Clinton Legacy Watch # 14: A Doctrine for Denuclearization

(Washington, D.C.): It is fitting, if ironic, that the Washington Post chose Sunday, 7 December
as the day to give enormous prominence to the handiwork of nuclear disinventors, within and
outside the Clinton Administration. After all, if the radical disarmament schemes given such
favorable treatment by the Post on Pearl Harbor Day come to fruition, it is a distinct possibility
that the homeland of the United States will once again be subjected to foreign attack.

Clinton Embraces Minimal Deterrence

These schemes are the subject of the journalistic equivalent of a “perfecta” by the Post‘s arms-controller-in-residence, R. Jeffrey Smith. In an above-the-fold article on the front-page, Smith
revealed the contents of what is supposed to be one of the most closely held documents in the
entire U.S. government — a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) setting forth U.S. doctrine for
the use of nuclear arms. What is most notable about this new doctrine is that it explicitly
abandons a strategy of robust nuclear deterrence that has formally underpinned American
policy since the beginning of the Reagan Administration.

At its root, President Reagan’s 1981 doctrine recognized that in order credibly to disabuse a
nation like the Soviet Union of the notion that it could benefit from a pre-emptive attack against
the United States, America had to have an array of nuclear forces and a strategic command-and-control system of sufficient redundancy and survivability to guarantee that unacceptable
retaliation would occur.

As first revealed by the Post, Mr. Clinton has now ordered “the military [to] aim its nuclear
forces to deter the use of nuclear arms against U.S. forces or allies simply by threatening a
devastating response, and drop any planning for a long nuclear war.” (Emphasis added.)
Superficially, this revision appears to leave much unchanged. For example, Smith cites National
Security Council staff member Robert Bell⁽¹⁾ as saying “the United States will continue to rely on
nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the ‘indefinite future,’ and that it will
retain a triad of nuclear forces consisting of bombers, land-based missiles and submarine-based
missiles.” The implication is that the U.S. would retain indefinitely at least the levels of forces
contemplated for START III (i.e., 2,000-2,500 accountable nuclear warheads by 2007).

In practice, however, President Clinton’s new doctrine is of a piece with — and lends
legitimacy to — other steps now underway that will leave the United States with, at best, a
minimal nuclear deterrent and, in all likelihood, ultimately no credible nuclear arsenal at
all.

Consider, for example, how this doctrine jives with other elements of the Clinton denuclearization
agenda about which the Center has raised an alarm in recent months:

• The United States no longer produces nuclear weapons. In fact, its nuclear weapons
  production complex is almost entirely shut down. The U.S. no longer has a domestic supply of
  tritium — a rapidly decaying radioactive gas without which no modern American nuclear
  weapon will operate. The trained personnel responsible for the development, testing and
  reliability of the stockpile have been hemorrhaging from its national laboratories. The Nation
  has not conducted a nuclear test in over five years and has pledged never to do so again. And
  there is no program to design or procure replacements for the United States’ aging missiles,
  long-range bombers and strategic submarines.

By adopting a doctrine that sets the stage for minimal, if any, U.S. nuclear forces over
the long-term, the Clinton Administration evidently believes it can remain indifferent to
the reality that these factors will inevitably make it impossible to maintain a viable
American deterrent.

• As one of its first acts, the Clinton Administration dismantled programs associated with
  U.S. efforts to ensure the survival of constitutional, representative government in the
  event Washington is attacked with a weapon of mass destruction. Few things could do
  more to minimize deterrence, if not actually serve to invite attack, than the prospect that the
  U.S. military could be paralyzed by “decapitation” of its command structure.
• This problem is compounded by another indicator of the Clinton Administration’s indifference
  about the lack of robustness in the U.S. deterrent: The United States operates today only
  one-quarter of the survivable airborne command-and-control aircraft fielded during the
  Cold War. Worse yet, those that remain are kept at reduced readiness and are, therefore, less
  able to provide an assured ability to formulate and communicate orders in the event of a
  chemical, biological or nuclear strike on Washington.
• The Administration risks further erosion in strategic “connectivity” by permitting the
  Nation’s early warning systems to degrade significantly. It has allowed maintenance to be
  deferred on, and even the suspension of operations by, some of the assets that would provide
  critical data should a missile or bomber attack be launched on the United States. For example,
  the two large, phased-array missile warning radars covering the southeastern and southwestern
  approaches to the continental U.S. have been quietly shut down and cannibalized for parts.
• Finally, the Administration is also reported to be actively considering a variety of
  initiatives that would reduce — if not virtually eliminate — the ability to launch
  American nuclear forces in a timely fashion. The stated purpose of such a U.S.
  “deposturing” would be to give the Russians an incentive to follow suit. There is, however, no
  guarantee that they actually will. And even should they do so, it seems hardly prudent to
  engage in deliberate degradation of the U.S. deterrent capabilities in the face of emerging
  threats from other quarters.

General Butler — Nuclear Disinventor

The other part of Jeff Smith’s perfecta was a paean to the Nation’s former top nuclear officer who
has denounced nuclear deterrence and now champions a world free of nuclear arms. By lionizing
retired General Lee Butler, the Post is able to lend a patina of military credentials to the
orthodoxy of unilateral disarmers that advocate minimal or no nuclear deterrence for the United
States.

But even coming from Gen. Butler, the rhetoric of radical disarmament sounds less than serious.
To cite just two examples:

• At his disarmer’s “coming out” party at the National Press Club on 4 December 1996, Gen.
  Butler averred: “Notwithstanding the uncertainties of transition in Russia, bitter enmities in the
  Middle East or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling
  global refrain will eventually bring the broader interests of mankind to bear on the
  decisions of governments to retain nuclear weapons.”
• Smith’s magazine article recounts how, “The first thing Butler thought when he heard about
  the February 26, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center was that the van the terrorists
  drove into the basement garage ‘could easily have contained a nuclear device.’ He says that
  realization helped convince him that the longer nuclear bombs and laboratories exist, the more
  likely it is that their knowledge or equipment will migrate into terrorist camps. ‘As you move
  toward the goal of zero, all of that atrophies, it goes away,’ he argues now.”

Out of Touch With Reality

Gen. Butler is not the only one out of touch with reality. This was (presumably inadvertently)
underscored when the Washington Post chose to juxtapose the continuation of the Smith article
on the new Clinton PDD with a report describing the increased reliance Russia may be placing
upon its nuclear forces:

“Russia’s military and civilian leaders are debating whether to increase reliance on
nuclear weapons to deter attacks from neighboring nations, enabling Russia to make
further cuts in its large and costly standing army, navy and air force, according to the
CIA.

“‘At present, a number of Russian observers advocate placing greater reliance on
nuclear weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of [Moscow’s] conventional
forces,’ the CIA told Congress in material released last week by the Senate
intelligence committee. Some Russian officials, the agency added, even ‘have
called for developing first-use and limited-use nuclear options to prevent a
regional conflict from expanding into a broader war.'”⁽²⁾

In fact, the Soviet Union/Russia has long demonstrated by its actions that it does not
subscribe to the view that it is impossible to fight and prevail in a nuclear war. For
example:

• Russia is continuing to build at mind-boggling expense an assortment of underground
  facilities, at least some of which are connected by dedicated subways to the Kremlin and other
  government agencies in Moscow. Russia’s continuing investment in these deeply buried, well-hardened concrete structures — one of which has been estimated to be the size of the area
  within the Washington Beltway⁽³⁾ — at a time of acute economic turmoil is explicable only as
  part of an ongoing effort to prepare for nuclear war-fighting.
• Russia has consistently upgraded and modernized its missile defense system, which
  includes not only defense for the people of Moscow, but also protection for its territory
  employing, according to noted former DIA analyst William Lee:

“…Two generations of national ABM defenses, which are prohibited by the [1972]
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. As of 1992, 10,000-12,000 SA-5/SA-10 national ABM
[interceptor] missiles and approximately 19 battle management radars were deployed in
violation of the ABM Treaty. [Illegal] national ABM development and deployment
paralleled [that of the legal] Moscow ABM defenses from 1953 to 1992.”⁽⁴⁾

• Russia has also been relentlessly modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. They have, in
  the last two months, begun to deploy their new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile
  (ICBM), the Topol-M. By the year 2000 they will field a new submarine-launched ballistic
  missile (SLBM) and a new ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to carry it.

Today, moreover, the Washington Times reports that the Defense Intelligence Agency
estimates that “Russia has about 10 times more of [the] short-range, battlefield atomic
bombs than it concedes.” These are among the most susceptible of nuclear arms to
diversion or theft, given their small size and relative portability. They also typically
have the least effective, if any, permissive action links — the devices that are supposed
to prevent unauthorized detonations.

• By some accounts, Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces are participating in simulated
  nuclear attacks upon the United States in a much more routine and aggressive manner
  than was the case during the Cold War.

The Bottom Line

President Clinton’s decision to adopt a doctrine that amounts to minimum deterrence further
underscores the need for adult supervision by the Congress and an informed debate among
the American people concerning this Administration’s nuclear stewardship. Even setting
aside the contradictions — seemingly unresolved by the new PDD — as to whether the United
States would use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state wielding biological or chemical
weapons, there are serious questions that need to be addressed before the Nation moves any
further in the direction of denuclearization and undeterrence.

At the very least, Mr. Clinton’s embrace of minimal deterrence demands a fresh examination of
the wisdom of the policy of “assured vulnerability” that he maintains is the “cornerstone of
strategic stability.” If the Washington Post‘s Pearl Harbor Day edition tells us nothing else, it is
that defenses of all kinds (missile, civil, air and leadership) are assuredly going to be needed
in the future as the American deterrent erodes.

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1. For more on Mr. Bell’s impact on vital U.S. security interests see the Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Too Clever By Half: Bob Bell’s Sophistry Must Not Be Allowed to Jeopardize U.S.
Military’s Ability to Use Landmines (No. 97-D 142, 24 September 1997).

2. See “Russia Considering Increased Nuclear Dependence; Move Would Allow Moscow to Cut
Armed Forces, CIA tells Congress” in the Washington Post, 7 December 1997.

3. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Restoration Watch # 9: Mt. Yamantau — From the
Folks Who Brought You the Cold War (No. 96-D 37, 16 April 1996).

4. The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion, William T. Lee, Council
for Social and Economic Studies, 1997.