SUMMARY OF THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY HIGH-LEVEL ROUNDTABLE ON THE FUTURE OF THE MANNED BOMBER FORCE

Introduction

In recent weeks, many Americans — including President Clinton
and his national security team — have been obliged to give
urgent consideration to possible military responses to the danger
posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Even the most
superficial stock-taking leads to similar conclusions: Important
constraints currently exist on the United States’ ability to
project power effectively and swiftly over long distances. Even
relative to the U.S. power-projection capabilities extant at the
time of — and utilized to such good effect in the course of —
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, American options for
dealing militarily with present and potential threats on the
Korean peninsula are seriously limited.

On 8 June 1994, the Center for Security Policy hosted a
day-long “Roundtable” discussion on these limitations
and their implications for U.S. defense and foreign policy in the
years ahead. The particular focus was the role long-range manned
bombers could — and should — play in future American defense
strategies. Held at the ANA Westin Hotel in Washington, D.C.,
this discussion drew upon the insights and experience of a
distinguished group of past and present senior government
officials including: former Secretaries of Defense James
Schlesinger and Caspar Weinberger; the
present Commander of the Air Combat Command, Gen. John M.
Loh; former Secretary of the Navy and Defense Department
Comptroller Sean O’Keefe; former Under
Secretaries of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Donald
Hicks; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank
Miller; senior representatives of the Congressional
Budget Office and the Defense Budget Project;
and top journalists from a number of national and trade
publications. (The full list of
participants is attached.)

In the course of the day’s deliberations the following key
topics were addressed in some detail: How important is U.S. power
projection in the post-Cold War Era? What role are long-range
manned bombers expected to play in U.S. power projection in the
future? Do current bomber force structure plans meet projected
needs? What options exist for bringing U.S. bomber forces into
alignment with requirements? How can required bomber capabilities
be afforded?

The following briefly summarizes the key points that emerged
in the course of the Center’s Roundtable. No effort was made to
define or formally approve consensus positions on these topics;
neither were specific recommendations adopted by the group.
Still, this summary sets forth a number of points that appeared
to be generally agreed — and that bear directly upon pending
executive and legislative branch decisions concerning the future
contribution of the U.S. manned bomber force to the nation’s
power projection capabilities.

The Importance of U.S. Power Projection in the
Post-Cold War Era

The Lead Discussant for this part of the day’s program was
Paul Wolfowitz, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
who is currently the Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies. Highlights included the following
observations:

Serious threats to U.S. vital interests have not
gone away even though they have become somewhat
more difficult to predict in the aftermath of the bipolar
paradigm of the Cold War. In fact, there is very little
prospect that the emerging world will be a stable one.

It is, of course, much more difficult to design forces to
meet myriad threats rather than a single one. A
premium is thus placed on those military systems with
considerable inherent flexibility.

Priority should also be given to those weapons
platforms whose flexibility allows them to perform
nuclear as well as conventional operations.
Dual-capable systems that provide great latitude in
targeting, over long distances and with the possibility
of recall are likely to be most valuable.

The present and projected defense budgets will
not sustain anything like the capabilities needed to
fight two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts
(MRCs). By some estimates, to do so would
require a restoration of at least $55-60 billion to the
Pentagon’s accounts.

The fact that the United States is increasingly
becoming a home-based force with relatively small
overseas deployments and forward bases greatly
compounds these realities.

In particular, it underscores the need to be able
to respond to emerging dangers quickly.

Experience with building and maintaining the Gulf War
coalition suggests that effective multilateral
solutions to international problems may only be available
to the extent that the United States is in a position
credibly to act unilaterally against threats to
its interests and stability.

What is more, coalition warfare in the future is likely
to place an even greater emphasis on the United
States’ unique ability to contribute power projection and
precision strike capabilities.

The maintenance of the United States’ qualitative
edge in the long-term military competition is crucial —
and must not be taken for granted. It is
seductive, but potentially quite dangerous, to believe
that the inability to identify a specific adversary
capable of matching American military technology at the
moment is grounds for dispensing with continuing
investments in development and production of
state-of-the-art weapon systems.

The Role of Long-Range Manned Bombers

Building upon the general sentiment that U.S. power-projection
was going to remain a crucial national requirement and that
certain weapon characteristics were likely to be highly prized in
the future, the discussion then turned to long-range
manned bombers — systems whose inherent flexibility, large
weapons payload capacity and ability to respond quickly to
changing circumstances optimize them for such roles.
Gen. John M. Loh, Commander of the U.S. Air Combat Command, was
the Lead Discussant for this portion of the Roundtable. Key
points made included the following:

The American military is increasingly being
viewed as an expeditionary force, operating ever
more from the continental United States and expected to
bring sufficient power to bear to win — and win
decisively — virtually anywhere in the world.

At the same time, the need to minimize the number
of U.S. service personnel put in harm’s way in the course
of such operations is growing.

It seems probable that strategic warning in the
future will often be ambiguous and in any event less
available than heretofore. As a result,
significant quantities of U.S. power projection
capabilities must be ready to go at a moment’s notice.
This “come as you are” requirement necessitates
not only the fielding of appropriate hardware but also
continuing investment in readiness, spare parts,
crew-training, etc.

Experience with Desert Storm demonstrated the
high value of precision-guided munitions and
“stealthy” weapons-delivery systems.

The Clinton Administration’s Bottom-Up Review recognized
the importance of long-range manned bombers to the
feasibility of its two-MRC strategy: The
Pentagon’s analysis determined that 100 bombers would be
a key ingredient in defeating hostile forces in the first
contingency then rapidly being shifted to interdict the
enemy and set the stage for victory in the second one.
To maintain such capability, the Defense Department
determined that a total inventory of some 184
aircraft would be required.

The present budget does not provide for that size
force to be retained, however. Instead, it permits only
107 manned bombers to remain in the active inventory.
The other seventy-seven would be obliged for lack of
funds to be moved into “back-up status” for
several years. In theory, they would be returned to
active duty in the “out-years”; in practice,
however, this sizeable contraction will probably prove to
be a permanent one, all other things being equal.

To retain an effective bomber force over time,
the inventory must be replaced. The B-52s are,
in many cases, older than the pilots who fly them and
cannot be effectively operated indefinitely. Given the
high unit costs of replacement systems and the need to
maintain a competent industrial capacity to produce them,
sustained low-rate production — akin to the Navy’s
approach to building capital ships — may be the only
feasible means of assuring an affordable modernization
program.

The idea of terminating the only long-range manned bomber
in production in the U.S. today while preserving a
larger-than-proportional share of indirect operating and
support expenditures is as absurd as a business
eliminating manufacture of its products in order to
preserve its overhead.

A Mismatch Between Current Requirements and Manned
Bomber Force Structure?

Having established the unique contribution manned bombers are
likely to continue to make to U.S. security, the Roundtable next
considered the adequacy of manned bomber force levels. Frank
Miller, a career civil servant who currently serves as a
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Clinton
Administration, acted as the Lead Discussant for this section.
Key issues raised included the following:

Important studies are currently underway
concerning the U.S. nuclear posture and the possible
reallocation of military roles and missions among the
armed services. If objectively performed, these
reviews may well assign even greater importance to the
long-range manned bomber force.

These questions are, however, being prejudged as
a practical matter by the budgets for Fiscal Years 1995
and 1996 and the dramatic reductions in bomber
force structure they allow. The simple truth is that the
Clinton budget will not permit the retention of even the
bomber forces it has said will be needed to deal with two
Major Regional Contingencies.

This impact may be particularly acute in the
nuclear area should the faltering prospects for
democratic and free market reform in Russia give rise to
renewed dangers from that quarter and create a renewed
requirement for a highly credible and flexible nuclear
deterrent.

Simply improving the capabilities and inventory
size of “smart weapons” will not offset the
effects of excessive contraction of the platforms
required to carry them. It also must be noted
that there are substantial costs associated with such
procurements of large quantities of precision guided
munitions.

Options for Sustaining a Viable Manned Bomber Force

Against the backdrop of widespread sentiment that long-range
manned bombers were likely to make an even more important
contribution in the future to U.S. power projection capabilities
than they had in the past and concerns that the present program
would not assure the long-term viability of the manned bomber
force, the discussion next turned to consideration of possible
corrective actions. Donald Hicks, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, served as Lead Discussant
of this session. Highlights included the following:

The United States is entering a period when, for the
first time since World War II, it has no
long-range bomber either in development or in production.

Now, as the decision to close down the production line
for the B-2 — a decision taken for budgetary and
political reasons with no regard for strategic
considerations — begins to be implemented, the United
States is about to lose its only industrial capacity to
perform the large-scale integration involved in
manufacturing a complex bomber aircraft.

The production of “stealthy” aircraft is a
particularly exacting task. Once skilled
workforces have been dissipated, it will take many years
to requalify a manufacturing capability.

There are essentially three options available:

Proceed with the Clinton Administration’s plan
to cap the production of B-2s at 20 aircraft and
close down the only existing U.S. capacity to
produce manned bombers, i.e., the B-2 production
line. To ensure the eventual replacement of aging
B-52 aircraft and maintain needed force levels, this
option would require that an enormous investment
be made in the future (judged to be on the order
of $50 billion). It would also take
conservatively 10 years before a new bomber could
be produced.

Importantly, the participants seemed
in general agreement that a new bomber would wind
up looking a great deal like the B-2 and costing
appreciably more per unit than the B-2.
It was also noted that the existing B-2 has
considerable growth capability with respect to
weapons carriage and stealth performance.

Suspend production of B-2 bombers until the
year 2000, taking such steps as are necessary to
retain the tooling and minimize the lead-time
involved in renewed manufacturing of this weapon
system. It would cost approximately $6
billion and take roughly nine years to get the
first B-2 off the reopened line.

Invest the $150 million needed in FY1995 to
preserve the option to continue production beyond
20 B-2s. For an expenditure of approximately $12
billion starting in FY1996, 20 additional
aircraft could be produced — at a
cost-per-aircraft of approximately $600 million
thanks to the investment (roughly $44 billion)
already made to produce the first 20 aircraft.

Matching Defense Requirements with Available
Resources

The Roundtable concluded with a discussion of the adequacy of
present and prospective defense spending levels for maintaining
critical military capabilities, including an effective manned
bomber force. Sean O’Keefe, former Secretary of the Navy and
Defense Department Comptroller, was the Lead Discussant for this
session. Its highlights included the following points:

The defense budget is seriously underfunded,
perhaps by as much as $100 billion over the Five-Year
Defense Plan. Out of the $156 billion in cuts
contemplated by the Clinton FYDP, only $14 billion have
been effected so far, raising serious questions about
where the remainder will be coming from.

Modernization-related investment is being the
most seriously affected by these reductions (down
by some 50%), far more so than indirect operations and
support spending (overhead — down by roughly 10 percent)
and direct operations and support (readiness-related
spending — down by 45%).

Matters are made worse by the roughly $15 billion
in non-military related spending now being assigned to
Pentagon accounts. These include expenditures
for environmental clean-up, peacekeeping, humanitarian
and disaster relief and related functions.

At these low levels of defense expenditures, the
impending loss of the capability to produce manned
bombers is only one of a number of worrisome industrial
base problems. Others include the nation’s
evaporating capacity to manufacture fighter aircraft,
tanks and submarines.

If the cost of procuring and operating 20 additional B-2
bombers over the next twenty years were to have to come
from within planned resources, it would require
draconian cuts in or the elimination of a number of other
programs.

On the other hand, given the increasing risks confronting
U.S. interests around the world — and the implications
of continued decline in defense capabilities and spending
for the Nation’s ability to project power and protect
those interests — it seems likely that additional
resources are going to have to be made available to the
Pentagon in the future.

With or without such additional resources, however,
serious consideration is going to have to be given to
reordering priorities so as to give preference to
those forces and weapon systems capable of providing the
most highly leveraged, flexible and timely
power-projection at the least risk to the lives of
American service personnel. By any measure,
long-range manned bombers in general — and the B-2 in
particular — fit this bill.

Conclusion

The thrust of the Center for Security Policy’s Roundtable on
the Future of the Manned Bomber Force suggested an informal
consensus: The United States cannot afford to effect the
draconian reductions in long-range bomber capabilities envisioned
by the Clinton defense plan. These forces are, if
anything, likely to be more important in the future due to
emerging world conditions and the contraction of American
military forces to bases in the continental U.S.

The discussion also established that the most
cost-effective means of assuring the future viability of the
manned bomber force would be through continued production of the
B-2. Compelling arguments were made for considering
low-rate production of this state-of-the-art system as a more
affordable alternative to block procurements. The idea of
investing $150 million in FY1995 — the amount needed temporarily
to preserve the existing B-2 production line pending further
analysis, debate and decisions about acquiring more than 20
“Stealth” bombers — appeared to enjoy the support of
most, if not all, the participants.