The Fight For Democracy In Central America: The Bush Administration Must Stay The Course

The chances for freedom in Central America may be sharply reduced at the summit meeting of Central American presidents this weekend. When the four democratically elected presidents meet with Daniel Ortega, the key agenda item is to be a Sandinista demand that the Nicaraguan Resistance forces be disbanded before Managua holds "free" elections.

The Sandinistas are well aware that the Honduran government will never use force to disarm and disband the Resistance forces, so no decision taken this weekend will actually force the Resistance to disarm in short order. The Sandinistas have, however, devised a clear (if cynical) strategy, fashioned, as ever, with an eye on politics — those in the United States as well as in the region. Even as they continue to benefit from massive infusions of $1 billion this year in Soviet arms and economic aid, Ortega et al. hope to eliminate totally the very modest assistance that sustains the Resistance and/or to create a pretext for precluding any genuine vote.

It is vital that the Bush Administration fully recognize, and act to prevent, a debacle for U.S. interests in the region resulting from the success of Managua’s initiative, namely the abandonment of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Years of American unreliability have greatly diminished U.S. credibility and clout in the region, and — even if American leadership is brought to bear — there is a considerable risk that a new "peace plan" could emerge from this weekend’s summit meeting, establishing a de jure requirement to disarm the Contras. Despite these odds, the Bush Administration must go all out to prevent such an ominous Sandinista victory.

The Legacy of Past Arias Plans

The original Arias Plan and its progeny have all been premised on the assumption of a simple but critical trade: peace for democracy. According to this logic, it was only when political systems opened up that guerrillas were expected to put down their arms and return home to compete for power with ballots in free elections.

Up to this point, notwithstanding a series of regional "peace" accords, it has been understood that the Nicaraguan Resistance was under no obligation to disarm or disband until after the Nicaraguan elections of February 1990. Indeed, it has been implicitly recognized by virtually all the non-communist players in this drama that the existence of a Nicaraguan Resistance movement was an essential factor in pressuring the regime in Managua to hold fair and free elections — and to respect their outcome.

In accordance with this understanding Congress has several times voted humanitarian aid to the Resistance, with bipartisan agreement that the aid is in no sense contrary to the various peace plans. Right now, U.S. humanitarian aid helps keep the Resistance forces together, and they remain an organized military force with surprisingly good morale.

The absence of on-going military support to the Resistance is not enough for the Sandinistas, however. Despite the Sandinistas’ abysmal record of violating the Arias Plan, the Contadora "process" and other international agreements such as those pledged to the OAS when they came to power, they want the Resistance completely eliminated now so that it is in no position to react if the Sandinistas decide to cancel or steal the election. And the only way to effect its elimination is via the U.S. Congress.

So, as usual, Congress is the real target in the Sandinistas’ regional diplomatic efforts. If he can get the other presidents to sign a paper calling for disbanding the Resistance prior to the elections in February, Ortega will have given his allies in Congress a powerful weapon to use in demanding a cut-off in humanitarian aid. The argument will be an all too familiar one: continuing aid violates the newest peace plan because it maintains the Resistance as a force in being. Henceforth, the Sandinistas’ allies and apologists will argue, the only legitimate aid is refugee resettlement assistance.

The Other Shoe

Moreover, knowing full well that the Resistance will not disband until democracy returns to Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are laying the groundwork for simply cancelling the elections. Should the internal opposition unite and threaten to win a free and fair election (were it to be held), the Sandinistas will claim that they are not obliged to permit such an election since the Resistance is in violation of the latest peace plan by remaining together and under arms. Surrender first, the Sandinistas will demand — then we’ll talk about democracy.

In the past, President Bush has spoken out strongly on behalf of the Resistance and the importance of U.S. support for their cause. One of the primary aims of his policy was to keep the Resistance in place to ensure that the Sandinistas would meet their current obligations of political liberalization and free elections. Yet some in his Administration recently forced the closing of the Miami office of the Resistance and, apparently convinced that the Congress will inevitably block any future military aid, have reportedly told Resistance field commanders that they should prepare for the near certainty that any funding approved by the Congress after November 30 would go only to demobilize and relocate the fighters and their families.

In addition, on July 27, U.S. represenatives at the United Nations voted for a Security Council resolution compelling the dismantling of all rebel forces in Central America at the same time President Bush was encouraging Central American leaders not to foster such demobilization for the Nicaraguan Resistance. Anyone seeking democracy in Nicaragua can only wish the President well in these efforts and urge him to redouble his campaign to encourage the regional presidents to adhere to the principle that democracy and peace in the region are inextricably linked.

"Big Mo" Is Working in the Sandinista’s Favor

A still tougher test will come if the Sandinistas succeed in obtaining the democratic presidents’ agreement to an accord to disarm the Resistance. This well may happen, for U.S. influence in the region has been on the decline since Congress cut off the freedom fighters in early 1988. Consider the current state of affairs:

• In Costa Rica, President Arias continues his foolish refusal to acknowledge publicly that the armed Resistance constitutes a major check on Sandinista absolutism and a profound worry to the communist regime.

 

• In Honduras, President Azcona nears the end of his term, disillusioned with the United States and fearing that his country will be left to face communist military strength alone. There are reports that the United States is currently withholding disbursements of economic aid to Honduras to press for Honduran cessation of support for the Resistance.

 

• In El Salvador, newly-elected President Cristiani worries that strong support for the Nicaraguan Resistance would threaten his ability to win aid from our Democratically-controlled Congress.

 

• Guatemala’s President Cerezo holds to his vaguely neutral stance, avoiding any fight that could make him enemies Left or Right.

President Bush’s Next Steps

Should a bad agreement be signed this weekend, calling for disarming and disbanding the Resistance before Nicaragua holds a free election, President Bush should stick to his principles and refuse to be bound by it. He should instead adopt a three part response:

• The President should continue to call for free elections and democratic politics in Nicaragua as a precondition for cutting U.S. aid to the Resistance. Such a commitment to principle will embolden Nicaraguans, as well as those in neighboring countries, who are unwilling to abandon the struggle for freedom there. It will increase the chance that the democratic opposition within Nicaragua will unite and force free elections.

 

• Such a presidential stance will also have therapeutic effects here at home, as well. It would put the new Democratic leadership in the Senate and House, and in particular Speaker Thomas Foley, to the test: Are they in thrall to the Sandinistas and their friends in the left wing of the Democratic Party, or are they willing to insist on democracy in Nicaragua?

 

• President Bush should also redouble the effort to ensure symmetry in the treatment accorded Nicaragua on the one hand and El Salvador on the other that was the intention of the original Arias plan. El Salvador has just had yet another free election; Where are the demands that the FMLN guerrillas lay down their arms? Where is the insistence that they disband? Where is the pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the Sandinistas, to halt their aid to the FMLN?

 

• Finally, the President should insist that the highly publicized, "benign" Soviet foreign policy apply to America’s neighborhood — the Caribbean Basin region. While Mr. Gorbachev talks of non-interference and respect for sovereignty, the sole means of support for the Cuban and Nicaraguan communist regimes is Soviet aid, and Soviet and Cuban assistance enables the Salvadoran Communist Party to fight on as part of the FMLN. Soviet destabilization of Central America must stop if glasnost and perestroika are to be taken seriously.

Conclusion

President Bush — if not his entire Administration — appears to appreciate the dangers ahead in Central America, and has begun acting to avoid them. He must, however, insist on the principle that peace and democracy are inextricably linked — and call upon the Central American presidents and the Congress to uphold that principle. The alternative — whatever the five presidents sign this week, and whatever the Democratic Party’s left wing in Congress claims — is the abandonment of democracy in Nicaragua, and with it, the future security not only of Nicaragua but of its neighbors, as well.