AT LAST, CONGRESS GETS READ-IN ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS: NOW WILL THE PUBLIC BE TOLD ABOUT THEIR COSTS TO THE U.S.?

(Washington, D.C.): Tomorrow at 2:00 p.m. members of the
House International Relations Committee will finally be briefed
by senior Clinton Administration officials about the status —
and implications — of ongoing negotiations between Israel and
Syria. The briefers will be the Administration’s point-men on
these talks: Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff,
Special Middle East Envoy Dennis Ross and General
Daniel Christman, the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

Such “consultations,” while welcome, are long
overdue and wholly inadequate. To the extent that these
negotiations will oblige the United States to assume significant
new, costly and possibly ominous responsibilities, the American
people should be consulted as well. At the very least, they
must be informed before formal commitments are undertaken,
particularly if those commitments could result in the loss of
American lives and/or material changes in the vital U.S.-Israeli
relationship.

Hearings on this issue have been publicly promised for nearly
a year by the Committee’s chairman, Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY).
With the Administration now acknowledging (at least implicitly)
that it is no longer “premature” to discuss the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations, congressional hearings must be held at
once.

How Does the Administration Respond?

There are ample grounds for concern about the emerging peace
agreement between Israel and Syria. Especially troublesome is the
notion that American personnel will be deployed on the Golan
Heights in support of this accord. The dangers of such a
deployment were the subject of a major study authored last fall
by eleven former senior military and civilian U.S. government
officials — including four former members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff — under the sponsorship of the Center for Security Policy.
Entitled U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights: An Assessment of
the Benefits and Costs, this
study arrived at (among others) the following conclusions,
none of which has to date been directly addressed let alone
been analytically rebutted by the Administration:

• A Minimal Contribution to the Parties’ Early Warning
  Requirements: U.S. troops on the Golan are not
  required — and would, in any event, not be relied upon
  — to provide the parties’ with military intelligence and
  early warning of military activity.
• The Dubious Role of U.S. Forces in Treaty Compliance: There
  is no need for the United States to undertake and
  expensive, risky and open-ended commitment of troops to
  carry out the relatively minor (and not inherently
  military) task of serving occasionally as a third-party
  referee on compliance issues. Furthermore, as a general
  proposition, it is not sensible for the United States to
  make a commitment of indefinite duration to put American
  troops on the Golan for purely symbolic purposes, when
  the necessary symbolism can (and undoubtedly will) be
  supplied amply be other means. Given the dangers of
  terrorism in the region, and the political instabilities
  and risks of war, it would be very irresponsible to
  deploy those troops as symbols.
• Real Dangers to U.S. Troops: Because of the Golan’s
  compact area and terrain, U.S. troops would be operating
  close to a substantial and potentially hostile
  population. They would be within range of Hezballah and
  other terrorist organizations based in south Lebanon.
  Placing U.S. forces in proximity to Syrian population
  centers and to the south Lebanon base areas of various
  terrorist organizations would enable hostile forces to
  attack those forces without Syria having to take
  responsibility. When U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Rich Higgins
  serving in a U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon, was
  killed in 1988 by terrorists there, the U.S. was unable
  to hold anyone in particular responsible — a point not
  lost on those who might threaten U.S. personnel deployed
  to the region in the future.
• Damage to U.S. Public Support of Israel: If U.S.
  forces on the Golan suffer casualties — from terrorism,
  for example — there will be U.S. public pressure to end
  the Golan mission. Israel’s image as a self-reliant ally
  would also be tarnished. Israeli anxieties about the
  reliability of the U.S. as a “peacekeeper” on
  the Golan would intensify, with good reason. American
  credibility would clearly be at stake.
• Misleading Comparisons Between the Sinai and the Golan
  Heights: It has been suggested that U.S. peacekeeping
  forces on the Golan mission would experience no more
  difficulties than the American contingent in the
  Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) has in the Sinai.
  However, risks of a Golan deployment are significantly
  greater than those attending the Sinai mission. The Sinai
  is approximately 120 miles wide and has no appreciable
  population. The much narrower Golan Heights could, by
  contrast, be rapidly remilitarized by Syrian forces. In
  any event, the risks of terrorism abound on the Golan
  Heights but are virtually nonexistent in the Sinai. In
  addition, the Golan abuts south Lebanon, a major base for
  terrorist groups hostile to the United States, with no
  analogous threat in the Sinai. And, finally, the
  political relationship between Israel and Egypt is of a
  much different nature from what exists now — or can be
  foreseen to exist — between Israel and Syria.
• Conclusion: The net effect of stationing U.S.
  troops on the Golan Heights could be negative for
  Israel’s security and regional stability. The
  consequences could, moreover, include the loss of U.S.
  lives and, possibly, a credibility-damaging retreat of
  the U.S. forces under terrorist fire. In any event, such
  a deployment would increase the danger of direct U.S.
  involvement in a future Middle East war and undermine
  Israel’s standing with the U.S. public as a self-reliant
  ally.

Concerns Affirmed by Distinguished American and Israeli
Generals

These conclusions were broadly confirmed in an important
panel discussion held yesterday at the National Press Club in
Washington under the sponsorship of the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs (JINSA). It featured eight American and
Israeli high-ranking retired officers with a broad range of
experience bearing on Syrian military capabilities, combat and
peacekeeping operations and the U.S.-Israeli strategic
partnership. A transcript of this proceeding should be required
reading for both legislators and executive branch officials prior
to completion of any agreement between Israel and Syria.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy encourages other relevant
committees of the Congress to join the International Relations
Committee in formal inquiries into the emerging Israeli-Syrian
deal and its implications for the United States. The latter
include not only those associated with a troop deployment on the
Golan but also the possibility that U.S. tax-dollars will be
pledged to Syria (either directly or through multilateral
sources). Such a step would likely require the Administration to
remove Syria from the lists of terrorist-sponsoring and
drug-trafficking nations, even though it continues to engage
in both of these heinous activities.

The words of the authors of the Center’s blue-ribbon study
are as true today as when they were first published last October:

“If the subject is debated now and Congress and the
executive branch decide to oppose a deployment of U.S. troops
on the Golan, Israel and Syria could take this into account
in their negotiations and devise alternative security
arrangements accordingly. Such a decision would be far less
disruptive if made now than if deferred until after a
Syrian-Israeli deal is concluded.”