Uh-Oh: On Eve of Release of Nuclear Posture Review, Energy’s I.G. Confirms Serious Problems with U.S. Stockpile

(Washington, D.C.): Within the next few days, the Bush Administration will unveil its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) — the long-awaited blue-print for America’s 21st Century nuclear arsenal. Some aspects of the NPR are already known; notably, President Bush has previously announced his decision to reduce the existing stockpile dramatically (from roughly 6,500 weapons to 1700-2200).

As yet undisclosed, however, is what will be the future disposition of the remaining weapons. Inquiring minds want to know: Will it be possible to maintain the strategic “Triad” — with sufficient numbers of weapons deployed on land, at sea and aboard airborne platforms so as to preserve the synergy of the three “legs” and to offset each ones’ inherent shortcomings? Of particular concern is the possibility that the nuclear arsenal will be deployed in a manner that renders it unduly susceptible to preemptive attack (for example, by concentrating a large percentage of the deployed stockpile at a small number of vulnerable bomber bases).

Arguably, the single greatest determinant of the compatibility of the Nuclear Posture Review-directed force with the Nation’s national security requirements will be whether the NPR requires the residual stockpile to be rigorously maintained and regularly modernized. This would seem to be a no-brainer. And yet, for either to happen, the United States will have to resume periodic underground nuclear testing — something President Bush has thus far declined to order.

Until recently, Mr. Bush could say that he had no reason to believe such testing was necessary. No more. As the Washington Post reported today, the Department of Energy’s Inspector General recently unveiled a dirty little secret: There are “growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the Nation’s nuclear weapons, [which] without nuclear testing, have become a most serious challenge area.'” Of particular concern are mounting backlogs in the non-nuclear testing program upon which the U.S. has relied exclusively to monitor the safety and reliability of the stockpile since 1992, when the first President Bush was euchred by congressional Democrats into imposing a moratorium on underground detonations. Energy’s I.G., Gregory Friedman, concluded: “If these delays continue, the department may not be in a position to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons stockpile.”

A continued inability to conduct underground nuclear tests would, moreover, preclude altogether the design of new nuclear weapons (e.g., to assure the capability to destroy an enemy’s deeply buried leadership, command and control, weapons of mass destruction caches and other strategic assets). It should also impinge upon our ability to make even relatively minor upgrades to existing designs (assuming, that is, that the sort of zero-risk-of- failure approach traditionally used in the U.S. nuclear weapon program is pursued in the future.)

Incredibly, the prospect that the United States may be left unable to maintain the safety, reliability and credibility of its nuclear deterrent comes at the same moment as President Bush has been induced to take an action that will likely greatly increase the threat posed to this country from foreign nuclear programs. That would be the probable effect of his decision announced yesterday to increase dramatically the capabilities of supercomputers exported by the United States to countries like those of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and China.

While the White House has claimed that “The president’s decision [on supercomputer exports] will promote national security,” this seems improbable in the extreme. We can only hope that the Nuclear Posture Review will actually do so.

The Energy Department’s inspector general has determined that the growing problems associated with the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons, without nuclear testing, have become a “most serious challenge area” for the newly established National Nuclear Security Agency that runs the weapons complex.

In a report sent to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham on Dec. 21 and made public yesterday, Inspector General Gregory H. Friedman said one review his office conducted last year turned up backlogs in flight and laboratory test schedules for five of nine nuclear missile warheads and bombs in the operational stockpile.

Another review, completed last month, showed backlogs of more than 18 months in correcting defects or malfunctions that were discovered in testing of older weapons systems.

“Without a robust and complete surveillance testing program, the department’s ability to assess the reliability of some nuclear weapons is at risk,” Friedman wrote.

Each year, the Pentagon and the Energy Department must certify to the president that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable and that there is no need to resume tests involving the detonation of nuclear warheads and bombs in underground caverns, as was done until 1992.

At a time when the Bush administration is contemplating sharp reductions in offensive strategic nuclear missiles and bombs, some lawmakers and senior officials inside the nuclear weapons complex and the Pentagon have been talking about the need to resume underground testing, said Sen. John W. Warner (Va.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“If the surveillance program can’t do the job, we will have to resume testing to make sure our [nuclear] weapons work,” Warner said recently.

The government’s process of certifying “high confidence” in the nuclear stockpile involves randomly selecting for testing about 11 units from each of the nine deployed nuclear warheads on land- and submarine-based intercontinental missiles and bombs on aircraft. Nuclear warheads, missiles and bombs are flight-tested by being launched or dropped to see if the propellants and guidance systems work.

The IG’s report showed that, over the past four years, there were delays in five of 16 tests scheduled for the W-80 warhead used on cruise missiles and in three of 12 tests scheduled for the W-88, which is carried by the sub-launched Trident II missiles.

Laboratory tests to see whether handling, aging or manufacturing problems have developed in components such as radars showed delays in eight of 30 tests related to the B-61 nuclear bombs and in eight of 31 tests planned for the W-76 warhead used on sub-launched Trident I missiles. Component tests — which include looking at “pits,” or nuclear triggers and detonators — are also running behind, with four pit tests delayed out of 13 that were scheduled for the four-year period.

When successful testing over four years falls below 75 percent of planned tests, “there is significant concern that anomalies or defects in the stockpile might have been missed,” the IG’s report said.

Part of the problem, according to the IG, is that the facilities of the nuclear weapons complex have been aging and need increased spending for maintenance and replacement. Congress recently approved an extra $200 million for such work, but more is needed, Energy Department officials say.

When testing shows a defect or malfunction, department procedures require immediate notification of the nuclear weapons lab that developed the weapon. Five days after notification, the lab is supposed to determine whether the problem is significant. If so, the lab has 45 days to determine through tests whether a major investigation should be initiated since the reliability and performance of the weapon could be involved.

About 10 percent of significant findings have resulted in “retrofits or major design changes to the nuclear weapons stockpile,” the IG reported. Nevertheless, the IG recently found that the 45-day period for determining the significance of problems had grown, in some instances, to 300 days.

After the determination had been made, “over two-thirds of the 64 active investigations remained unresolved beyond the department’s one-year benchmark for completion,” according to the IG’s report.

Only a small cadre of engineers and experts carry out these investigations and they often are involved in other projects, a former top Pentagon official said. The IG noted that, as of March 2001, 18 of 24 such investigations remained unresolved after 18 or more months at Los Alamos National Laboratory, which spent the past two years adapting to tighter security rules in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage.

“If these delays continue, the department may not be in a position to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons stockpile,” Friedman wrote.