Glaspie Redux in the Balkans: As With Saddam, Appeasing — Rather than Resisting — Milosevic is a Formula for Wider War

(Washington, D.C.): Once again, it appears that a senior American diplomat has inadvertently
emboldened a despotic thug who aspires to become a dominant force in his region — and will stop
at nothing to do so. Recall that in early 1990, then-U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie
conveyed the impression to Saddam Hussein that the United States so valued its relationship with
him that it would turn a blind eye should he escalate tensions with neighboring Kuwait. To
Washington’s horror, he did so, setting in train the events that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and Operation Desert Storm. Could the State Department actually make such a disastrous
mistake twice within a decade?

Amb. Glaspie Meet Amb. Gelbard

Unfortunately, the answer appears to be: “Yes.” As the New York Times
reported yesterday:

“It was the United States’ special Balkan envoy, Robert S. Gelbard, who made a
remark during a visit to Belgrade last month that many now cite as a trigger to the
latest [Serbian] crackdown [in Kosovo]. Mr. Gelbard praised [Yugoslav President
Slobodan] Milosevic for his cooperation in Bosnia and branded the Kosovo
Liberation Army ‘without question a terrorist group.’“

Of course, today — as in 1990 — such deplorable statements do not occur in a vacuum.
Amb. Glaspie was executing directions she received from James Baker’s State Department.
These, in turn, were a product of the Bush Administration’s extraordinarily short-sighted strategy
of embracing and empowering Saddam Hussein as a reliable partner for regional security.

Appeasing Slobo

Interestingly, the Bush Administration was no less inept with respect to its dealings with the
former Yugoslavia. Indeed, as the Times’ report observed:

“The [Gelbard] statement stunned the ethnic Albanians, and echoed Secretary
of
State James A. Baker 3d, who argued in 1991 that Yugoslavia should remain one
nation. Mr. Baker’s assertion was apparently interpreted by Mr. Milosevic to
condone attacks against Croatian separatists.” (Emphasis added throughout.)

The truth is that the Baker call for preserving the “territorial integrity of Yugoslavia”
was
read by the Communist Serb strongman as an invitation to realize his goal of a Greater Serbia at
the expense of not only independence-minded Croats. Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian and
other minorities of the former Yugoslavia also paid a terrible price when the West refused to thwart
Milosevic’s self-serving nationalism.

This misplaced confidence in Slobodan Milosevic⁽¹⁾ was
infamously heightened by the Clinton
Administration when, in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election, it finally decided to try to
bring an end to the years of genocidal carnage wrought in Bosnia by the Butcher of Belgrade and
his Serb chauvinist proxies. Amb. Gelbard’s predecessor (and rival), Amb. Richard Holbrooke,
built the entire house of cards that became known as the Dayton Accords on basically the same,
odious principle: The man who inspired and bore much of the responsibility for Europe’s worst
bloodshed since World War II could now be dealt with as a dependable man of peace. In fact,
according to Holbrooke and his apologists, Milosevic had been transformed into the indispensable
man.

It was this fraud that the Clinton Administration was rewarding with the eased sanctions and
accolades served up last month in Belgrade by Amb. Gelbard. More to the point, it was this
long-running, if preposterous, premise that made the latest events in Kosovo — and the prospects
that
they will ultimately spread far beyond Yugoslavia — but a matter of time. As the Center for
Security Policy observed in October 1995, shortly after the Dayton Accords were initialed:

“Fresh revelations point to the intimate involvement of Serbian dictator Slobodan
Milosevic in genocide and other war crimes as recently as three months ago in
Srebrenica. Under the circumstances, it is appalling that the United States would be
hosting him in Dayton, Ohio this week — to say nothing of casting him in the role of
lynchpin for a Bosnian peace agreement. There is unlikely to be any peace in the
Balkans until Milosevic is removed from power and incarcerated.“ href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾

The Bottom Line

In the former Yugoslavia, as in Iraq, the Clinton Administration refuses to recognize the
fundamental reality: One cannot “do business” with psychopathic, megalomaniacal
criminals like Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. By trying to do so, the United
States
government merely emboldens and empowers them, even as it demoralizes and otherwise
undermines those whose commitment to Western-style values compels them to oppose the regime
in question.

It is time for America to adopt a fundamentally different approach in both the Balkans and
Iraq.
We must address the source of the problem in these crises — Milosevic and Saddam,
respectively. Toward this end, Washington must stop compounding the ignominy
and futility of U.S. policy by
subordinating it to the dumbing-down that is unavoidable if its approval by Russia, the UN or
others must be obtained. Instead, as retired Brigadier General Walter Jajko eloquently argues in
the attached op.ed. article published in today’s Washington
Times: “The U.S. objective ought
to be the rapid removal of the entire Milosevic gang from Belgrade.” The same therapy is
the only one likely to prove effective in treating the threat posed by Saddam’s ruling clique
in Baghdad.⁽³⁾

Such an approach offers the United States in both cases the opportunity to stop punishing
through
sanctions populations who bear not responsibility for the crimes of their unaccountable, despotic
leaders without abetting the wider wars those leaders clearly have in store. Best of all, this Nation
can eschew further, demeaning association with and support (whether implicit or explicit) for the
likes of the Butchers of Belgrade and Baghdad.

– 30 –

1. As the Center for Security Policy noted at the time — see
‘Tired of Killing Each Other…’
Eagleburger Statement Shows Depth of Administration’s Error in Yugoslav Crisis ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=92-D_47″>No. 92-D 47,
4 May 1992) — this confidence appeared to stem, at least in part, from the personal relationship
between then-National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and then-Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger, both of whom had served in Embassy Belgrade earlier in their careers.

2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Guilty As Charged: Milosevic Is A War Criminal
Who Should Be Arrested, Not Feted In Dayton ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=95-D_84″>No. 95-D 84, 30 October 1995).

3. For more on the proper strategy for dealing with Saddam’s regime,
See the Center’s Decision
Brief entitled Father of a Free Iraq? Iraqi National Congress’ Chalabi Details a
Program for
Liberating His Country From Saddam (No. 98-P 39, 4 March
1998).