Hemispheric security watch

The following is one of a series of occasional papers illuminating emerging threats to hemispheric security.

The Center for Security Policy does not necessarily agree with every one of the points contained therein but believes that these observations contribute importantly to an understanding of ominous trends in Latin America trends that warrant the urgent attention of security policymakers and the public alike.

During the Chilean presidency of socialist Salvador Allende in the early 1970s, Cuba and the Soviet Union both lusted for control of that frail South American democracy. Yet between Moscow and Havana, there were serious differences about the best way to realize the dream. Cuba favored violent revolution while the Soviets believed in a slower, ideological conversion. In a 2000 interview in Santiago, two Moscow-educated researchers studying Soviet archives described to me the U.S.S.R.’s Chile strategy of “working to plan, organize and build a structure for the whole country.”

Fidel won the argument but his plan sowed chaos, prompting the 1973 Pinochet coup, whereby Chile escaped Castro’s clutches. Had the Soviets employed their gradual subversion skills, things might have turned out differently. Nobody, it seems, understands that better than Castro. Proof of how much he learned is now on display in Venezuela.

Since winning a presidential election in 1998, Castro’s Venezuelan protege, President Hugo Chavez, has pursued precisely what the Russian researchers in Santiago described: the methodical consolidation of absolute authority under the guise of “democracy.” Along with paramilitaries and community snoopers, the Chavez power grab has entailed converting the congress into a unicameral body, rewriting the constitution to enhance his rule and purging potential opponents in the military.

Having “legally” completed these initial steps to consolidate his power, Mr. Chavez then militarized the government, packed the Supreme Court, imported a large number of Cubans to indoctrinate the citizenry and began choking off the private sector with capital and price controls. The Catholic Church and the media remain largely outside his grasp but regularly are targets of state intimidation tactics. Virulent Chavez rhetoric polarizes society, inflames hatred and puts the safety of independent thinkers at risk.

Developments this week demonstrate that this crazed “Bolivarian revolutionary,” as he sees himself, is now in the final phases of his consolidation. The noose is already so tight around the neck of what is left of the democracy that it may not be able to escape. Short of some improbable rebellion by the largely unarmed opposition, Venezuelan free society will be swinging from the gallows by the time Mr. Chavez’s useful idiots in the U.S. Congress and the Organization of American States figure out that he is no democrat.

The opposition has tried hard to abide by the rules of Mr. Chavez’s “democracy.” The latest chapter is the popular effort to win a recall referendum, a mechanism Mr. Chavez himself put into his constitution so that a dissatisfied electorate would not resort to a military coup as he did in 1992.

In order to hold the referendum, the opposition had to collect a minimum of 2.4 million signatures. Its leaders maintain that over 3.4 million Venezuelans have signed that petition. But shortly after the petition drive ended, Mr. Chavez proclaimed that the process was riddled with fraud. On Tuesday, the electoral council (CNE), which by a margin of 3-2 is pro-Chavez, ruled that only 1.8 million signatures could be certified. The ruling says that 1.1 million signatures might be valid but must be verified by the signers. The CNE threw out over half a million names.

International observers see this as a stalling technique that further lowers the chances that a referendum will ever materialize. Goldman Sachs analyst Alberto Ramos summed up the skepticism in a March 3 report: “The odds that there will be a presidential recall referendum dropped to 20%, given the sheer number of appeals that have to be lodged and the many venues at the disposal of the government to abort the process.”

The appeals process delays the vote that Venezuelans are clearly entitled to under constitutional law. But it also exponentially increases the potential for bureaucratic impediments. There are legitimate fears about the state’s power to intimidate petitioners who are called in to verify their signatures. In a country where so many are employed by the government, threat of job loss alone is a powerful tool.

Add to this the typical Third World complexities for petitioners who might have trouble learning that their signatures have been challenged or have problems physically reaching the official locations for appeal. Consider too that the labor-intensive process will be difficult to monitor. As master of the state’s resources, Mr. Chavez certainly has the upper hand.

What all of this suggests is that if the international community advises the opposition to go along with the appeals process, it must also ensure its fairness. Failure to do so is equivalent to handing Mr. Chavez the pistol he will use to finish off the last vestiges of Venezuelan democracy.

What’s at stake is more than the enslavement of Venezuela. Mr. Chavez’s model, if successful, will be fashioned into a template for the rest of Latin America. Without a clear message from the international community that it will not tolerate the militarization of democracy, the Chavez virus could infect other Latin nations….