‘Founding Act’ Or ‘Final Act’ For NATO?

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(Phoenix, Arizona): Albert Wohlstetter
must be spinning in his grave. The
Clinton Administration’s gross
mismanagement of the NATO enlargement
issue, and its ominous implications for
the Nation’s most important alliance,
would infuriate Dr. Wohlstetter — the
world-renowned and recently deceased
strategist whose six decades of brilliant
contributions to U.S. and allied security
policy and programs are to be honored at
a memorial service in Washington
tomorrow.

One can only imagine the withering
contempt with which Dr. Wohlstetter would
dissect the so-called “Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security Between NATO and the Russian
Federation.” This sixteen-page
document was unveiled late last week in
Moscow with much fanfare and declarations
that the way was now clear for including
several former Soviet-occupied states in
Central Europe in the Atlantic Alliance.
Unfortunately, if the United States is
not careful, this “Founding
Act” could become the “Final
Act” for NATO.

A Bill of Particulars

Consider some of the particulars of
this agreement:

  • As Richard Perle — one of Dr.
    Wohlstetter’s most accomplished
    protégés — noted at a splendid
    congress of the New Atlantic
    Initiative held here over the
    weekend, the agreement
    reads like a Soviet document
    .
    This is, as the communists loved
    to say, “no accident,
    comrade.” After all, the
    principal author for the Russian
    side was an unreconstructed
    apparatchik and long-time KGB
    operative from the old Soviet
    Union, Foreign Minister Yevgeny
    Primakov.
  • Mr. Primakov’s fine hand is
    evident in the mutation
    of NATO contemplated by this
    document
    — from a
    free-standing military alliance
    of democratic states to a
    “Euro-Atlantic”
    community with which Russia
    becomes an “equal
    partner” in political as
    well as security matters. The
    tone is set with the pledge by
    the two parties to pursue
    “to the maximum extent
    possible, where
    appropriate…joint decisions and
    joint action with respect to
    security issues of common
    concern.”
  • Moscow will be in a good position
    to try to enforce this commitment
    as it will always
    co-chair the new “Permanent
    Joint Council”
    created
    by this accord. The United
    States, by contrast, will only
    serve as a co-chair on a
    rotating basis
    , taking turns
    with the other fifteen-plus NATO
    member states. Since NATO
    operates by consensus, chances
    are good that this arrangement
    will make alliance
    decision-making more ponderous
    and problematic than ever.
  • In addition, the “Founding
    Act” explicitly and
    repeatedly affirms the
    primacy of multilateral
    organizations
    in which
    Moscow enjoys a de jure
    or de facto veto,
    notably the United Nations
    Security Council and the
    Organization on Security and
    Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). For
    instance, it declares that
    “any actions undertaken by
    the Russian Federation or NATO,
    together or separately, must be
    consistent with the UN Charter
    and the OSCE’s governing
    principles.” While Russia
    was not much concerned with such
    principles in its war with
    Chechnya, it is predictable that
    it will find grounds in this
    language to oppose or otherwise
    constrain NATO’s planning and
    freedom of action.
  • Concerns on this score are
    further exacerbated by the myriad
    institutional arrangements

    promised by the “Founding
    Act” agreement. In addition
    to the Permanent Joint Council
    which will be “the principal
    venue of consultation between
    NATO and Russia in times of
    crisis or for any other situation
    affecting peace and
    stability,” meetings of
    foreign ministers and of defense
    ministers will occur twice per
    year. As a practical matter, this
    will likely translate into
    including the Russians in at
    least parts of the currently
    scheduled semi-annual ministerial
    meetings of the North Atlantic
    Council and Defense Planning
    Committees. Inexorably, Russia
    can be expected to insinuate
    itself more and more into these
    important events, in much the
    same way as it has functionally
    transformed the G-7 into the G-8.
  • In addition, Moscow will get to
    participate in regular joint
    meetings of senior military
    officers, and various committees
    and working groups. Clearly, if
    the spirit of this “Founding
    Act” is faithfully honored
    by NATO, the Russians
    will have ample opportunity to
    shape alliance decisions and
    prevent those they cannot
    influence. These bureaucratic
    realities are, after all, more
    likely to govern than will the
    blithe assertion that neither
    NATO nor Russia have “a
    right of veto over the actions of
    the other.”
  • The language of the
    “Founding Act” is also redolent
    of Soviet-style moral equivalence
    .
    Fresh promises are made to
    “observe in good faith [the
    parties’] obligations under
    international law” —
    papering over the fact that
    Russia has consistently violated
    its treaty commitments, both at
    the margin and in material ways.
    Repeated pledges are made to
    “transparency” when
    there is precious little about:
    the real status of Russian
    strategic forces; chemical and
    biological weapons programs;
    Moscow’s continuing preparations
    for nuclear warfighting
    (evidenced, for example, by
    enormous expenditures on vast,
    deep underground command
    complexes); its aggressive
    intimidation of former Soviet
    republics and client states in
    the so-called “Near
    Abroad”; etc.
  • Last but hardly least, this
    NATO-Russian charter sows the
    seeds of trouble for enlargement
    of the alliance
    . It
    clearly gives Moscow a seat at
    the table before the new
    candidates for membership —
    presumably, Warsaw, Prague and
    Budapest — get represented
    there. It appears to relegate new
    members to a second-class status
    with what amount to pledges that
    they will never have nuclear
    deterrents or allied troops
    deployed on their soil nor will
    their existing military
    infrastructure be available to
    NATO. And it encourages
    speculation that Russia will be
    able to create insurmountable
    friction if additional
    enlargement is contemplated.

This Accord Demands the
Senate’s Advice and Dissent

The “Founding Act” is being
described by the Clinton Administration
as a “political” document, not
a legal one. Therefore, the Clintonistas
contend this agreement need not be
submitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent — even though it
threatens to modify the North Atlantic
Treaty more dramatically than Mr.
Clinton’s efforts to multilateralize the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would do to
the latter accord
. href=”97-D69.html#N_1_”>(1)

Fortunately, the Senate voted
unanimously last week to declare that the
Memorandum of Understanding concerning
ABM Treaty successorship must get the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Senators
should, accordingly, insist on no lesser
standard for an agreement that could
wreck NATO.
Such an approach
seems particularly justified since the
Russian Duma will be asked to approve
ratification. How could the Kremlin
object if the United States treats this
agreement every bit as seriously as it
does?

The Bottom Line

In any event, since the Clinton
Administration agrees that Russia’s
consent is not a precondition for the
enlargement of NATO, there is no reason
why a Senate ratification debate on the
“Founding Act” should be
allowed to interfere with formally
inviting new members to join the alliance
at the Madrid summit in July. What such a
debate would do, however, is give the
Senate an opportunity to fix or reject an
agreement that threatens to make the
price for enlargement, at best, the
neutering and, at worst, the evisceration
of the Atlantic Alliance.

Albert Wohlstetter would certainly
approve.

– 30 –

1. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Will Senate Pass
‘No-Brainer,’ Insist On Right To Advise
And Consent On Major A.B.M. Treaty
Changes?
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_64″>No. 97-D 64, 12
May 1997).

Frank Gaffney, Jr.
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