THE McCAIN ANTIDOTE FOR APPEASEMENT: ‘BIG STICK’ TIME FOR PYONGYANG

(Washington, D.C.): Statements issuing
forth from Moscow, Tokyo and the Clinton
D-Day road-show suggest that the
international community is entering a
feverish new phase of collective
handwringing concerning North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately,
the available evidence suggests that the
result is likely to be more feckless
stalling and appeasement on the part of
the United States and the rest of the
U.N. Security Council — and further
progress by Pyongyang toward deploying
nuclear arms.

While President Clinton today spoke
again of his expectation that the
international community would “show
resolve,” the Clinton Administration
seems still disposed to seize upon any
suggestion of North Korean
cooperativeness — no matter how oblique
or improbable — as an excuse for
continued U.S. inaction. China’s
reiterated refusal to cooperate on
pressuring Pyongyang through immediate
economic sanctions and Russia’s
insistence on a “summit”
meeting to address North Korea’s nuclear
program before sanctions are
considered will only reinforce the
Administration’s worst instincts.

The next straw to be grasped at may be
any sign that North Korea would be
willing to accommodate International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections
— even though the IAEA today said the
point of no return has been passed. The
possibility that international inspectors
might yet gain access to worrying
spent-fuel rods will then be called
grounds for further, protracted
negotiations. It will also serve as a
basis for claiming that a crisis has been
averted once more.

Of course, it is absolutely
predictable that North Korea will do yet
again what it has so many times before:
Once the pressure is slackened, Pyongyang
will cynically impose clearly
unacceptable preconditions or otherwise
ensure that no useful inspections occur. In
the meantime, it will have moved that
much closer to having operational nuclear
weapons and medium-range delivery
systems; it will also have given further
lie to the illusory notion that
multilateral measures can curb
proliferation.

Enter John McCain

Fortunately, the Clinton
Administration has been given an
alternative — a well-reasoned and
realistic plan for dealing with North
Korea. In a oratorical tour de force
delivered on the Senate floor on 24 May
1994, Senator John McCain (R-AZ):
carefully reviewed the litany of missteps
and misconceptions that have animated the
Clinton policy toward Pyongyang’s
incipient nuclear capabilities since
January 1993; analyzed the probable
consequences of failing to address this
crisis effectively; and laid out a
road-map for bringing North Korea to
heel.

Sen. McCain’s analysis and
recommendations, excerpts
of which are attached, closely
parallel those offered by the Center for
Security Policy over the past fifteen
months (e.g., the Center’s 19 March 1993 Decision
Brief entitled, What To
Do About North Korea’s Nuclear Threat:
Execute the ‘Osirak’ Remedy,
(No. 93-D
20). The Center strongly urges their
adoption as U.S. policy and urgent
implementation.