Excerpts from REMARKS BY FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR. before THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOREIGN POLICY SYMPOSIUM

Washington, D.C.
2 November 1993

WHAT TO DO ABOUT NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR THREAT: HOLD THE ‘CARROTS,’ APPLY THE ‘STICK’

I believe that — if power remains in the hands of the communist totalitarian Kim Il Sung and his son and anointed successor, Kim Jong Il — it is just a matter of time before North Korea acquires nuclear weapons and seeks to exploit them for political, economic and/or territorial advantage. Unfortunately, the signals currently being sent by the United States and its allies appear likely, at best, to encourage uncertainty about the West’s determination to thwart Pyongyang’s ambitions. Lest we forget, the last time such confusion existed about America’s commitment to its ally on the peninsula, Kim Il Sung launched a costly war of aggression….

[I]f as now seems likely, the United States is perceived as having abdicated its decades-long commitment to defend its friends and allies in the region — or as having lost the capability to do so — it is predictable that Japan, South Korea and probably Taiwan and perhaps other Asian rim states will "go nuclear." Such a development would have lasting, and possibly highly deleterious, implications for U.S. security interests.

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With so much at stake, the United States cannot afford to ignore or otherwise accommodate North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. As with Iraq, there are risks associated with taking forceful action — but they pale by comparison with those sure to arise if Pyongyang can wield "The Bomb."

Accordingly, the Clinton Administration should make no further diplomatic, political or economic concessions to North Korea. Instead, it should urgently take the following steps:

• First, act to discourage North Korean military ambitions — and to deal with them if all else fails. This would involve, at a minimum:
  • Augmenting the 36,000 U.S. troops permanently stationed in South Korea including airborne, naval and air force elements. The purpose would be both to demonstrate unmistakable U.S. resolve and to improve the South’s capacity to deter aggression in the near-term.
  • In this connection, ships equipped with nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles should be ostentatiously deployed within striking distance of North Korean targets. Notice should also be served that further North Korean defiance will result in the basing of nuclear-capable aircraft and their weapons in South Korea. And
  • Rescinding past commitments concerning the suspension of joint U.S.-South Korean exercises. In fact, it should be made clear that the certain consequence of continued North Korean nuclear activity will result in intensified bilateral military cooperation.
• Second, stipulate that international inspectors must be permitted unfettered access to all North Korean facilities suspected of housing nuclear weapons-related activities by a near-term date certain;
• Third, try to put in place a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to liquidate such uninspected facilities by that time.
  • Notice should be served, however, that if China — which has threatened repeatedly to veto a U.N. resolution condemning Pyongyang — blocks adoption of this resolution, the international community will not be prevented from acting in its self-defense.
  • It goes without saying that severe penalties in trade and political relations with the People’s Republic of China must follow any such Chinese veto.
• Fourth, either way, prepare to prevent North Korea from obtaining and threatening the use of nuclear weapons.
  • At the very least, selected military strikes designed to neutralize those facilities associated with Pyongyang’s covert nuclear weapons program must be prepared. Israel’s brilliant preemptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak should serve as a model for this form of "assertive arms control."
  • In this connection, high priority must be given to improving the United States’ ability to attack and destroy deeply buried assets — one approach taken by the North Koreans to conceal and harden some of their nuclear weapons-related manufacturing sites.
• Fifth, intensify consultations with U.S. partners in the North Asian/Pacific Basin about reinvigorating regional security arrangements — and back up words with deeds.
  • The object should be to demonstrate tangibly the United States’ continued resolve to remain a presence and a power in the area and to collaborate actively with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, for the common defense.

As the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), observed earlier this year in calling for destruction of the North Korean nuclear facilities, taking such steps means that: "There is no question we would have to be prepared to go to war." Regrettably, the choice — as with Iraq two-and-a-half years ago — is not between possibly going to war with North Korea on the one hand and not going to war. Rather, it is a question of risking going to war now, when U.S. military capabilities are relatively strong and North Korean nuclear forces are minimal (or not yet completed), rather than later, when such advantageous conditions will almost surely not exist.