Symposium on the fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War

Summary of the Proceedings of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace and The William J. Casey Institute of The Center For Security Policy

22 February 1999

Willard Hotel

Washington, DC

On 22 February, the William J. Casey Institute of the Center for Security Policy and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace convened an elegant luncheon and informative symposium in Washington to examine in detail the policies and people assembled by President Ronald Reagan that materially contributed to ending the Soviet Empire. In contrast to revisionist accounts (e.g., CNN’S "Cold War" series) concerning the demise of the Soviet Union, the Casey/Hoover event established that the Soviet Union was indeed an "Evil Empire" and that the extraordinary achievement of bringing about its collapse was neither an accident nor inevitable.

It was, instead, the result in no small measure of a concerted, deliberate and principled strategy to liberate the peoples subjugated by Soviet totalitarianism — a strategy crafted and executed by President Reagan, his Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey, and other principals of the first Reagan Administration’s national security team.

The Reagan Role in the Soviet Empire’s Collapse

Following the luncheon at the Willard Hotel, an illustrious group of Reagan-era policy-makers convened to address "The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Reassessing the Causes and Consequences of the End of the Cold War." Among those who made presentations were: former National Security Advisors to the President Richard V. Allen and William P. Clark, former Attorney General and Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, and former Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Iklé.

Like the panel, the audience of more than three hundred policy-practitioners, scholars, industry leaders and members of the press included a sizeable number of those who played pivotal roles in securing the successful conclusion of this triumphant "twilight struggle."

The afternoon session was moderated by the Casey Institute’s William J. Casey Chair, Hon. Roger W. Robinson, Jr., who also made opening remarks. Mr. Robinson was formerly Senior Director of International Economic Affairs at the Reagan National Security Council, and was intimately involved in the formulation of the economic dimensions of the comprehensive secret strategy employed by the President and his national security team to roll back the Soviet Union. He outlined the symposium’s objectives, notably to "dispel the myths seemingly intended to diminish President Reagan’s principled, moral leadership as well as that of those who served with him in the trenches of the Cold War."

Why did the Cold War End?

The scene was further set for the discussion by one of the Hoover Institution’s distinguished Fellows, Peter Schweizer, who authored Victory — one of the most historically accurate studies of the end of the Cold War. Mr. Schweizer described the Reagan plan for denying Moscow Western life- support and stressing its fragile economy. Highlights of Mr. Schweizer’s remarks included the following:

"The Soviet Union simply collapsed, seemingly under its own weight. This has given rise to a discussion or a debate about how the end came about and what factors loomed largest. I think certainly we could look at such issues as latent nationalism, the decline of Soviet ideology, and, of course, the economic shortcomings that plagued the Soviet Union, but I think we need to dig deeper than that.

"We have to ask the question, why did it occur when it occurred? One area where we can find a dramatic change in the health of the Soviet system is a direct result of the changes in U.S. policy that took place in the Reagan Administration….The United States under the Reagan Administration broke from containment in two very important areas: [Encouragement and support for] those forces trying to roll back Soviet power…The second twin part was the economic war that the Administration carried out."

"The Reagan Administration represented a dramatic break from the past American foreign policy. . . that was a critical factor in determining the ultimate fate of the Soviet Union."

"History is going to be the judge, but history will judge the Reagan Administration very clearly. All the gentlemen that are here played an important role [and] several individuals who could not be here today also played a very important role — perhaps most of all, Bill Casey, the director of the CIA."

"The idea of economic warfare, the idea using covert action to roll back the enemy opponent are initiatives that [Casey] carried out during the Second World War…and he saw the effort against the Soviet Union in very much the same light."

Reagan’s Winning Philosophy

Another Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Hon. Richard V. Allen, then addressed the topic, drawing upon his experience as Candidate Reagan’s chief foreign policy advisor and, after the 1980 election, as his first National Security Advisor. Mr. Allen described Mr. Reagan’s philosophy with respect to American power and interests — and the principles and objectives that carried him into the Presidency:

"It was in 1976…that [Mr. Reagan] began a concentrated focus on developing a comprehensive and coherent national strategy….When he began his spring offensive [against then-President Gerald Ford] in 1976, with an attack on the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, his campaign ignited…."

"Mr. Reagan went right to the heart of the matter….[At one point, he told Mr. Allen] ‘My idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic. We win and they lose.’ Mr. Reagan went right to the heart of the matter."

"Utilizing American values, strength and creativity, we could out-distance the Soviets and cause them to withdraw from the Cold War — or perhaps even collapse. Herein lay the great difference, back in early 1977, between Ronald Reagan and every other politician. He literally believed we could win and he was prepared to carry this message to the Nation as the foundation of a presidency."

"There was a leader, and the leader had a clear concept of how to marshal American strength in the service of a historic objective."

Mr. Allen also related some anecdotes regarding experiences that contributed to the evolution of Mr. Reagan’s philosophy toward the former Soviet Union:

"It was in Berlin [before he came to office] that Ronald Reagan experienced a powerful first-hand encounter with the face of Communism. Approaching the wall, his countenance darkened, and he stood before it in silence for several minutes before turning to us saying, ‘We have got to find a way to knock this down.’"

"I believe the encounter with the wall and witnessing the armed harassment of an ordinary citizen seared into the Governor’s memory, the brutality of the Communist system, and reinforced his dedication to placing it upon the ash heap of history."

Tactics that Led to the Demise of the Soviet Union

Dr. Fred Iklé, who currently is a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, next delineated two key features of the Reagan strategy for defeating the USSR — his defense build-up and export control initiatives. Dr. Iklé also drew comparisons between the U.S. policies that under President Reagan did so much to advance the cause of freedom and those being pursued today. Among his most important points were the following:

"Ronald Reagan had the courage to articulate what was then an incendiary idea…namely, that we had a Cold War because of the Evil Empire — and we could not end the cold war without undoing that empire."

"Together with Bill Casey’s CIA, we fought on every front to destabilize the Soviet empire ….By destabilizing the Evil Empire, we dealt with the cause of the Cold War — not its symptoms — and we won."

"We do not lack information about today’s troubles and threats. We lack conviction and the courage to use our knowledge ….We lack leaders like Bill Casey, who have the courage to give strategic meaning to what we know."

Reagan’s Strategy Implementation

A particular highlight of this extraordinary program came when Hon. William P. Clark discussed his role as President Reagan’s second National Security Advisor for the first time since he left that office sixteen years ago. Judge Clark was responsible for supervising the creation and implementation of the key National Security Decision Directives that achieved the roll-back and ultimately the unraveling of the Soviet Empire. In addition to his pivotal role at the White House, this long-time Reagan confidant served as Deputy Secretary of State and Secretary of the Interior. Mr. Clark spoke of Mr. Reagan’s visions of a Soviet strategy:

"It has always been the objective of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union to combine containment with negotiations ….[Under President Reagan,] the United States Government [added] a third objective to its relations with the Soviet Union, namely encouraging anti-totalitarian changes within the USSR and refraining from assisting the Soviet regime to consolidate further its hold on the country."

"In the ideological competition, the United States should strongly affirm the superiority of Western values, expose the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside world, and prevent the Soviet Union from seizing the semantic high ground in the battle of ideas."

"War was inevitable unless we were able to change the Soviet system….We worked hard on that new policy element of trying to turn the Soviet Union inside itself."

Reagan’s Challenges

Next, Hon. Ed Meese outlined some of the key turning points in President Reagan’s efforts to challenge and thwart Soviet predations.

"It is hard to remember in some ways how bad things were, particularly in the national security field ….We had an underfunded military….Some of the Vietnam Syndrome was still lingering….We were told we had to acquiesce to virtual, perpetual coexistence with the Soviet Union and an acceptance of the inevitable continuance — if not triumph — of socialism as an economic doctrine and Marxist totalitarianism as a political doctrine."

"Three vital aspects to President Reagan’s strategy were: Engage the Soviet Union on a moral level….[Reagan] felt that totalitarianism and oppression was not only wrong in itself from a moral standpoint, but it also had the seeds of its own destruction….The second major part of the strategy was to halt the aggression of the Soviet Union, and indeed, during his term of office, there was not one square kilometer of new soil that fell beneath the boots of Soviet troops. But the most important aspect perhaps of this strategy was [the President’s] determination to roll back the prior aggression through support of freedom fighters around the world."

"Marxism had failed to liberate less-developed countries, and in fact had wrought misery, famine, and genocide of historic proportions….The United States in the 1980’s faced a unique opportunity to help oppressed peoples resisting totalitarian regimes and to inject free-market approaches…."

In remarking upon the dramatic difference between the policies of the Reagan Administration and those of the Clinton Administration, Mr. Meese emphasized the deleterious contribution being made to the latter’s policies by its senior personnel:

"The people who…were wrong about the 1980’s…are the people who are [currently] responsible for foreign and defense policies and practices that have jeopardized our security, that have violated principles of integrity and consistency, and that have failed to keep faith — particularly with the men and women in our armed forces who have the ultimate mission of protecting our citizens and our country."

"The State Department today is being led by Jimmy Carter’s third string. There is no way that people who cannot understand or who did not understand Soviet Communism and who cannot learn the lessons of victory that Ronald Reagan taught will ever learn how to effectively provide us with a national security policy that will advance America’s interest, keep us out of situations and places where we do not belong, and ultimately contribute to world peace and stability on a rational basis."

Applying the Reagan Lessons

Finally, Frank J. Gaffney Jr., the President of the Center for Security Policy who formerly acted as an Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration, concluded the session’s formal proceedings with a discussion of "Where We Go From Here." He argued that the principles that underpinned the Reagan strategy — of peace through strength; commitment to individual freedom and economic opportunity; and steady, competent U.S. leadership in international affairs — must once again serve as guides for American security policy.

Mr. Gaffney issued a call to arms for those who continue to adhere to these principles, urging them to join forces in a concerted effort to ensure the prominence of national security in our public discourse and to ensure that related policies are effectively executed once more for the purpose of safeguarding and advancing vital U.S. security interests around the globe. The following were among the highlights of his remarks:

"We need to teach this history. It is not enough for those of us who had the privilege of being part of it to remember and to share anecdotally some of our insights. It must be conveyed to future generations….It is a peculiar phenomenon that the Cold War may be the first war in history whose story is being written by the losers — the intellectual elite that embraced moral equivalence if not the Soviet cause, itself — and that is clearly an unacceptable situation."

"We must implement at long last Ronald Reagan’s single most important national security initiative, and that, of course, will require us to begin to deploy an effective anti-missile system capable of ending America’s current, abject and increasingly reckless vulnerability to attack."

"Let us go forward from this room not only moved by what we remember from these glorious years of old, but committed to bring to the years ahead the kind of safety, the kind of opportunity, both personal and national, that gave Ronald Reagan’s America its lietmotif as "the shining city on a hill" and an inspiration to the world at large."

The Casey Institute and Hoover Institution Symposium enthusiastically reaffirmed the principles that have in the past given rise to a coherent and powerful U.S. foreign policy — and that are even more required today. Those responsible for the formulation and implementation of the American security policies that led to the end of the Cold War should be heeded closely and their legacy allowed to serve as a beacon to future policy-makers.