Needed: A Real Commitment to Taiwan

(Washington, D.C.): There’s good news and bad news about the Bush Administration’s decision on arms sales to Taiwan. The good news is that the new team did not entirely accede to pressure from China to deny the Free Chinese the weapons they need to defend themselves against a real and growing threat from the Communists in Beijing. The bad news is that the leaders of the PRC may nonetheless perceive Mr. Bush’s decision not to approve at this time the sale of Aegis destroyers as evidence that the U.S. may be under new management, but the Sino-centric policy of the previous administration remains in place.

This is not only because the Chinese made blocking the sale of the Aegis air- and missile-defense system the focus of the 2001 version of their annual campaign of anti-arms sale bluster, intimidation and coercion. Since the decision also deferred or rejected other parts of the Taiwanese requested package — from Patriot anti-missile batteries to Apache attack helicopters to land-attack Harpoons to M1-A1 tanks to air-delivered JDAMs and HARM missiles — and since there will be lengthy delays in the delivery of those systems that were approved, the net effect of the Bush decision is likely to be read by Beijing, their theatrical complaints aside, as a gesture without strategic significance.

That will particularly be the case if, as seems predictable, China is able to lean on the Dutch and Germans not to sell Taiwan diesel-electric submarines. Or maybe Lockheed- Martin will find it uneconomical to reopen the P-3 production line for just 12 aircraft. Even the Kidd-class destroyers will not be serviceable and delivered for two more years.

Against this backdrop, it is all the more important to reflect on the obligations of the Taiwan Relations Act and the need for a real course correction on American policy towards China. These are topics addressed in a thoughtful essay by Ambassador Harvey Feldman that appeared in yesterday’s Washington Times. In addition to adopting the approach recommended by Amb. Feldman, the United States should make clear that until such time as Taiwan is able to take delivery of the weapons it needs to defend itself, this country is determined to prevent whatever efforts the mainland might make to reunify the two Chinas through violent means.

Even before the mid-air collision over the South China Sea caused more turbulence in Beijing-Washington relations, the arms issue was making its own waves. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) dispatched senior officials to lobby strenuously against approval of any major items, objecting most strongly to the one heading Taiwan’s list: Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis battle management system. Yesterday, the Bush administration decided on an arms package for Taiwan. It did not include the controversial destroyers.

One of Beijing’s principal arguments is that any transfer of military equipment violates the joint communique of Aug. 17, 1982. In that document, the United States said that “it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan.” Further, the Reagan administration agreed that arms sales to Taiwan “will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”

Thus, 19 years after this communique was signed, China insists that the United States has no business selling any arms to Taiwan, let alone sophisticated equipment. But Beijing’s argument omits some crucial historical facts. Both the text of the communique and a public statement issued by President Reagan on the day it was released link arms reduction quite directly to PRC policy and its degree of threat to Taiwan.

Even more directly and dramatically, in a message to Taiwan’s then-President Chiang Ching-kuo on July 14, 1982 – a message only recently made public – President Reagan went further: “I want to point out,” Mr. Reagan said, “this decision on the communique with Beijing is based on a PRC decision only to use peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue. On this point, the U.S. will not only pay attention to what the PRC says, but will also use all methods to achieve surveillance of PRC military production and military deployment. If there is any change with regard to their commitment to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, the U.S. commitments concerning arms sales would become invalidated.”

The reference to “all methods to achieve surveillance” has particular resonance now, given Beijing’s campaign to end our intelligence-gathering flights. But the more important question is whether the PRC is committed to a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue.

So let’s look at the facts. The PRC is steadily increasing the number of land attack missiles opposite Taiwan. It has been buying advanced combat aircraft, destroyers and submarines from Russia. It issued two White Papers in 2000, justifying use of military force if Taiwan delays entering into negotiations for unification. But at the same time , Beijing has turned down Taiwan’s attempts to get a dialogue started, refusing to enter into talks on any basis other than Taiwan’s acceptance of the proposition that it is a part of China and that the Beijing regime is the sole legal government of China. As Taiwan has evolved into a thriving democracy, pressure from the giant dictatorship next door has escalated.

The weapons that Taiwan wants to buy are defensive in character. Taiwan seeks to protect itself from missile attack, naval blockade and general harassment from the air and by sea. The idea that Taiwan, with its 23 million people, would want to start a war with the PRC and its 1.23 billion people, is ridiculous on its face.
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, commits the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable

Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” It also says that the determination of what and how much to sell should be based solely on Taiwan’s needs. That is exactly what should have been done.

Amb. Harvey Feldman was a foreign service officer for 32 years, specializing in Asian affairs. In 1979 he co-chaired the State Department working group that prepared the initial draft of the Taiwan Relations Act.