ROBUST U.S. DEFENSES FOR THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: WHAT THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS SHOULD SAY

(Washington, D.C.): President Bush’s
State of the Union address tonight comes
amidst one of the United States’ periodic
national debates about the size and
composition of the military it requires.
It is hard to overstate the importance of
this debate — and the stakes involved
should it fail to be an informed and
deliberative one leading to thoughtful
force structure and budgetary decisions.
This Decision Brief offers some
thoughts on the way the U.S. military
should be sized and configured based on the
kinds of capabilities this nation
requires today — and will likely need in
the future. It takes as the
point of departure the American
experience in the Persian Gulf War one
year ago.

Desert Storm — A
Prototypical “Post-Cold War”
Conflict?

The war with Iraq was instructive on
some points. For example, it showed
conclusively that — even in the
absence of a significant Soviet threat
— the United States is likely still to
face numerically substantial and heavily
armed threats in places far removed from
its shores. This reality strongly
suggests that America will continue to
require sufficient forces, lift and
technological superiority to contend
reliably with such threats.

Indeed, it would appear on the face of
it that, given the possibility of Desert
Storm-style contingencies in the future, the
United States would not want to have
appreciably less of any
of these determinants of military power
than it possessed at the time of Desert
Storm. That said, it must be
remembered that the United States had
such capabilities when they were needed not
because it sized its military to perform
this sort of mission in the Third
World. Rather, they were the result
of a decade of heightened military
spending aimed at configuring and
equipping American forces to deal with
the immense threat posed by Soviet
power.

What is more, the lessons of Desert
Storm can also be misleading when
considered as a guide to future defense
requirements. In this war, American power
projection relied decisively on a massive
and secure U.S.-designed infrastructure.
It was the product of a forty-year
coordinated investment program and was
available to coalition forces for
six-months prior to 16 January 1991. In
addition, the enemy completely ceded the
initiative, leaving the choice of when
and under what circumstances the war
would be fought to the United States and
its allies.

Similarly, the United States enjoyed
exclusive access to space and to modern
command, control, communications and
intelligence capabilities. Finally,
Washington had the support of allies who
went along with and — to varying degrees
— facilitated U.S. military operations.

This partial listing of the
differences between the Desert
Shield/Storm scenario and virtually
any other involving U.S. forces that
one can realistically imagine suggests
that more flexible, more
sustainable American power projection
capabilities are needed — not less.
Whether those can be achieved within the
context of radical reductions in overall
defense spending and military force
structure is far from clear. If it can be
done at all, however, it will entail a
very careful and non-traditional approach
to decision-making concerning the forces
to be cut and those to be retained. There
is no evidence that the requisite
approach is being used by either the Bush
Administration or the Congress in their
respective assaults on the defense
budget.

Avoiding
Strategy/Capability Mismatches in the
Future

There have in the past been
significant mismatches between U.S.
strategy and the forces America
maintained to implement that strategy.
Fortunately, those mismatches proved
non-determinative with respect to the
outcome in the major global contest in
which this country was engaged, i.e.,
that with the former Soviet Union. The
United States prevailed anyway because
the Soviet system — when contained by
such power (political, economic,
technological as well as military) as the
U.S. did bring to bear — could not
withstand its own inherent
contradictions, inefficiencies and
immorality.

In the present and prospective budget
climate, however, the United States
simply does not have the luxury of
retaining such slop in the system. It is
going to be compelled to do a
better job of matching resources to needs
and ensuring that they are sufficient to
persuade others that our deterrent
strategy can be credibly implemented.

This will require among other things:

• A competent understanding of
  potential threats, both specific
  and generic;
• An appreciation of what it will
  take to deter and, if necessary,
  to fight such threats in terms of
  force structure, weapon systems,
  standing capabilities and
  research and development;
• Decisions both as to how
  reductions are going to be
  apportioned and how the remaining
  funds will be allocated must be
  made in a manner as insulated
  as possible from the
  distorting effects of service
  bureaucratic parochialism and
  congressional pork-barrelling.
• Of particular concern with regard
  to the latter is the insidious
  effect of the mindset that is the
  legacy of the 1947 Key
  West accord. This
  forty-five year-old agreement
  divided defense missions and
  responsibilities among the armed
  services. It has also served to
  inculcate an attitudinal
  predisposition within the Defense
  Department that assigns equal
  shares among the Army, Navy
  and Air Force whether the budget
  is increasing or contracting. No
  less real are the pressures for
  each congressional district to
  retain its defense establishment
  and any defense production lines
  it may have — irrespective of
  their contribution to the needed
  national capability.

Considerations in
Sizing/Configuring U.S. Forces in the
Anticipated Environment

The
foregoing requirements can best be met if
the decision-making process on which the
United States is now embarked is guided
by the following considerations:

• The United States will continue
  to have global interests, be they
  of a strategic, trade and other
  economic, political or other
  nature.
• It is becoming ever less likely
  that anyone else is
  going to look out for these U.S.
  interests. In particular,
  longstanding alliance
  relationships are changing and
  becoming less reliable.
• For example, Germany’s
  reunification and its increasing
  preoccupation with domination of
  European political and economic
  affairs has recast its
  traditional post-war desire for
  American protection and its
  willingness to be a deferential
  partner in international affairs.
  Similarly, Japan’s immense
  economic clout and the diminution
  of an imminent Soviet threat in
  East Asia have exacerbated the
  tensions often present in
  U.S.-Japanese security and other
  ties. Where the U.S. ability to
  act depends upon these
  and other allies — in contrast
  with Desert Storm where, in the
  final analysis, it did not
  — it seems reasonable to expect
  that they will be increasingly
  unlikely to play whatever role
  the United States requires.
• Unfortunately (although not
  coincidentally), U.S. dependence
  on its allies is actually growing
  substantially as a result of the
  loss of forward bases, notably in
  Germany and the Philippines. This
  would likely mean that the costs
  and difficulties associated with
  U.S. power projection in the
  future will increase.
• The turmoil and change now being
  experienced by the former Soviet
  empire may or may not mean an
  appreciable and sustained
  reduction in the threat that has
  traditionally come from that
  quarter. It seems prudent to
  expect, however, that — unless
  and until a genuine
  transformation of the old Soviet
  system (especially, its
  military-industrial complex) is
  secured — the potential for
  future problems with the former
  USSR cannot be permanently
  dismissed.
• Moreover, those whose aggressive
  tendencies were formerly held in
  check or otherwise influenced by
  Cold War calculations (e.g., the
  danger of nuclear escalation) may
  no longer be able or willing,
  with that conflict’s passing, to
  resist temptations to go after
  neighbors or other targets of
  opportunity. This may be true
  even where, by so doing, they act
  in ways contrary to U.S.
  interests. In this connection, it
  is important to remember that the
  collapse of USSR is producing a
  glut of advanced weapons and
  military know-how on the world
  market with which such aggression
  can be undertaken and which could
  add substantially to the costs of
  reversing it.

So What is Required?

Under these circumstances, the United
States will need substantial quantities
of forces featuring the following
characteristics:

• Capable of rapidly bringing U.S.
  power credibly and discriminately
  to bear on conflicts against
  adversaries anywhere in the
  world;
• Featuring the flexibility to have
  application at many — if not
  virtually all — levels of
  conflict in the spectrum of
  warfare running the gamut from
  counter-terrorism to strategic
  nuclear war;
• Exploiting inherent U.S.
  advantages — notably in high
  technology — to maximize the
  effectiveness of our forces
  against even the most
  sophisticated of adversaries.
  This is especially true of the
  need to enhance the
  discriminateness of attacks
  (i.e., reduction of unintended,
  collateral damage) while
  minimizing the degree to which
  U.S. personnel are put in harm’s
  way.

Such characteristics are best
exemplified in the following
forces — which should,
therefore, be given priority in
budgetary, force structure and
programmatic decisions:

• Carrier battle groups,
  equipped with relatively
  long-range, stealthy strike
  aircraft. It is far from
  clear that present and future
  conditions permit a safe
  reduction in the number of active
  carriers from fourteen to twelve
  — let alone to ten or fewer
  carrier battle groups. In any
  event, the nation must
  clearly proceed with procurement
  of a new carrier for both
  industrial and force obsolescence
  considerations.
• Sea-launched cruise
  missiles (SLCMs).
  Increased deployment of SLCMs
  equipped with a variety of
  warheads optimized for
  land-attack, runway busting,
  choke point-denial and other
  purposes would add enormously to
  the Navy’s on-shore
  power-projection capabilities.
• Precision guided
  surface-to-surface missiles with
  advanced submunitions.
  Deployment of such advanced
  systems would reduce present
  reliance on heavy armor for the
  combat power of ground forces.
• Marine amphibious forces,
  equipped with indigenous sea- and
  airlift assets (including
  deployment of the
  force-multiplying V-22 Osprey
  tiltrotor system).
  Consideration should be given to expanding,
  rather than reducing, the Marine
  Corps and other special
  operations forces under present
  conditions.
• Stealthy
  intercontinental-range bombers,
  namely, the B-2. These
  aircraft are uniquely capable of
  striking heavily defended targets
  anywhere in the world within
  hours of a decision to do so and
  with negligible need for allied
  support or risk to U.S. service
  personnel.
• Space-based surveillance
  and space control capabilities
  (including a secure space launch
  and anti-satellite capacity).
  The Gulf War demonstrated that
  command of and operations from
  space will be increasingly
  indispensable to terrestrial
  warfighting strategies.
  Particular emphasis should be
  placed on space-based
  intelligence and warning
  capabilities.
• Global (including
  space-based) defenses
  against ballistic missile attack.
  A clear lesson of the Gulf War is
  the unacceptability of a posture
  of vulnerability to such attack;
  the United States simply must
  provide effective defenses
  against ballistic missiles for
  both its forward deployed troops,
  assets and allies and for its own
  population. The most
  cost-effective and highly
  leveraged way to accomplish this
  would be through a layered
  deployment including space-based
  Brilliant Pebbles interceptors.
• Reliable, survivably
  based nuclear forces (including
  nuclear sea-launched cruise
  missiles deployed at sea,
  not kept ashore). These
  weapons will continue to be
  needed for deterrence of nuclear
  war and warfighting, should it be
  necessary.
• Robust command, control,
  communications and intelligence
  capabilities. These must
  include in the future more
  distributed systems capable of
  equipping battlefield commanders
  in real-time with the products of
  advanced intelligence systems.
• Greater sea- and airlift
  capabilities than were available
  at the time of Desert Storm.
  To the extent that American
  ground will increasingly be based
  in the continental United States,
  the need will only increase for
  lift capacity sorely taxed by
  Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

In an environment of finite — and
declining — resources, trade-offs
will inevitably have to be made to
acquire and maintain such capabilities.
Candidates for reduced priority and
funding include the following:

• Heavy armored and mechanized
  infantry divisions of the U.S.
  Army.
• Tactical fighter wings.
• Nuclear-powered attack
  submarines.

Unfortunately, these tend to be precisely
the systems most strongly favored by the
service constituencies that currently
dominate the Army, Air Force and Navy
hierarchies, respectively. Therefore, they
are the assets and capabilities least
likely to be cut by any
decision-making approach to force
reductions that relies upon those
hierarchies to determine service
priorities and candidates for cuts.
Not surprisingly, it appears that, in the
defense cuts Mr. Bush will recommend
tonight, these less important systems
will be protected at the expense of many
of the higher priority programs and
capabilities mentioned above.

The foregoing prescription for a
revised U.S. defense posture might,
on net and over time, result in a
military force somewhat smaller
than that projected by the Cheney
Five-Year Defense Plan unveiled last
year. This, in turn, could entail defense
outlays below those projected by his
plan. The exact size of any such further
cuts and associated savings would, of
course, depend upon the specific force
levels (ships, air wings, divisions,
etc.) selected.

Whether the alternative defense
posture recommended here could result in
any appreciable savings would almost
certainly depend on whether present and
serious inefficiencies in defense
procurement are reduced and greater
stability and predictability imparted to
out-year budgeting by both the executive
and the legislative branches.
Regrettably, at present there appears to
be little willingness on the part of
either the executive or legislative
branches to rectify these critical
systemic problems.

Supporting Actions

In the latter regard, it is of
particular importance if the United
States is to obtain maximum return on its
declining investment in defense, that it
reconsider present approaches toward
government-industry collaboration in
support of national security readiness
and technological competitiveness. Here,
too, there has been a painful inattention
— or, worse, active resistance — on the
part of the Bush Administration to
anything that might smack of
“industrial policy.”

Specifically, thought needs to be
given to ways in which the United States
can responsibly eliminate unsustainable
duplication in defense industrial
capacity while ensuring that at least a
single U.S. supplier remains available to
provide vital hardware or components. Far
and away the best way to accomplish this
would be for the Administration and the
Congress to agree on a level of defense
capability that will be required for the
foreseeable future — and stick to it
long enough for market forces in the
defense industry to adjust and stabilize
accordingly.

Under such a arrangement, if it is
decided that cuts are in order,
they could be phased in in an
orderly and gradual manner. As a
result, the present Hobson’s choice of
destroying the morale and readiness of
the volunteer armed forces or denying
them the capabilities required to do
their jobs could be avoided. While either
the Congress or the executive branch —
or both — has found it difficult to
fashion and stick to an agreed defense
spending plan in the past, this is the
only formula that holds out any hope of
maintaining the sort of forces, equipment
and industrial base needed for today and
tomorrow.

Forget About R&D-Only

By contrast, the Bush Administration’s
apparent decision to embrace the idea of
conducting research and development on
major new weapon systems — but
refraining from putting them into
production — is a formula for disaster.
Consider the following:

• A significant technology in
  modern weapons involves
  manufacturing technology;
  stopping short of at least
  limited full-scale production
  dramatically lessens the
  confidence one can have in the
  producibility and viability of a
  given system.
• Some of the most critical skills
  needed to produce modern weapons
  reside in a highly qualified and
  employed workforce. If that
  workforce has been disbanded,
  there is negligible prospect of
  swiftly restoring it to reliable
  operation within the stipulated
  year’s time.
• Not fielding enough systems,
  albeit sometimes a small number,
  will prevent necessary military
  doctrine and operational art to
  develop. For example, had this
  policy been applied to the
  helicopter, the F-117,
  conventional cruise missiles and
  many other systems, the United
  States could never have fielded
  what was necessary for Desert
  Storm — even if the production
  base had been in place.

The effect of a penny-wise and
pound-foolish R&D-only policy is
predictable: It will ensure that today’s
American five-year olds will be
ill-equipped to deter a war fifteen or
twenty years hence — and may die
unnecessarily should deterrence fail.

“Systemic” Arms
Control

Another step that should be considered
in connection with force structure cuts
and defense budget reductions would
involve minimizing the risks associated
with such cut-backs — especially those
that would affect forces principally
designed and structured to deal with the
threat the U.S. has faced from the Soviet
Union. This can best be done by effecting
the wholesale transformation of
the Soviet system — both political and
economic.

While accomplishing such a
transformation ultimately depends upon
the will and determination of the
successors to the Soviet Union, there is
much the United States and its allies
could do to facilitate it. For one thing,
the West can deal with those
“qualifying” republics that
demonstrate with concrete and aggressive
action their commitment to the democratic
and free market overhaul of their
societies. After all, by bringing to bear
Western aid, trade, technological
assistance, know-how and other assets in a
selective and highly leveraged manner
on behalf of such “qualifying”
republics, Western nations could ensure
that far more effective and lasting
disarmament of the residual Soviet
military capability is actually
undertaken.

A systemic approach — rather than
misbegotten throw backs to an arms
control era now past (e.g., de-MIRVing,
nuclear freezing and sweeping unilateral
cuts of modern and important strategic
systems) — is the order of the day.
President Bush’s determination to press
ahead with the latter sort of arms
control initiatives is at best distinctly
premature. At worst, it could prove
downright reckless.

Conclusion

When all is said and done, the
business of defining appropriate levels
of U.S. defense force structure and
expenditures is an art, not a
science. It requires highly subjective
decisions to be made about the degree of
threat the United States faces and the
amount of risk it is willing to assume
with regard to our preparedness to deal
with that threat.

Fortunately, notwithstanding the
unhappily lingering recession, this
country is in a position to take its time
to draw down its force structure. Given
the considerable uncertainties about the
emerging world and the dangers it may
pose to U.S. interests down the road, it
would be wise to avoid the mistake this
country has made again and again in the
past, namely of cutting defense too
dramatically and too quickly. After all, the
costs entailed in trying to rectify the
situation that usually follows such a
rash act typically far exceed
any savings that might accrue in the
short-run.

It would appear, therefore, for fiscal
as well as strategic reasons that the
United States should strenuously resist
the temptation to gut our defenses. Alas,
that would appear to be the effect of
even the Cheney draw-down
program enunciated last year — if
it is implemented in the absence of
systemic reforms both here in the United
States and in the former Soviet
Union. Needless to say, matters will only
be made worse if inaction on the systemic
side is compounded by a slashing of the
U.S. defense budget and force structure
well beyond the levels recommended by
Secretary Cheney.

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