to get their corpses out of Gaza before Israelis overran Hamas positions in November and December.

Additionally, Israel suffered multiple cyber-attacks immediately before, during and after the attack, the scale and extent of which have been underreported.^[4] These attacks are said to have shown a high degree of sophistication. It is reasonable to presume that Iran participated in these attacks, although some may have been beyond Iran's capacity, raising the question of Chinese or Russian involvement.

Timing

The timing of the October 7th attack also aligns with Iran's objectives. Like Hamas, Iran sought to benefit from U.S. political considerations, seeking to launch a blow against the West before President Biden leaves office. Iran had been especially concerned about Israeli-Saudi negotiations and was beginning to feel increasing pressure from growing cooperation between UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. [Reports](#) suggest Israel was even in early stages of discussions with Pakistan on Iran's eastern border.^[5] This resulted in Iran feeling increasingly encircled. Iran may have believed that the humiliation of a successful large scale Hamas attack would tarnish Israel's reputation as a reliable regional ally and paint the Jewish state as a burden on America and Saudi Arabia, making it a "lame donkey," rather than the "strong horse."

Second, the Iranian regime has been known to use conflict as a cover during times when it was making sizeable gains on its nuclear program. According to the [IAEA](#), Iran has enough Uranium enriched to 60% purity for three nuclear weapons.

Last, this attack may have been designed to drain the West's ability to support Ukraine and force the U.S. to divide military aid. Opening a second front vis-à-vis Israel puts increased pressure on Western allies who have been unwilling to go into wartime industrial mobilization and may represent a part of a strategic understanding between Iran and Russia. It would also strain European and American efforts to assist Taiwan in a crisis.

Hizballah

After October 7th, Israel [sent](#) large numbers of troops to the Northern border to deter an attack from Hizballah. Initially, many were concerned Hizballah would launch a simultaneous attack. It is possible that this was part of the plan and Hizballah leadership delayed, waiting to see whether Hamas would be successful. By the time it became clear the Hamas assault had succeeded, Israel had already mobilized nearly 200,000 troops, even before issuing call-ups. Within four days, Israel had [mobilized 300,000](#) troops, and Hizballah had missed its window.

While the Iranian regime was apparently willing to risk the survival of Hamas, it regards Hizballah as integral to its agenda. Hizballah provides the Iranian regime with a method to control the Shiite population of Lebanon, which is a potential source of instability to the regime's ideological control of Shiism. Hizballah is a vital Iranian military and terrorist instrument against Israel and its allies. Thus, Iran needs the war to stay within certain limits, to avoid the total destruction of its Lebanese proxy. Teheran believes this can be accomplished through successfully manipulating the U.S. and France to pressure Israel not to escalate.

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

There is some evidence to suggest that Russia was involved in the attack as well. The Ukrainian Center for National Defense [reported](#) Wagner Group mercenaries, ostensibly independent but in fact under Kremlin control, had trained Hamas fighters in assault tactics and dropping explosives from drones prior to the attack. The Associated Press [reported](#) that many of Hamas' weapons were of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or North Korean origin, although the site of manufacture is no indicator of the actual supplier. According to [Kyril Budanov](#), head of Ukraine's military intelligence, on September 24, 2023, a Russian spacecraft capable of conducting radio-electronic reconnaissance and intercepting satellite signals was moved to Israel's geostationary orbit. On September 19, 2023, a Russian military delegation [visited](#) Iran, reportedly to discuss intelligence sharing. A few days later, a meeting took place in Beirut between Iranian officials, Hamas, and Hizballah.

Putin's Behavior

On October 5, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin [spoke](#) at the Valdai Club – a Kremlin-sponsored annual gathering of Western and non-Western experts. Putin was unusually upbeat and very confident, while virulently anti-Western. He claimed that the West is on the path to historical decline, the current world order is breaking down, and the rules of the current world order must not be followed.

Following the October 7 attack, Putin was silent for three days – a significant departure from the usual Russian diplomatic response to terrorism. On September 11, 2001, Putin had been the [first foreign leader](#) to call President George W. Bush to express condolences. Now, on October 10, 2023, Putin met

with the Iraqi prime minister in Moscow and made a [statement](#) in support of a Palestinian state with a capital in Jerusalem. Putin continued to make these claims over the next several weeks. On October 26th, a Hamas delegation [visited](#) Moscow.

Prior to the attack, Israel had been carefully balancing relations with the Kremlin because of the threats Russia could create for Israel in the North. Israeli military forces had worked to deconflict with Russian forces in Syria to prevent clashes. Netanyahu had been careful not to antagonize Putin personally. For example, during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Israel supported Ukraine with medical supplies and limited humanitarian assistance, but was one of the few Western countries to avoid providing [military support](#). In March 2023, Israel [reportedly](#) approved export licenses for defensive systems.

Israel [stopped warning](#) Russian forces ahead of airstrikes in Syria beginning on October 30, 2023, suggesting a significant change in Israel-Russian relations. An Israeli defeat of Hamas will allow it to turn its attention to Hizballah, which may explain why Putin attempted to stall the launch of the Israeli ground war. It is possible that Russia operated behind the scenes to ensure the United States served as the main agent for restraining Israel from finishing off Hamas in Rafah.

On December 6, 2023, Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia. During his visit to the UAE, he mentioned a Palestinian state. The Kremlin [press release](#) about the Saudi visit days later did not mention a Palestinian state, however, indicating that Putin's Saudi hosts were uninterested in the topic. That may have caused Putin, who had recently built working relations with Riyadh for the first time in history, to stop using the Palestinian state issue as a public talking point.

After that visit, Putin shifted to preventing the destruction of Hamas by injecting a Russian presence into Israel's proximity. Putin first proposed the creation of a Russian "hospital" in Gaza. Such a hospital could serve as a military and intelligence base at Israel's border, with the obvious goal of supporting Hamas. Even with no military or intelligence presence, a Russian hospital presumably would have included some sort of Russian guardianship. In January, Russian fighter jets began to [patrol](#) Syrian airspace above the Golan Heights, and in February, Moscow added a new [Russian observation point](#) in the area.

Russia has a clear interest in preventing the fight from escalating, given what Israel could do to its assets in Syria if a war breaks out with Hizballah. If Israel were to decide to take the war to Iran itself, it presumably would cripple industrial production capacity for the drones and other equipment Russia needs to continue the war in Ukraine, presenting Putin with a major setback on his most vital military endeavor after strategic nuclear modernization. Providing Russia drones in 2022 was the Iranian regime's [first](#) military support for a non-Islamic country since 1979.

CHINESE INVOLVEMENT

In March 2023, Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a "strategic cooperation" [agreement](#). As Putin departed, Xi [said](#), "Right now there are changes – the likes of which we haven't seen for 100 years – and we are the ones driving those changes together." Putin agreed.

[According](#) to China expert Gordon Chang, Xi Jinping "is working to impose the Chinese imperial-era system in which emperors believed they not only had the Mandate of Heaven to rule *tianxia* – "all under Heaven" – but also Heaven actually compelled them

to do so." While China has not been as explicit about its goals as Iran or Russia, it has provided support.

China has provided an economic lifeline for the regime in Iran. Since 2018, China has helped Iran [evade sanctions](#) by purchasing crude oil [at a discount](#) using a "[ghost armada](#)." As a result, Iranian oil shipments to China have more than [tripled](#) over the last three years. Without China's economic support, Iran would not be able to fund and arm its proxies. In 2021, China and Iran [signed](#) a 25-year agreement, the longest agreement Iran has ever signed with another foreign power.

In April 2023, Beijing [facilitated](#) the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Under the Trump administration, the Abraham Accords had brought Arab countries into alignment with Israel, against Iran. The re-establishment of Iran and Saudi diplomatic ties left Israel isolated. Mahmoud Abbas visited Xi Jinping in June 2023, signing a "[strategic partnership](#)."

The IDF [found](#) Chinese weapons in Gaza. The *Telegraph* [reported](#) that the weapons caches included cartridges and rifle sights for American M16s, automatic grenade launchers, and communications devices. South Korean intelligence [stated](#) that Hamas used North Korean-made weapons. But there is no evidence of direct Chinese involvement in the October 7th attack.

On October 8, 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a [statement](#) calling for an end to "the hostilities" and the creation of a Palestinian state. Xi Jinping did not publicly comment on the attack for nearly two weeks. At the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing, Xi [called](#) for a ceasefire and Palestinian state. China [invited](#) Arab and Islamic foreign ministers to Beijing in November.

China has used this conflict as a way to boost its international position, [blaming](#) the U.S. and positioning itself as a “[fair voice](#)” while taking a “[proactive role](#).”^[6] It has partnered diplomatically with Russia on the conflict.

UNITED STATES RESPONSE

The fact that the United States found itself again in “response” to a major asymmetrical operation reveals that Washington remains beset with intelligence collection and analytical blindness, and still has no strategic mindset or ability to pre-empt or, in this case, alert Israel to pre-empt on its own.

Opinion polls show that the American people [overwhelmingly support](#) Israel in its war with Hamas. Initially, the Biden administration appeared supportive. It [sent](#) the U.S. Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 12 to the region. The president promised the U.S. would [provide](#) new ammunition including Iron Dome interceptors. He [sent](#) military aircraft to U.S. bases that cover the Middle East. President Biden even [visited](#) Israel.

Throughout October, it appeared that the U.S. and Israel had converged and traveled along parallel paths, but it was more of an intersection, after which the paths diverged even more.

Biden Administration

The Biden White House, like the Obama administration before it, has been governed by two fundamental *a priori* assumptions about the Middle East. First, Iran is a regional power to which the U.S. must accommodate itself. Second, the establishment of a Palestinian state is essential to regional stability and other political objectives. Both assumptions drive nearly all of the Biden Administration’s policy toward

the Middle East, and both are deeply threatened by Israel’s response to the October 7th attack.

The Biden administration views the Iranian regime as legitimate and an authentic representation of the will of the Iranian people. It is therefore convinced there will be no internal change in Iran because the opposition –which neither Obama nor Biden supported as they did with Muslim Brotherhood-led revolts against Arab governments– will never succeed in its efforts to overthrow the regime. Therefore, the United States needs to come to terms with Iran, which means acknowledging its regional power and strategic ambitions and thus “rebalancing” the region in the mullahs’ favor. This idea also appeals radical leftists within the Democrat base (and within the administration), who reflexively support any nation perceived to oppose American power.

Since the administration views the establishment of a Palestinian state as fundamental to regional stability, and because negotiating a Palestinian state requires Israeli concessions, the administration has actively sought to undermine Israeli security. In 2014, then President Obama stated this explicitly in an [interview](#) with Thomas Friedman: “In some ways, Bibi [Netanyahu] is too strong [and] in some ways Abu Mazen [Abbas] is too weak to bring them together and make the kinds of bold decisions that [Egypt’s president] Sadat or [Israeli prime ministers] Begin or Rabin were willing to make.”

Netanyahu and the forces he represents in Israel, therefore, have been in the Obama-Biden team’s sights for more than a decade.

The establishment’s view of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been based on this single-minded line: Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas has been weakened by Hamas because Israelis

haven't provided enough concessions to validate the concept of negotiation with Israel.

In 2021, a [memo](#) drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs, Hady Amr to Secretary Blinken was leaked to an Emirati newspaper. The leak of an internal, high-level State Department document to a foreign media outlet in a country critical to the Abraham Accords suggests that the document, or at least the leak, was designed to influence the Emirati government.

Given that the memo was written to a superior, it was not necessarily policy. But in July 2022, Biden [laid out](#) his approach to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the first time as President while visiting Mahmoud Abbas in Bethlehem. "Two states along the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, remains the best way to achieve equal measures of security, prosperity, freedom and democracy for the Palestinians as well as Israelis," Biden [said](#). The President's approach was almost entirely aligned with Amr's leaked memo.

Amr has long advocated for a deal with Hamas. In 2019, Amr [advocated](#) for an agreement between Israel, Hamas, the PA and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Amr was the founding director of the Brookings Institute's Center in Doha (Qatar is Brookings' [largest](#) funder). In 2007, he [advocated](#) for engaging the Muslim Brotherhood.

After the October 7th attack, the administration may have seen some utility in allowing the IDF destroy to Hamas in Gaza. Then, Abbas could take over a newly formed Palestinian state with 1967 borders. Initially, the point of intersection between Israel and the Biden administration was the common aim of devastating Hamas, but it soon diverged. Israel's goals focused on destroying Hamas to establish positive security control over the Gaza Strip to prevent its

being used again as territory from which attacks can be launched. Israel no longer would rely on a third force to provide it with security. The administration's goals, in contrast, were to degrade Hamas enough that it no longer threatened Abbas's reign – essentially the IDF was seen as the agent to make Palestine safe for the Palestinian Authority, which in turn, was seen by the Biden administration as the best way for Israel to secure itself. By late November, the gap between Jerusalem and Washington became visible as the Israeli government began to [publicly state](#) that it would not allow the Palestinian Authority to assume control over Gaza.

The Hamas attack demonstrated the error of the Obama-Biden assumption that only an insecure Israel will negotiate. Instead, from October 8th onwards, Israelis understood that had a sovereign Palestinian state invaded on October 7th, there would be no Israel today. If Hamas had been able to simultaneously attack from the West Bank, 80 percent of Israel's population would have fallen. Even left-wing Israeli leaders, like Benny Gantz, have [openly said](#) they no longer support a Palestinian state.

The Biden administration has refused to alter its policy objectives, instead, again borrowing from the [Obama playbook](#), and [attempting](#) to get Prime Minister Netanyahu thrown out of office.

Negotiations

Having abandoned the hope that the Israeli destruction of Hamas would give rise to a Palestinian state under the PA, the Biden administration began to emphasize a focus on negotiating a ceasefire to preserve Hamas. Qatar, perhaps the [foremost state sponsor of Hamas](#) after Iran, is the [primary interlocutor](#) for these negotiations.

In addition to being the forward headquarters of U.S. CENTCOM, Qatar is also home to the political leadership of Hamas and serves as the nexus for Hamas' external relations with the United States and Europe. Qatar funds Hamas and the Islamist organizations that support this terror entity. There is no way for Hamas to proceed without money and support from Qatar. Qatar is the sole Gulf Arab state friendly to the mullahs in Iran.

Egypt [reportedly](#) also sought the position of mediator. The two Arab states have long been at odds with one another over Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood. While Egypt maintains some leverage over Hamas due to its control over the Rafah crossings, America and Israel accepted that they had to deal with Qatar, even while European intelligence officials [warned](#) that Qatar may have had advance notice of the attack.

During the initial negotiations, the White House expected the hostages would be Israel's Achilles' heel, and the best route to a ceasefire, playing off the long tradition of religious rules around ransoming Jews known as *Pidyon Shvuyim*. Israel's first 40-50 years was an aberration of Jewish history which has typically emphasized the ransoming of captives over and above tactical or even strategic considerations. This might explain why the Biden administration never made freedom for the hostages, especially the American citizens among the hostages, a primary issue or goal. The Biden administration cynically believed that the hostages could serve as leverage for a ceasefire, since the only way to get the Israelis to concede was with the hostages, and they turned to the Qataris to try to deliver. The Israelis played along because negotiations did deliver some hostages.

Israelis sought to condition aid to the release of

hostages instead. Around Thanksgiving, the Biden administration began to realize that Israel would not back down on trading a permanent ceasefire for hostages. Pressure built as families of the Israeli hostages began to show up in [demonstrations](#) at crossing points for humanitarian aid, blocking trucks and questioning why aid was being sent in if Israeli children were not coming out. The U.S. began seeking [temporary ceasefires](#) for aid, seeking a mechanism that administration officials hoped would essentially end the war and trick the Israelis into accepting a long-term ceasefire.

When that failed, the Biden administration decoupled the aid question from the hostage issue by unilaterally conducting [airdrops](#) into Gaza, and now through the military [construction of a pier](#) for the delivery of seaborne aid, essentially ending the Israeli imposed blockade of Hamas and circumventing nearby Israeli ports. Now, the only way Israelis can hope for a negotiated settlement of the hostage issue is by granting the U.S. its preferred ceasefire.

The UN Security Council (Resolution 2728) vote, however, on March 25, 2024 decoupled the ceasefire and hostage release by calling on the sides to do both independently of each other – while failing to condemn Hamas altogether – rather than making the ceasefire contingent on a hostage release. The United States thus joined the majority of the Security Council in allowing this resolution to pass, effectively ending the last remaining incentive for Hamas to release hostages.

POLITICAL WARFARE

In Israel

Hostage-taking historically is among the ultimate low-cost, high-impact tactics of asymmetrical warfare against democratic societies. The Palestinian terrorists, like their Iranian regime sponsors, are masters of the art.

With past behavior to guide them, Hamas assumed that the hostages would convince Israelis that they could not invade in a counterattack on Gaza. If Israel invaded, Hamas expected the IDF would lose thousands in the underground war in the tunnels. John Spencer, chair of the urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, [noted](#) how Hamas used the tunnels for a political, not just military advantage. Because all the tunnels are connected to densely populated civilian areas, Hamas set Israel up to be criticized for destroying them, which requires advanced methods and time. In part, the tunnels were an extension of Hamas' [long-held strategy](#) of using civilians as human shields.

Hamas has also used human shields above ground. As the IDF [warned](#) Palestinians to evacuate the northern Gaza strip, Hamas [urged](#) Palestinians to stay put. Israel, familiar with Hamas' tactics, was reluctant to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza.

“Hamas will continue to use the basements in Gaza's hospitals as the command posts of its vast terror tunnel network. It will continue to use mosques as fortified military positions and weapons depots. It will continue to steal fuel and humanitarian assistance from U.N. facilities,” Netanyahu [stated](#).

Hamas [remained](#) well supplied, as it had stockpiled aid. Hamas has long used civilian resources creatively:

concrete and steel to build the terror tunnels and [sewer pipes](#) as rockets. In January 2024, the Shin Bet director [said](#) that 60 to 70 percent of the humanitarian aid entering Gaza either went directly into Hamas' hands or became a Hamas tool for leverage. Aid is distributed by UNRWA.^[7] At least 12 UNRWA employees participated directly in Hamas' slaughter of Israelis, and an [estimated](#) 10% of UNRWA staff have ties to Hamas.

Hamas' strategy has been effective. To encourage Gazans to move south in order to allow the IDF to clear Hamas out of the north without harming civilians, Israel cut off Hamas' power plant on October 11. Israel provided Gaza with [free electricity](#) for years. Israel energy embargo of Gaza met with [international condemnation](#). Under pressure from the [Biden administration](#), Israel restored power, and Hamas won the opinion battle.

Hamas created the humanitarian crisis by pressuring civilians to remain in Gaza, while hoarding humanitarian supplies. Egypt, beset with its own socioeconomic troubles, [refused](#) to open the crossing at Rafah. Rather than pressure Hamas, which started the war with atrocities against Israelis only to withhold international aid from Palestinian civilians, the Biden administration has placed continued pressure on Israel.

Despite this, however, a [plurality of Israelis](#) prioritize destroying, not merely defeating, Hamas. Israelis understand that if they do not deliver a strategic victory, their state is no longer viable. Therefore, total victory in Israel is essential – total defeat and destruction of Hamas.

In the United States

As militant activism in cities and universities throughout the Western world has shown since October 7, Hamas has become ensconced in anti-Western philosophy, ideology, and psyche. It is here that the terrorist group's asymmetric strengths appear clearly. Through an entrenched political action and communications network, Hamas has been able to influence the policies of the United States and other countries far beyond what it could have done as a mere terrorist group. The roots of this influence go back decades. Modern-day Palestine, for lack of a better word, plays a pervasive role in modern leftist ideology. The radical Left supports the destruction of Western civilization. Israel is a living documentation of everything that is biblical, and therefore the foundation of the West and the ethics on which American civilization was built. The concept of Palestinian statehood was [developed by the Soviet Union](#) as part of its global [terrorist infrastructure](#). New Left third-world revolutionary movements have long had a symbiotic relationship with Hamas and radical Arab networks in the United States for their own political purposes, irrespective of their differing ideologies and desired end-states.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the radical left had very little on which to grasp. Despite having long denied any influence from the USSR, the Left feared that, without a Soviet regime, the global Marxist movement would not survive. The Palestinian issue provided the radical left a life raft in a period where everything else was sinking. In 1993, Israel invited the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was part of the Soviets' third-world non-aligned movement terrorist strategy, into the [Oslo Accords](#). Legitimizing the PLO meant questioning the legitimacy of 1948 and Israeli statehood.

Prior to October 7th, there was evidence the American radical left was gearing up for a major protest campaign, intending to target the Biden administration over its perceived support for Ukraine and demanding an immediate ceasefire. When the October 7th attack occurred the organizers immediately shifted gears and called for a ceasefire, even before the Israeli counterattack had begun. On October 7th and 8th, demonstrations had already begun, a synchronized feat that could have been stood up in mere hours.

Current radical left organizing theory calls this a “moment of the whirlwind” where the objective is to deploy a pre-prepared campaign narrative when an appropriate opportunity [arises](#) to create a sea-change in policy.

This explains how organizers were able to launch multiple protest actions nationwide on a moment's notice, including the blocking of [highways](#), [rail](#), [ports](#), [airports](#) and airlines, and shutting down public events like community [Christmas tree lightings](#). The emphasis on public disruption is a hallmark of this kind of campaign. While Pro-Palestinian and Islamist organizations, including American Muslims for Palestine, Students for Justice in Palestine and the Palestinian Youth Movement, have played significant roles in organizing events, the primary drivers have been left-wing organizers that have nothing to do with ethnicity or religion. It builds on the Old Left and labor movement's concept of “solidarity” with other causes that share a common target or goal. One of the [major D.C. protests](#) was led by the Democratic Socialists of America, a large radical left party which counts among its members multiple local and state elected officials, as well as several members of Congress.[\[8\]](#)

All protest actions have been directed at the Biden administration, including attempting to [block Air](#)

[Force One](#), and seeking to interrupt the President's travel to the Capitol to deliver [the State of the Union](#) address. One of the key players is presidential protest candidate Cornell West who is running to Biden's left. In 2020, the far left did not run a protest candidate but coalesced around Biden. The 2024 campaign saw [a push in Michigan](#) to encourage Muslims not vote for Biden in the Democratic primary, which was noticed by none other than Hizballah's Hassan Nasrallah.

As with the Old Left, today's solidarity movement penetrates and infiltrates American institutions, including the federal government. Hamas or "Palestine" solidarity activity found organizers inside the [White House](#), [Congressional offices](#), within the [State Department](#), and even in the intelligence community. Personnel from as many as [22 federal agencies](#), including the Department of Homeland Security, engaged in solidarity protests. A military intelligence airman stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland, went so far as to [burn himself alive in protest](#) at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.

Because traditionally the Democrat party has relied on radical left organizers for manpower and assistance during political campaigns, these organizers are sometimes rewarded with staff positions in the administration. Politicians prize these armies of campaign volunteers, especially the well-organized and motivated professionals with experience to mobilize people to deliver votes. This is how the Hamas networks across the U.S. were mainstreamed with senior political figures, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, who delivered a speech critical of Israel [that outraged](#) many traditional pro-Israel [Democrats](#). Such politicians avert their eyes from the fact that grassroots supporters in swing states like Michigan are indeed part of a Hamas support structure. When those grassroots organizers cheer a

major terrorist offensive, it puts delicate coalitions at risk. In this way radical organizations can manipulate the policy platforms of their larger coalition partners.

Additionally, many staffers of such organizations are recruited from among elite colleges and universities, where radical left positions, especially on Israel/Palestine have become de rigueur. In some cases, well known radical Palestinian activists, including Maher Bitar and Hady Amr have been brought in the Biden administration. Bitar, who serves as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs, is a former high-level Boycott Divestment and Sanctions ([BDS](#)) [activist](#) and served as a SJP leader. Other Biden administration officials, like U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Director Samantha Power, have no ethnic or cultural ties to the Palestinian cause but are enthusiastic allies in the name of solidarity for a cause they see as greater than the United States.

Paradoxically, it's unlikely the Biden administration minds the pressure it receives from its left-wing base, because this provides cover for dealing with Israelis. For example, Samantha Power once [advocated](#) for a "mammoth protection force" to protect Palestinians from Israelis. In January, Power was [challenged](#) by former and current USAID staffers. Power [then pressured](#) Netanyahu. So, while it appears very confrontational, and the far-left is seeking to undermine Biden electorally, the protests have the effect of allowing the Biden administration to adopt a more hardline and ultimately anti-Israel position than it would have otherwise, without facing significant public backlash.

Hamas is attentive to what the Biden administration says, and then uses that as its core strategy. For example, the U.S. has been concerned about civilian

casualties. The Gaza Health Ministry, which is controlled by Hamas, claimed implausibly large numbers of civilian deaths from Israeli counterattack on Hamas targets. The Biden administration then [echoed](#) the false Hamas claims. While it should be clear that terrorist organizations lie, Abraham Wyner, a professor of statistics at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, provided a [statistical analysis](#) demonstrating why the numbers are literally unbelievable. Hamas has learned how to tap into key information and policy structures to define what's important based on the demands of domestic actors.

All of this is asymmetrical warfare at its finest. Through simple makeup, torn clothes, red paint, and a lot of wailing for social media, Hamas can turn a significant segment of the American population away from Israel to the benefit of the terrorist group. Campaign volunteers easily influenced and mobilized by Hamas front organizations turn that into political pressure and potentially votes.

TAKEAWAYS

Intelligence Failure

The October 7th attack was a massive failure for Israeli intelligence. Israeli intelligence was aware of the battle plan [more than a year](#) in advance but dismissed it. Several [early warning signs](#) became obvious as Hamas prepared its offensive. For several months, soldiers from Israel's border surveillance forces, known as the tatzpitanivot, [observed](#) Hamas fighters training and sending drones up around the fence. The night before the attack, there were additional signs of Hamas activity but the Shin Bet and IDF [chose not](#) to place military forces on high alert. None of this ever reached the political echelon; Prime Minister Netanyahu and his aides were not informed of anything until the war

broke out at 6:30 a.m.[\[9\]](#)

Since Oslo, Israel has viewed the Palestinian issue as a current security question – something police and limited military forces could address. The passive defensive strategy was to deter Palestinians from violence, while incentivizing them as much as possible through work permits in Israeli communities and homes. Without large conventional ground forces, the Palestinians were not viewed as an existential threat to the country. Indeed, leaked documents suggest just how [deeply dismissive](#) the IDF intelligence and senior echelon had been of the rudimentary competence of Hamas altogether. Any risk could be handled by the large physical walls, and the “roof” represented by the Iron Dome. This institutional Israeli outlook represented an obsolete worldview that all but dismissed the economy of Hamas' asymmetric warfare. The IDF relied on a [\\$1 billion](#) security barrier and believed its technical surveillance was so sophisticated that it would be [aware of everything](#) Hamas did. Confident in this posture, the IDF stopped monitoring Hamas communications over a year ago, seeing it as a “[waste of effort](#).” Hamas was able to defeat these high-tech systems with intelligence, informants, cheap weapons, and creativity.

Meanwhile, the biggest military threat looming was –in traditional military terms – the Iranian nuclear program. Israel planned to deal with Iran through the Air Force and intelligence organizations, like the Mossad. Israeli defensive structure was organized around those assumptions, and money and focus poured into those organizations. In May 2021, an IDF intelligence assessment [reportedly](#) concluded that Hamas would not attack for fear of an Israeli response. Hamas' strategy had been to deceive Israel into believing the Palestinian militants lacked the will to fight, a strategic deception of the kind learned

by decades of Soviet tutelage among the scions of international terror.

U.S. intelligence also failed. On October 7th, CIA Director Bill Burns [was scheduled](#) to speak at an intelligence conference in Georgia. Had the CIA been concerned about an incoming attack, it is highly unlikely the director would have scheduled a public event. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan wrote an [article](#) for *Foreign Affairs* that went to press on October 2, 2023 claiming the Middle East was calmer than it had been in years, ignoring a reality—well known to opponents like Iran, Qatar, and their jihadist allies—that the United States had won the battles but lost the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the attack just five days later, *Foreign Affairs*, that fancies itself as the most prestigious forum on international affairs, [quietly edited](#) the online version of the article.

Ultimately, Israel’s inaction in the face of the looming threat from Hamas appears to indicate that the Jewish state followed, or at least paralleled, the American lead – bureaucratization of intelligence and defense structures, overall complacency and minimized seriousness about real and present dangers, and a supreme confidence in the solidity of deterrence.

Industrial Capacity

Israel lacked the ammunition to respond, let alone confront, Hamas. This was no secret. In the immediate days after the attack, the U.S. flew in [over 200 cargo planes](#) of ammunition. This is another catastrophic failure due to the IDF’s complacency and self-deception that there would not be another ground war. Ammunition became leverage for the Biden administration, which soon sought to restrain the Israelis from moving forward on the counterattack. In January, administration officials [leaked](#) that they were considering slowing or pausing arms shipments to

convince Netanyahu to back off his pledge to destroy Hamas. In March 2024, an Israeli official [told](#) ABC News that American military shipments had become “very slow.”

The ammunition shortage was exacerbated by the U.S. [draining](#) a jointly-run Israeli-U.S. stockpile in the Negev desert. During the 1973 war, the U.S. had to airlift supplies to Israel. As a result, CENTCOM created the Negev stockpile in part to calm Israeli fears of another 1973 scenario. Either country, with the approval of the other, could draw from this stockpile in a regional emergency. That stockpile was [largely emptied](#) however, especially of critical ammunition, in 2022, to divert arms to Ukraine for its defense against Russian invaders. IDF strategic planning factored in the stockpile. When the United States started emptying the stockpile for Ukraine, Israel began to [look elsewhere](#). Even before the attack, Israel had begun to [increase domestic production](#) of ammunition. For example, Israel [ordered](#) a new production line of 155mm shells in August 2023. Production significantly accelerated, and it appears that Israel now has enough that it will not need resupply if war starts with Hizballah.

Israel is unlikely to forget how the Biden administration derailed its war strategy with the delay of weapons and can be expected to shift to self-sufficient production as it becomes more able.

For decades, the national security establishment conventional wisdom has held, despite the strategic losses of Iraq and Afghanistan in the age of the “forever wars,” that modern wars will be short and run by professional trained armies. [Ukraine](#) and [Israel](#) have mobilized hundreds of thousands of soldiers. It appears that modern wars may require armies of hundreds of thousands if not millions of people.

Military industrial capacity has been so reduced that Russia is [already producing](#) two and half times more artillery ammunition than the U.S. and Europe combined.

While [defense spending](#) in the EU has risen by a reported 20 percent over the last ten years – well below the level of inflation – Russia has increased its defense budget by 300 percent and China by 600 percent. In terms of conflicts with peer rivals, the West still has its asymmetry backwards.

Atrophied Alliance Structure

Since World War II, the U.S. national security establishment has made “stability” the overriding goal. The United States has encouraged its allies to be weak and dependent on the U.S. for war supply and intelligence. The State Department cannot influence bad actors, so instead it tries to appease or incentivize them while controlling allies with threats or dependency. It makes the allies fundamentally unable to fend for themselves, damages our flexibility and thins our resources, and weakens the alliance overall.

To confront a global conflict, the Western alliance structure needs to be built on strength, which means encouraging allies to be more self-reliant and capable. In the long run, if allies compromise on their convictions at the behest of the State Department, they lose the American’s respect and build permanent resentments against the United States. Americans, in turn, scorn and resent dependent and incapable allies who lack a fighting spirit. Dependency is no guarantee for American support. Allies will get more support by defending their convictions and empowering themselves as sovereign countries.

CONCLUSION

For the last 30 years, the West generally has believed great power competition was over, and conflicts would be arbitrated by international institutions or waged in grand coalitions deploying vast sums of national wealth, prestige and manpower against weak states and non-state actors. There was a dominant belief that violent conflict could be resolved simply through surgical strikes against perceived “rogue states” who objected to the dominate international order. This attitude ignored geopolitical realities, history, culture, or any other factor for the sake of installing democratic political processes and institutions without regard to viability or outcome, which in turn undermined non-Western or “less-than-perfect” allies in favor of corrupt, unrepresentative, or overtly anti-Western nominal “democracies”.

The West, and above all the United States, continues to demonstrate that it has not learned from history and its own mistakes. It instead continues to rely upon a defense model based on producing unsustainably expensive weapons systems without any attention to a grand strategy to guide their development, deployment, or even use. It takes a condescending view toward more resourceful adversaries, dismissed as primitives, who outwit and outmaneuver with inexpensive strategies, tactics, and tools. These adversaries stymie or even defeat us time and time again through their asymmetric approach, with themselves successively playing the role of David to our Goliath, and winning. The Israel-Hamas conflict shows, as did Afghanistan before it, that our opponents realize they win merely by surviving, and allowing the West to drive itself into strategic retreat.

Enemies are empowered to act in this way because the West fails to be mindful and resourceful in its own

approach, utilizing a variety of non-tangible assets against *foreign* threats large and small.

An academic theory of International Relations, built on antiquated assumptions developed by a massive military and intelligence bureaucracy, has formed the basis of national security professionals' understanding of the world while the fundamentals of statecraft – distinguishing friends from enemies, understanding adversaries' goals and their abilities to achieve them – have been forgotten. The United States has forgotten them. Most NATO allies have forgotten. Israel forgot them until its brutal awakening on October 7. Even then, Israel squandered its once-formidable psychological advantage of perceived invincibility. It has failed to achieve or maintain a psychological advantage against its enemies. And it is rapidly losing influence among friends and allies.

Israel's present situation is a warning. Those who helped facilitate Hamas' attack have a shared goal – the destruction of the West – and they are actively mobilizing in service of that goal.

In both wars against Israel and Ukraine, conflict is driven not by grievance but because of fundamental contempt. Hamas' contempt for the West and Israel is evident in its [founding charter](#). Russia seeks total “[de-Nazification](#)” of Ukraine – which means the [destruction of Ukraine](#) as a country. Kremlin propaganda discusses this war in global terms – a cultural and civilizational battle between the West and the non-West.

But Western elites too have expressed contempt, both for the people they are supposed to serve, and for the principles foundational to Western civilization. Domestic political polarization and failed “forever wars” have made Americans wary of involvement in foreign conflicts, especially when led by leaders who

appear more enamored of American adversaries than their own constituents. Enemies have effectively exploited existing divisions. The subversion of institutions and attacks on civilizational strength have allowed a small and relatively weak actor like Hamas to have catastrophic impact.

The credit built by U.S. power and prestige gained over 200 years of sacrifice has been cashed in by this generation of leaders at an unsustainable rate. Current U.S. leadership seems unaware that the power to which they were entrusted is eroding. The world is entering the acute phase of the next great power conflict, and like the last one, the West enters it complacent and asleep. Violent conflict is increasingly likely because the West is not mobilizing to meet the upcoming existential challenge intellectually, morally, politically, financially, militarily, and industrially.

Especially morally. The corrupting effect of the military-industrial complex about which President Eisenhower famously warned has produced the world's best weapons and worst strategists and leaders.

Western leaders are so fearful of Iranian escalation they ignore even attacks on U.S. citizens and troops, while refusing to support young Iranians who are genuine opponents of the Ayatollah's regime and whom these Islamists fear more than any weapon system. The West, and especially the United States, continues to permit the double-dealing and ultimately terror-sponsoring regime of Qatar to serve as the linchpin to our entire Middle East presence, while it corrupts American institutions and leaders with an outsized influence campaign. Western leaders can't envision a Russia beyond Putin or a world without the Chinese Communist Party.

Being unable to envision its preferred end-state, it cannot conceive of a grand strategy to secure its own

interests.

The U.S. and most of its allies have chosen to fail to internalize the value of economical, less violent or even nonviolent asymmetric worldviews, mindsets, and strategies against rising threats. That failure will continue to cede incremental victories to America's most ruthless enemies while we fall further into strategic retreat.

This strategic defeat, and the consequences of it, are reversible. However, this will require that U.S. and Western leaders first admit their failures and then dedicate themselves to investing the kind of innovative and disciplined thought and action exhibited by our forefathers during the revolutionary war.

America's Founders fought, and won, an asymmetric war against a massive and determined enemy. Because they placed an immense focus on being intellectually, politically, financially, militarily, and – especially – morally fit and capable, they succeeded. The industrial might of our nation followed and it too can be regained, but that too will take a significant investment and time.

Endnotes

[1] Limit of advance is a military term denoting the phase line beyond which an attacking unit is instructed not proceed further.

[2] Real IDF reporting numbers make clear this threat never materialized and the total number of such “Refuseniks” were greatly overstated.

[3] According to Israeli sources.

[4] According to Israeli sources.

[5] On October 10, 2023, Senator Mushahid Hussain, the defense committee chair of the upper house of the Pakistani parliament, [told](#) VOA “The first lesson of the Gaza war is that the so-called recognition of Israel debate or discussion in Pakistan has been buried, and rightly so.”

[6] The Global Times is owned by the Chinese Communist Party and produces English language propaganda.

[7] Palestinians are the only refugees who have their own UN agency, and are [defined differently](#) from all other refugees that fall under UNHCR.

[8] Rashida Tlaib, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Cori Bush, and Jamaal Bowman are all [members of the DSA](#). As one example of new-left support for Palestinian causes, Bowman attended a pro-Palestine rally in November 2023 where he [claimed](#) reports of Hamas rapes were “propaganda.”

[9] Netanyahu has publicly stated he was not informed of any intelligence, but received so much back lash for doing so that he [apologized](#) for bringing it up in the midst of a conflict. Israeli sources confirm however that elected officials were not told about the battleplan or the warning signs.



This report was produced by the Center for Security Policy, a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)(3) institution focusing on national security policy issues.

It was made possible by generous contributions from the Center for Security Policy's supporters. All views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Security Policy. All rights reserved