What Undid the Middle East ‘Peace Process’

(Washington, D.C.): It is now increasingly ineluctable that the Clinton-Barak
approach to
relations with the Palestinian leadership has failed. Less well understood are the reasons why it
has failed — and failed in ways that are giving rise to more hatred, more violence and a
potentially mortal threat to the Jewish State.

Fortunately, two of our time’s most thoughtful intellects — former Soviet
refusnik-turned-Israeli
political leader Natan Sharansky and syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer — have
published essays today that provide Rosetta stones to the factors that doomed the so-called
“peace process.” Reduced to their essence, these brilliant essays concur that there could be no
peace out of a process pursued with a despot in the preposterous expectation that he would be
willing to treat the people of Israel better than he would his own people.

Unless and until the Arab world in general, and the Palestinians in particular, come to enjoy
the
institutions, values and fruits of liberal democracy, there is no likelihood that their governments
will be real partners for peace — and that a real and durable peace will eventuate from Israel’s
dealings with them.

Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2000

Only Democracy Brings Peace

By Natan Sharansky.

In the past three weeks many supporters of the peace process, both in Israel and abroad, have
expressed their “shock” at the outbreak of violence.

What appears to have caught those dreaming of a quick solution to the conflict completely by
surprise is the depth of hatred that the Palestinians evince toward Israel. The animalistic
mutilation of our soldiers and the calls of “Death to the Jews” that are now echoed in the Arab
world have raised the eyebrows of even the most ardent supporters of compromise.
Unfortunately, most of those taken aback by recent events have focused attention on the
symptoms rather than the disease.

Long ago, Andrei Sakharov taught me that a society that does not respect the rights of its
own
citizens will never respect the rights of its neighbors. The reasons for this are simple. Democratic
leaders are dependent for their rule on the will of a free people and as such have a vested interest
in promoting the peace and prosperity that all free societies desire. In doing so, the nations they
govern naturally assume a nonbelligerent posture toward their neighbors, particularly when those
neighbors are also democratic states pursuing the same objectives.

Leaders of authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, aren’t beholden to an electorate and
devote
their energies to controlling the minds and bodies of their subjects in order to maintain and
consolidate their power. But to exert such control necessitates a repression that will not be long
tolerated if the regime does not manufacture external and internal enemies that serve to justify it.
“War” and “peace,” clear opposites in the lexicon of democratic leaders, are for the tyrant merely
interchangeable methods of subjugation.

That is why governments in countries with cultures as diverse as the former Soviet Union,
Cuba,
North Korea and Iraq all share one thing — hate. For such states, brute force is never enough.
They must also indoctrinate their subjects into a hate-filled ideology that can be used to keep
them mobilized against any “enemy” of the regime — an indoctrination that also helps to divert
the dangers of popular dissent, which could threaten authoritarian rule. Such regimes are
therefore inherently belligerent and democratic nations must always be on guard against them.

One would think that policymakers in Israel might have understood this when they attempted
to
make peace with their authoritarian neighbors. Had Israel and the West ensured that the emerging
Palestinian society was free, they would not only have served their own interests, but would also
have sent this message to leaders in the region: that they too must embrace democratization and
liberalization.

Yet the pervasive assumption among nearly all of Oslo’s proponents was that the
undemocratic
nature of Yasser Arafat’s regime, far from being an obstacle to peace, was actually a strategic
asset. Repeatedly told that Mr. Arafat was the only man who could “deliver,” we were also
informed that he would be even more effective than Israel in fighting terror. Yitzhak Rabin used
reasoning that chillingly summed up the government’s approach. Mr. Arafat would deal with
terrorists, he said, “without a Supreme Court, without human rights organizations and without all
kinds of bleeding heart liberals.” In light of such an understanding of our “peace partner,” do we
have anyone to blame but ourselves for what Mr. Arafat’s authoritarianism has brought upon us?

The notion that strong dictators make valuable allies is neither new nor exclusive to Israeli
policymakers. Whether it was appeasing the Soviet premiers of yesteryear or coddling today’s
Arab autocrats, the tendency to see the merits of such iron-fisted rule has colored Western
strategic thinking. The axiom that democracies do not go to war with one another may well be
understood in the abstract, but is all too often ignored in practice.

Yet while America and the West have sponsored tyrants from a comfortable distance, Israel
has
been subsidizing a dictatorship right in its own backyard. Like all dictators, Mr. Arafat needs an
external enemy to justify internal repression and maintain his authority. And who better than
Israel.

That is why, in the seven years since Oslo, he has used every means at his disposal, from the
Palestinian-controlled media to newly printed textbooks, to speeches by his own wife, to
inculcate hatred of the Jews and their state. And that is also why I have done everything to
convince policymakers that the nondemocratic nature of his regime was itself the greatest threat
to peace and security. My years of preaching that what was being taught in Palestinian schools
and broadcast on Palestinian television was the most important factor in building a true
reconciliation between our two peoples was met with polite nods of agreement, yet little action.

In truth, no one took these issues seriously. After all, demanding that Mr. Arafat actively
promote peace to the next generation of Palestinians was too much to ask of the “freedom
fighter” if he was to remain the “strong” leader we so badly needed. Consequently, a peace
process that should have been designed to reduce an animosity that existed long before a Jewish
state was born exacerbated it instead.

Sadly, Mr. Arafat’s antics are all too familiar to the Jews. When Hitler came to power, he
took
the reins of a European state that, like many of its neighbors, had deep anti-Semitic roots. Yet the
short path to the most heinous crime in human history was paved by an authoritarian leader who
consolidated his hold on power by using every means at its disposal to demonize and
dehumanize Jews and blame them for all of his nation’s woes.

As Mr. Arafat beats the drums of war, I am comforted by more than the fact that, unlike 60
years
ago, the Jews now have the power to defend themselves. I am also hopeful that the latest
violence may usher in a new approach to the peace process — an approach that will allow the
forces of liberalization and democratization to penetrate the Arab world. By not thinking the
Arab people incapable of establishing a free society, the democratic nations of the world will
begin to create the real “New Middle East” that so many of us can still dream about.

Mr. Sharansky, a member of Israel’s Knesset, was minister of the interior in the Barak
government.

Time Magazine, 23 October 2000

The Barak Paradox

The most pro-peace leader in the country’s history, and what does he get? War

By Charles Krauthammer

A most peculiar paradox hovers over the smoke and blood of the Middle East today. The
current
Palestinian uprising against Israel is aimed not at the government of Yitzhak Shamir or Benjamin
Netanyahu, Likud leaders known for their hard line, but against Ehud Barak, the most dovish
Israeli Prime Minister the Middle East has ever known. Indeed, Barak has gone so far that
Yitzhak Rabin’s widow said he’d be “turning in his grave” if he could see what concessions
Barak had offered.

How is it then that the most pro-Palestinian, pro-peace Israeli government in history is the
target
of the most virulent, most frenzied anti-Israel violence in at least a half-century?

Call it the Barak paradox. Its answer is as painful as it is clear. For 30 years there has been an
argument between doves and hawks in Israel. Said the doves: Assuage the other side’s
grievances–end the occupation; give the Palestinians land, a militia, their own state–and then we
will have peace.

Said the hawks: The grievances are not satisfiable. They are existential. They don’t just want
their state; they want our state. After all, they were offered a state in 1947 (and autonomy in
1979) and turned it down. Why? Because they claim not just Ramallah but Tel Aviv as well. If
you make concessions, lower your guard and show weakness, you invite war.

Accommodation or deterrence? Open hand or iron fist? Peace now or peace through
strength?
Rarely does history settle such debates as decisively and mercilessly as it has this one.

For seven years, the dove theory has been in command. In 1993 Israel brought the P.L.O. out
of
exile and gave it recognition, international legitimacy, self-government, foreign aid, the first
elections in Palestinian history and an end to occupation for 99% of the Palestinian population.
This July, Barak went the final mile, offering concessions so sweeping that even the U.S.
negotiators at Camp David were astonished: giving up virtually all the West Bank (including the
militarily crucial Jordan Valley), offering to divide Jerusalem, ready even to renounce Israeli
sovereignty over Judaism’s holiest site, the Temple Mount.

What happened? Yasser Arafat refused. He refused even to make a counteroffer. Then,
finding
no international support for his intransigence, he decided to reshuffle the deck: start a war that
might give him the upper hand–a war that would bring enough international pressure on Israel to
enable him to dictate terms.

Seizing a pretext, Arafat let loose his forces. Through all the days of stones and bullets and
Molotov cocktails, he uttered not a word of restraint. On the contrary, his state-controlled media
gave the war cry. Begged by President Bill Clinton and other world leaders to call a halt, he
replied contemptuously, “Our people do not hesitate to continue the march to Jerusalem.”

Under the doves’ theory of accommodation, the transitional period of the “peace process”
was
supposed to give time to teach reconciliation and trust. The opposite happened. With control of
TV, radio, newspapers and textbooks, Arafat has imbued a new generation with the most virulent
hatred of Israel, descending often to pure anti-Semitism.

The fruits of that education are now on display: the lynching of two Israeli reservists, a
young
Palestinian raising his bloodied hands in triumph to the cheering crowd; the destruction of the
Jewish shrine at Joseph’s Tomb, not just torched and desecrated but dismantled stone by stone.

In the fury, there is an exhilaration. In a dozen Middle East capitals, mass demonstrations
call for
death to the Jews. This euphoria, points out Middle East scholar Daniel Pipes, has not been seen
since 1967. It comes from the feeling that the Jews are on the run.

In May-June 1967, on the eve of the Six-Day War, frenzied crowds in Cairo and Damascus
and
elsewhere called for the final battle to destroy Israel. Israel’s swift and stunning victory deflated
that enthusiasm quickly and for decades to come.

Until now. With Israel’s myriad concessions, unilateral withdrawals, pleas for peace and
general
demoralization, the euphoria has returned. Israel’s enemies sense weakness. The disorganized
withdrawal from Lebanon has become the model. If the Israelis could be driven out of Lebanon,
reason the Palestinians, we can drive them out of Palestine. The Palestinians see an Israel with no
stomach for losses; an Israel crossing previously sacred redlines without getting anything in
return; an Israel prepared to surrender sovereignty over Judaism’s holiest shrine; an Israel
bending to every U.S. pressure to keep giving with no reciprocity.

And now they see Barak giving empty ultimatums. Why shouldn’t Arafat keep fighting? He
has
the Security Council, the Western media and the Arab world behind him. In front of him lies an
Israel in shock, dazed and confused by the Barak paradox. No dove ever wanted or pursued peace
more fervently. And what does he get? War. Neville Chamberlain was equally perplexed on Sept.
1, 1939.