HARDY PERENNIAL: TIM WEINER, SENATE ALLIES CONJURE UP FALSE CHARGES AGAIN IN HOPES OF MAKING MORE CUTS IN SDI

(Washington, D.C.): Like the Spring
bringing swallows to Capistrano, the
congressional season for finalizing
spending decisions related to strategic
defenses against missile attack seems to
produce a predictable annual phenomenon:
Zealous opponents of what little remains
of spending for such defenses can rely
upon an unscrupulous reporter for the New
York Times, Tim Weiner, to generate
controversy and confusion — conditions
that lend themselves to further
reductions in investments in anti-missile
systems.

The latest Weiner salvo was unleashed
on the Times’ front page last
Saturday, 23 July 1994 under the
headline, “Inquiry Finds ‘Star Wars’
Tried Plan to Exaggerate Test Results.
The lead paragraph was no less
provocative: “Federal investigators
have concluded that ‘Star Wars’ officials
conducted a deception program in the
1980s as part of a plan to make the
Soviet Union think the ballistic
missile-defense project was far more
advanced than it was.

‘Deja Vu All Over
Again’

Such statements call to mind the
frenzy kicked off by Mr. Weiner at
approximately the same point during last
year’s budget cycle. On 18 August 1993,
the New York Times gave
front-page treatment to a libelous and
factually unfounded story under Mr.
Weiner’s by-line concerning a 1984
missile intercept test called the Homing
Overlay Experiment (HOE). This test, the
fourth in a series conducted by the Army
and sponsored of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), was deemed an
extraordinary success — involving the
first successful destruction of one
missile by another by direct impact,
without the aid of explosive devices. As
such, it was pointed to as a proud proof
of the feasibility of advanced strategic
defenses by their supporters. And for
SDI’s critics, debunking or discrediting
this test became a high priority.

It was, consequently, momentous when
Tim Weiner charged in the Times
that the fourth HOE test was deliberately
“rigged” to assure its success,
to deceive the Soviets and —
intentionally or otherwise — to con the
Congress. He quoted “former Reagan
Administration officials” (sic) as
saying that “to insure that the
missile defense program would be seen as
a success, the test was faked.” And
he cited an unnamed “scientist”
to the effect that: “We put a beacon
with a certain frequency on the target
vehicle. On the interceptor we had a
receiver.” Mr. Weiner added,
“In effect, the scientist said, the
target was talking to the missile,
saying: ‘Here I am. Come and get
me.'” Congressional critics of the
SDI program like Sen. David Pryor (D-AR)
and Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) were
quoted in the article confirming the
thrust of the report and/or expressing
outrage at its content in a way
calculated to lend authority to Mr.
Weiner’s claims.

In fact, the report about the
beacon transmitting targeting data to the
interceptor — like so much in Mr.
Weiner’s reporting — was absolutely
wrong. The interceptor had no
C-Band radio receiver compatible with and
capable of reading what was being
transmitted from the target for
range-safety and other instrumentation
purposes. On 9 September 1993,
then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
announced the results of a Pentagon
investigation into this and other charges
served up by Mr. Weiner and the New
York Times: “[The experiment]
was not rigged by the inclusion of a
radar beacon…on the target or by any
other means. The experiment demonstrated
what it purported to demonstrate, namely
that the final guidance of the
interceptor to a direct hit was
done by the onboard heat seeker.”⁽¹⁾

On that occasion, Secretary Aspin also
disputed other points prominently
featured in the original Weiner articles
and a subsequent one published on 27
August 1993. ⁽²⁾
These included, notably, distortions
and/or misrepresentations concerning the
use and nature of measures to enhance the
signature of the fourth HOE test’s target
vehicle. They also described the
placement aboard the target of “a
bomb” that purportedly was to be
used to suggest that an intercept had
been achieved — even if it had not been.
In his rebuttal, Mr. Aspin essentially
endorsed statements challenging the
Weiner reports that had previously been
issued by his predecessor, Caspar
Weinberger, by the director of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
at the time of the fourth HOE test, Lt.
Gen. James Abrahamson, and by the
then-commander of the Army Strategic
Defense Command, Maj. Gen. Eugene Fox.
⁽³⁾

When In Doubt, Press On

What is really remarkable about Mr.
Weiner’s latest assault on the truth is
that much of the article
published last weekend actually documents
his previous inaccuracies and
misrepresentations. In fact, in
reporting on the results of a General
Accounting Office study (performed at the
request of Sen. Pryor after the results
of Secretary Aspin’s investigation were
made known), Mr. Weiner gave the careful
reader plenty of reason to distrust his
accuracy, if not his integrity. The
following quotes from the Weiner article
of 23 July are illustrative:

• The GAO found that the
  original Weiner report was
  egregiously wrong:
  “The [GAO] report directly
  contradicted accusations, made by
  four men who worked for the Star
  Wars program…that Star Wars
  officials rigged the fourth test
  in the series as part of the
  deception program. It found no
  evidence that a beacon on board
  the target missile sent a signal
  to the interceptor missile
  saying, in effect, ‘come and get
  me’….”
• The GAO found that the
  test was “not
  deceptive”:
  “The report said the
  enhancements Star Wars officials
  took to double the chance that
  the fourth test would succeed
  were secretive, but not
  deceptive.” (Emphasis
  added.)
• The GAO found that the
  test was not part of the
  so-called “deception”
  plan: “The
  deception program had been
  abandoned [in 1984] and, in the
  opinion of the [GAO]
  investigators, no deceptive
  measure remained….”
• The GAO found that the
  so-called “bomb” could
  not be used as part of a
  deception: “A bomb
  [actually a spotting charge
  consisting of a mere 320 grams of
  high explosive] was on board the
  target missile in the fourth
  test, though military officials
  told the investigators that it
  was not wired to go off
  on…command.”
• The GAO found that the
  test practices were
  “reasonable”:
  “The investigators concluded
  that these enhancements were
  reasonable from the perspective
  of Strategic Defense Initiative
  officials trying to prove the
  program could work.”⁽⁴⁾

In short, the General Accounting
Office — an organization known for its
studies’ uncanny ability to provide
congressional sponsors with virtually any
conclusion they want — has produced a
study for Sen. Pryor that has a bottom
line that is, presumably, very different
from the one desired: On
virtually every point, Tim Weiner’s
case against the Strategic Defense
Initiative and its leaders was erroneous.
This fact may explain why this GAO study
remains classified and unavailable except
when leaked to journalists like Mr.
Weiner.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy
deplores the blatant advocacy journalism
in which Tim Weiner and the New York
Times persist in opposing programs
to defend the United States against
missile attack. Surely a new low has been
reached in this regard, however, when the
Times uses precious page-one
space to compound the damage it has
previously done to the program — and the
national interest — by promoting afresh
assertions that have repeatedly been
disproved. The Center calls for the
immediate release of the GAO study on the
Weiner charges. And it calls upon the
newspaper that considers itself to be the
Nation’s journal of record to present the
GAO’s conclusions fairly —
i.e., under a front-page headline and
lead graph that accurately describe what
amounts to a complete vindication for the
SDI program and a thorough repudiation of
Mr. Weiner and the New York Times.

– 30 –

1. Interestingly,
in his 23 July article, Mr. Weiner chose
to make no mention of the findings of the
study commissioned by Mr. Aspin in
response to his earlier reporting.
Perhaps he feared that, had he reminded
his editors of the wholesale debunking of
his earlier journalistic feats, his
latest efforts would have been given
appropriately short shrift — rather than
front-page placement.

2. For more on the
Aspin rebuttal, see the Center’s press
release entitled Center to New York
Times: How About An Apology Now That the
Pentagon Has Debunked False Claims About
SDI Test? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-P_77″>No. 93-P 77,
9 September 1993).

3. See the Center
for Security Policy’s Decision Briefs
entitled, All the ‘News’ that
Fits the Times’ Political Agenda: Latest
Assault on SDI Unfounded, Indefensible,
(No. 93-D
70, 18 August 1993) and ‘Paper
Trail’ Confirms New York Times’ Agenda,
Sloppy Reporting on Recent SDI Conspiracy
Allegations, ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_71″>No. 93-D 71,
26 August 1993).

4. This conclusion
closely tracks with a May 1988
publication by the Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment entitled, SDI:
Technology Survivability and Software.
This study makes clear that OTA — an
institutional hotbed of SDI critics —
was aware of and untroubled by
the steps taken as part of a legitimate
weapons development effort:

“The simulated reentry
vehicle (RV) fired from Vandenberg
Air Force Base in California [as the
target for the fourth HOE test]
radiated about 10 times more infrared
(IR) energy than that expected from
today’s Soviet RVs, and future RVs
could have even lower IR signatures
with thermal shrouds….These
comments on the SDI validation
experiments should not be construed
as criticism of SDI Organization
management. These are all sound
experiments properly designed
to collect bits of information necessary
on the path to developing a working
system.” (Emphasis
added.)