AND NOW, MOSCOW’S RIPOSTE TO THE BUSH DISARMAMENT PLAN: BETTER LOOK THIS ‘GIFT HORSE’ IN THE MOUTH

(Washington, D.C.): On 5 October,
Mikhail Gorbachev responded to President
Bush’s dramatic arms reduction
announcement of the week before. Like the
American initiative, the steps announced
by Moscow center are a mixed bag. (See
the Center for Security Policy’s Decision
Brief Bush’s Nuclear
Disarmament Initiatives: Too Clever By
Half.?, href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=91-D_102″>No. 91-D 102, 28
September 1991).

Some of the Soviet weapons reduction
initiatives appear to be helpful,
although their verification may be
problematic. Some are ambiguous and
therefore difficult to evaluate. Some are
simply vintage Soviet gambits intended to
undermine the effectiveness of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. Before the United
States rushes to embrace the Gorbachev
proposals, Washington would do well to
consider them with care and to reject
swiftly and categorically those
inconsistent with long-term U.S. security
interests.

Seemingly Positive Aspects

Gorbachev’s announcement that all
land-based tactical nuclear weapons
(i.e., artillery shells and warheads for
short-range missiles and mines) would be
destroyed is a welcome development. To
the extent that such small, easily
transported and concealed weapons might
be especially susceptible to
misappropriation or misuse, their
destruction is highly desirable.

Similarly, his pledge to withdraw all
tactical nuclear weapons from ships,
submarines and ground-based naval
aviation and the destruction of some of
them is a positive step. These systems
pose a significant threat to U.S. naval
assets — especially carrier battle
groups. The withdrawal and partial
elimination of nuclear warheads for
air-defense missile systems would also
serve to reduce the proliferation of
large quantities of relatively small
nuclear weapons around the former Soviet
Union.

Unfortunately, none of these
measures can be verified with confidence.
Even in the era of post-coup glasnost,
sophisticated satellite collection
devices and limited on-site inspections,
the inherent characteristics of such
weapons are such that even large numbers
of them can retained covertly with little
fear of detection.

Other steps announced by Gorbachev are
more readily verified but of negligible
strategic significance. For example,
given the relatively small size and
typically low level of readiness of the
Soviet bomber force, a commitment to take
such bombers off operational duty and to
store associated weaponry is not a
militarily momentous step. It certainly
does not have an effect on the USSR’s
offensive potential comparable to that
experienced by U.S. forces when President
Bush “stood-down” the American
bomber force.

By the same token, confining Soviet
rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic
missiles to garrison would make them more
vulnerable to an utterly implausible
first-strike by the United States. It
would not, however, degrade their ability
to conduct such an attack on this
country. (Interestingly, while Gorbachev
appeared to include road-mobile ICBMs in
his commitment not to upgrade the Soviet
mobile missile force, these SS-25
missiles evidently would not be confined
to their “permanent bases.”)

Important Ambiguities

The most important ambiguity inherent
in the Gorbachev proposals is whether
he has the authority to
commit to such changes in the nuclear
forces of the former USSR and whether
he can make them stick. He
averred that “Boris Yeltsin and
leaders of other republics share [his]
opinion” of the need to continue
progress toward nuclear disarmament. It
is unclear, however, whether all of the
affected republics have actually approved
the Gorbachev initiative. If they
have not, Gorbachev may once again have
promised more than he is able to deliver.

Even if the Gorbachev plan has
been fully coordinated with the
republics, other questions arise. For
example, are the six ballistic missile
submarines (three already “removed
from operational duty” and three
more to follow shortly) and 503 ICBMs
being withdrawn from service systems
whose reductions were already mandated by
existing arms control commitments or by
START? The value of these reductions —
and even that of the additional 1,000
warhead reduction beyond START levels
that Gorbachev has pledged to make —
could be substantially diminished
depending upon the age and character of
the weapons involved.

If Gorbachev’s statement that he is
“prepared to consider proposals from
the United States…on non-nuclear
anti-missile defense systems” proves
to be a departure from past Soviet
dissembling and stonewalling on strategic
defenses, it could helpfully clear the
way for the “concrete steps”
toward deployment of such defenses called
for by President Bush. It should be
remembered, however, that the Soviets
have in the past sounded more forthcoming
on strategic defenses when faced with
apparent U.S. determination to proceed
with their deployment. The U.S.
Senate’s approval in principle of a
limited deployment plan last July,
combined with the President’s recent
statement endorsing such an action, could
have induced Moscow center once more to
adopt a posture of feigned interest,
masking an unaltered determination to
thwart American moves needed to provide
an effective national defense.

Pernicious Steps

In laying out his response, Gorbachev
has reiterated a central purpose
diametrically opposed to
President Bush’s declared policy: He
professes a determination to
bring about a nuclear-free world. Mr.
Bush, by contrast, has properly
underscored the importance of preserving
an effective American nuclear deterrent
for the foreseeable future.

Soviet initiatives aimed at
terminating nuclear testing, prohibiting
fissile materials production and a
binding renunciation of defensive
first-use of nuclear weapons are, simply
put, incompatible with present and
prospective U.S. security interests. They
should, accordingly, be rejected out of
hand. The longer the Bush Administration
refrains from doing so, the more it
invites intense pressure from
congressional and other quarters to
accede to these demands.

A measure that would prohibit
deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched
cruise missiles would also be contrary to
this country’s national interests.
Indeed, it was a mistake for President
Bush to include such assets among those
that were to be removed from ships and
submarines under “ordinary
circumstances.” As the probability
grows that the United States will be
faced with the need to deter nuclear
(and/or chemical and biological)
aggression by third parties, it is vital
that the credible capability for
selective and appropriate nuclear
responses be preserved.

Finally, if the Gorbachev and Bush
initiatives signal anything, it is that
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty has
been overtaken by events. Clearly,
changes inside the former Soviet Union
and the positions seemingly adopted by
its leadership are substantially more
promising than are the terms incorporated
in START at the insistence of discredited
individuals like former Chief of the
Soviet General Staff Mikhail Moiseyev and
former Foreign Minister Alexsandr
Bessmertnykh.

Far from plunging ahead with
ratification of START — as both
President Bush and Gorbachev have
suggested — to say nothing of embarking
on new negotiations with Moscow center on
still more radical agreements, these
developments argue for the United States
to adopt a different tack: It
should now be seeking negotiations with
the individual independence-bound
Soviet republics that would produce the
sort of transparency and systemic
disarmament steps so clearly in both
their interest and that of the United
States. In particular,
Washington should be very cautious about
permitting its enthusiasm for Gorbachev’s
latest arms control initiatives to be
parlayed into support for the Soviet
central authorities and their continued
hold on power.