In Lake’s Wake, A Higher Standard For D.C.I.
(Washington, D.C.): The Center for
Security Policy welcomes the announcement
last night that Anthony Lake has asked
President Clinton to withdraw his name
from further consideration for the
position of Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). This decision brings
to an end the critical Senate review of
Mr. Lake’s judgment, record of dealings
with Congress and the intelligence
community and trustworthiness that had,
if anything, become even more
necessary following the nominee’s
three days of testimony last week. (See
the attached
column by the Center’s Director,
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., which appears in
today’s Washington Times.)
What’s At Stake
Far more importantly, Lake’s
withdrawal spares the U.S. Intelligence
Community a DCI virtually certain to compound,
rather than correct, the serious problems
confronting the Central Intelligence
Agency and its sister organizations.
Indeed, as President Clinton considers
his choices for a new nominee as Director
of Central Intelligence, he would be well
advised to avoid any individuals saddled
with some or all of Tony Lake’s baggage.
The Senate also has an interest in
avoiding another bruising confirmation
fight, if at all possible. It should not
— and surely will not — shrink,
however, from challenging future Clinton
nominees who are poorly equipped to
perform important duties. The
fact that Senators did so in this case is
evidence that the constitutionally
mandated advice-and-consent process is working,
not as Mr. Lake has suggested, that
Washington is going “haywire.”
A New Standard
Accordingly, the Senate should impress
upon the President the need to select
someone with the following personal
qualities and professional record:
- A Distinguished
American: The
Intelligence Community at this
point needs as its leader someone
of unimpeachable
integrity and independent spirit,
who will, from Day One command
the respect of Congress, his
counterparts in the executive
branch, the public, foreign
interlocutors and the press.
Such an individual should be
disinterested in further personal
advancement and be committed to
restoring the capabilities of the
CIA, its sister agencies and
especially the organizations
responsible for
counter-intelligence to perform
the priority missions assigned to
them. These missions are
becoming, after all, more
complex and demanding in the
“post-Cold War world”
than ever they were during the
“Twilight Struggle.” - An Intelligence
‘Professional’:
Previous DCIs have generally had
some first-hand experience with
the business of collecting and
analyzing intelligence. This is,
in and of itself, no guarantee
that the Intelligence Community’s
leader will be competent and
effective in overseeing its work.
Such a background does generally
preclude, however, the
appointment to that post of
someone who has either a)
exhibited in the past
considerable hostility toward
(not to say contempt for) the CIA
and its work or b) is personally
disposed toward the
politicization of intelligence. - An Individual of
Independent, Sound Judgment:
The next DCI should not have been
associated with the Clinton
Administration’s myriad, dubious
intelligence practices and its
dismal conduct of security policy
more generally. In particular,
he or she must have no
association with the
Administration’s odious conduct
with respect to personnel and
information security — conduct
at the heart of a number of the
scandals now afflicting this
Presidency.(1) - As-Yet-Unindicted
Co-conspirators Need Not Apply:
It should go without
saying that the next DCI should
not be anyone saddled with the
sort of baggage Tony Lake carried
with respect to one or more
breaking Clinton scandals. Only
by reaching outside of the
Administration can the President
be assured that he is not
subjecting either the nominee or
the Intelligence Community to
present or future controversies
over that individual’s conduct. - A Competent Manager:
The next DCI faces truly heroic
challenges in stanching the
hemorrhage of talented, committed
professionals from the U.S.
Intelligence Community and
restoring its esprit de corps
and effectiveness. Experience
managing a large, diversified and
often fractious organizational
structure is an essential
prerequisite. It would be highly
desirable, if not absolutely
necessary, if the individual had
demonstrated an ability to
weather serious turbulence and
periodic crises affecting his or
her organization — as there will
surely be more of those in the
CIA’s future, if only as a result
of the proverbial
“chickens” loosed by
the Clinton Administration coming
home to roost.
Ensuring that the nominee has a
record of visionary leadership
and a capacity for innovation can
mitigate against the obvious
down-side risk, namely that a
person with ties to the
Intelligence Community will be
unwilling and/or unable to effect
necessary reforms. Such
an individual is likely,
moreover, to err on the side of
“speaking truth to
power,” rather than
viscerally seeking to make
intelligence “serve”
its consumers by conforming to
their policy requirements.
This would preclude from
consideration, for example,
anyone involved in drafting and
promoting products like Director
of Central Intelligence Directive
(DCID) 1/7-1. This Directive,
which was circulated for comment
on April 16, 1996 by then-DCI
John Deutch, aimed to revise
“Security Controls on the
Dissemination of Intelligence
Information.” DCID 1/7-1 was
intended to institutionalize the
widespread sharing of sensitive
U.S. intelligence material —
much of it collected at enormous
cost to the American taxpayer and
often at considerable risk to
personnel working for or with the
United States government — with
the U.N. and other multilateral
organizations, with foreign
governments and their nationals.
The result of such sharing could
well have been to jeopardize the
often fragile, and sometimes
irreplaceable, sources and
methods by which it was obtained.(2)
Wanted: James Schlesinger
An individual who would eminently fill
this bill would be a former
Director of Central Intelligence, James
Schlesinger. While Dr.
Schlesinger has performed more than his
share of public service — including
stints as Secretary of Defense during the
Nixon and Ford administrations and as
Secretary of Energy under President
Carter — he may be willing to come once
again to the aid of his country at a time
of considerable need. If so, his high
standing with Members of Congress should
assure swift confirmation by the Senate,
something that cannot be expected of
anyone who fails to meet the foregoing
criteria. More important still, his
record of commitment to robust U.S.
intelligence and a vigorous national
security posture would send an immediate
and highly therapeutic signal throughout
Washington — and to the Nation’s friends
and foes abroad — that the period of
American decline is over.
In the event Dr. Schlesinger cannot be
prevailed upon to serve once again, the
President would be well-advised to find,
if he can, someone of comparable
intellectual ability, experience,
integrity and personal fortitude.
The Bottom Line
The transitional period from the Cold
War era should, by now, be considered to
be behind us. Yet the U.S. Intelligence
Community, which ought to be at the
forefront of identifying the threats to
and protecting American interests in the
post-Cold War era, is still floundering.
Indeed, it is in grave danger of foundering.
President Clinton has nominated
successive candidates for DCI — only two
of whom have been confirmed — but the
most serious shortfall remains with him
and his leadership. Even a Jim
Schlesinger would be hard pressed to
revitalize and reform the Intelligence
Community without Mr. Clinton’s strong,
committed and responsible support.
It is high time, therefore,
for the President to take seriously his
own responsibilities with respect to
American intelligence — first by
nominating a Director of Central
Intelligence that meets the foregoing
criteria and then by affording that
individual routine and timely access and
unwavering encouragement and support in
the job of speaking truth to power.
– 30 –
1. In this
connection, see such Center products as The
Clinton Security Clearance Melt-Down:
‘No-Gate’ Demonstrates ‘It’s The People,
Stupid’ (
25 March 1994), ‘High Crimes
And Misdemeanors’? The Huang Caper
Reinforces Concerns About Clinton
Malfeasance On Security Matters
(No. 96-D
109, 1 November 1996) and Fiddling
While The Nation’s Nuclear Weapons
Complex ‘Burns’ Down: O’Leary’s Last
Denuclearization Shot? (
29 November 1996).
2. For more on
DCID 1/7-1, see the Center’s Decision
Brief entitled Before
U.S. Intelligence Can Be Reformed, The
Clinton Administration Must Stop
Deforming It (
6 May 1996).
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