‘Do The Right Thing’: Congressional Defense Choices For The Post-Kuwait World

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Introduction

In the face of the unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq — with all these actions portend for U.S. and global economic and security interests — the United States Senate is considering the FY1991 Defense authorization bill. Incredible as it may seem, even as the possibilities mount that this country may shortly become engaged in hostilities, the legislation now taking form on Capitol Hill continues to reflect many legislators’ determination to gut the defense budget. While such an attitude was misguided before the Kuwait crisis, today it can be seen as nothing less than irresponsible.

Particularly striking is the extent to which these legislators have as their targets many of the very programs and military capabilities that would be of greatest value to the United States in dealing with similar contingencies — if not with the Iraqi invasion itself. Generally speaking, these systems and capabilities have in common three characteristics: the flexibility to perform multiple missions; the utilization of advanced technology — an area of competitive advantage for the United States; and the ability to project power over long distances. In the interest of helping more far-sighted Senators protect the national interests against such initiatives, the Center offers the following illustrative examples of weaponry and military capabilities the United States cannot afford to do without.

The B-2 Bomber

The B-2 bomber has the potential to be a very powerful force-multiplier in situations like that confronting the United States today in the Persian Gulf. Its exceptionally long range, large payload and resilience to detection and attack by even advanced air defenses (like those fielded by Iraq) offer policy-makers the means to bring weapons to bear on distant targets with a minimum of delay or risk of loss of American lives.

While the Senate yesterday voted to support the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recommendation to proceed with production of two additional B-2s, it tied expenditure of funds for this purpose to an array of performance milestones. The net effect will probably be to delay the availability and further drive up the costs of this system. Worse still, the Committee’s House counterpart voted to terminate all production of the B-2.

The Center believes that the B-2 constitutes an ever more important national asset and it recommends that procurement and deployment of this system proceed at the fastest possible pace.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

The prospect of allied or friendly nations — and possibly even U.S. forces — coming under attack from Saddam Hussein’s ballistic missiles offers but one more, if a particularly compelling, reason to deploy active defenses against such attacks. The work being pursued under the SDI program to realize such a capability is, unfortunately, facing severe assault from the Congress.

The Bush Administration sought $4.6 billion to develop and prepare for a deployment decision a multi-layered system capable of significantly diminishing massive intercontinental-range ballistic missile attacks and defeating altogether smaller strikes involving missiles launched accidentally, in an unauthorized fashion or for terroristic purposes. The Senate Armed Services Committee reduced the request to $3.57 billion; the House Armed Services Committee voted a mere $2.9 billion — a crippling reduction from last year’s level.

What is more, Senators Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and Richard Shelby (D-AL) intend to offer a floor amendment which would further impede progress toward a deployable, effective and multi-layered SDI system by restricting how the $3.57 billion authorized will be spent. Specifically, the Bingaman-Shelby amendment would greatly retard progress being made on space-based interceptors known as Brilliant Pebbles in favor of a limited deployment of a single layer of ground-based interceptor missiles and open-ended research on more exotic directed energy technologies — devices that would come on-line (if at all) far down-stream.

Suffice it to say, neither of the alternatives proposed by the Senators will offer near-term capabilities to intercept Iraqi intermediate-range ballistic missiles or similar threats from other sources. For this reason, among others, efforts like the Bingaman-Shelby amendment must be rejected by the Senate.

MILSTAR

The ability to communicate reliably and securely with widely dispersed U.S. forces — be they strategic or tactical — is an essential ingredient in assuring the deterrent credibility and war-fighting effectiveness of the American military. For nearly a decade, the MILSTAR satellite system has been under development to serve as the backbone of the United States’ future command, control and communications (C3) system.

Evidence provided by the Iraqi incursion that this country may still face formidable adversaries far from home, equipped with modern military capabilities, should put to rest arguments that such conflicts are things of the past and that sophisticated, jam-resistant C3 systems like MILSTAR are no longer necessary. In fact, the need for the assured ability to provide 24-hour-a-day, secure, two-way and world-wide communications — offered only by MILSTAR — is more obvious now than ever.

The Bush Administration sought $1.08 billion this year for research and development, procurement and operation for the MILSTAR system. The Secretary of Defense and the uniformed commanders-in-chief strongly support this request. Unfortunately, the Senate Armed Services Committee — on a straight party-line vote — acted to terminate it. The Congress must not permit the many billions of dollars already invested in MILSTAR to be wasted or deny the U.S. military the vital C3 capabilities this system alone offers.

V-22

Few elements of the U.S. military are likely to be more important than the Marine Corps in contending with potential adversaries around the world like Saddam Hussein. Few capabilities are more indispensable to the future combat effectiveness of the Marines than those that enable troops and equipment to be rapidly and survivably transported from assault ships over the beach and around the battle zone.

No system yet invented promises to perform that mission more efficiently and cost-effectively than the revolutionary tilt-rotor Osprey. This aircraft, dubbed the V-22, is capable of taking off and landing like a helicopter and of transitioning to horizontal flight like a conventional aircraft in mid-air. The vital contribution the Osprey will make to the Marine’s ability to perform a high priority defense mission would in and of itself justify investing in this aircraft. The unattractive alternative is to sink another $24 billion in less survivable and less effective traditional helicopters.

In fact, there are other, compelling reasons to proceed urgently into procurement and deployment of the V-22. As many as a further 25 important defense functions (from special operations to drug interdiction to search and rescue to anti-submarine warfare) can be performed superbly by the Osprey. What is more, there are abundant civilian applications for this American technology — promising commercial applications waiting only on the U.S. military to perform the vital role it traditionally has done with such radical new technologies, namely validating them with extensive operational use otherwise unaffordable to the private sector.

To its credit, the Senate Armed Services Committee has rejected the Secretary of Defense’s decision to terminate the V-22 by authorizing $238 million in further research and development funding. Unfortunately, the Committee did not see fit to approve the necessary advance procurement funds ($160 million in FY1991). In the interest of providing a needed military capability, obtaining a return on the $2.5 billion already invested in the V-22 and ensuring that the current American preeminence in this technology and its availability for commercial applications is not forfeited, the Senate should authorize full funding for the Osprey’s long-lead procurement requirements.

C-17

If the Iraqi invasion makes anything clear, it is that the United States desperately needs to improve its capacity to move large quantities of men and materiel to distant and relatively primitive locales quickly. Present, severely constrained capabilities in this area contribute significantly to the limiting of options now confronting the Bush Administration as it considers military responses to the Kuwaiti crisis. The C-17 air transport was designed with precisely such a mission in mind and would, if currently available, do much to alleviate the immediate airlift shortfall.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, however, eliminated $1.8 billion originally requested for procurement of six of these aircraft. The Center believes that contingencies like that threatening U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf today — if not a more cautious appraisal of possible future requirements for reintroducing American forces expected to be withdrawn from Europe shortly — argue for the full Senate to reverse the Committee’s action.

Conclusion

This list is not all-inclusive — nor is it intended to be. Indeed, there are any number of military systems and forces that current events in the Middle East suggest the United States must retain, should acquire or ought to improve. For example, it seems demonstrably prudent under present circumstances to suspend steps now in the offing to reduce the number of carrier and battleship battle groups or withdraw American personnel from most forward bases.

These are, however, in the view of the Center among the most important of such programs and capabilities. They are also among those most immediately jeopardized by Congressional actions.

While implementing the Center’s recommendations would require somewhat higher funding than is provided for in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s recommended bill, the Center believes that the national defense investments entailed will represent money well spent indeed if they serve to deter — or at least mitigate — costly military conflicts around the world in the future.

Center for Security Policy

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