The role of green-on-blue attacks in the Taliban’s strategy to weaken the Afghan military

On March 19^th an Afghan soldiers opened fire on U.S. coalition troops at a military base in the Helmand province, an area heavily contested by the Taliban. Three U.S. soldiers were wounded and the perpetrator killed. The Taliban did not claim responsibility, but praised the attacker.

This was the first green-on-blue attack this year, which are attacks by Afghan soldiers on U.S. and coalition forces. First reported green-on-blue attacks occurred in 2008, but it was not until 2012 that these attacks reach their peak of 44. At that point they accounted for 15% of all U.S. and NATO combat deaths in Afghanistan. The next year these attacks declined to 13 and continued the downward path reaching only two attacks in 2016. Taliban has claimed that their infiltrators in Afghan military have perpetrated these attacks.

Quantifying green-on-blue attacks is difficult in part because ISAF does not report on attacks unless soldiers have been wounded or killed, so unsuccessful or prevented attacks are not included in calculations. There remains a debate over to degree to which Green-on-Blue attacks are the results of religious or cultural conflicts between Afghan and Coalition service members, or the result of a campaign of Taliban infiltration.

Turning Afghan military personnel over to their side has been a serious effort by the Taliban. The jihadist group’s now deceased leader, Mullah Omar described in 2012 a “Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration” department, designed to encourage Afghan army and security personnel to defect to the Taliban. It’s not entirely clear how successful this effort has been, although there have been some notable defections. In November 2016 a group of 41 Afghan National Army soldiers surrendered and turned their entire base in the Chora District over to the Taliban.

Defections and desertions are the result of low morale in the Afghan military it’s military suffering from high casualty rates and low reenlistment numbers. As of November 2016 the army is at 87% of its strength and has likely grown weaker because the Taliban was able to expand control in the country.

Low morale stems at least in part from the corruption within its officers’ corps. For example, corruption among army commanders in the Helmand province caused military operations to stall and led to mass desertions. The problem extends to the army supply chain, which had to be taken over by U.S. because the Afghan military could not supply its soldiers properly. In interviews some Afghan soldiers even cited corrupt officers as the main reason for leaving.

One of the likely reasons for the decline in Green-on-Blue attacks is the decline in the number of U.S. and NATO troops present in Afghanistan to serve as targets. The number of coalition troops has steadily decreased since 2012 when attacks reached their pinnacle.

As of October, 2016 the U.S. coalition forces numbered about 10,000, compared to about 100,000 in 2010.

The most recent green-on-blue attack took place as the U.S. prepares to deploy 300 Marines to bolster the Afghan army’s fight in Helmand. The Pentagon no doubt must consider the possibility that the return of U.S. troops in substantial numbers to the theater might well be accompanied by a commensurate increase in green-on-blue attacks.

Green-on-blue attacks, when factored into preexisting problems of desertion and endemic corruption, drive a wedge between ISAF and Afghan forces. Exploiting this space is of substantial strategic value for the Taliban. The Taliban’s recent gains clearly illustrate that Afghan forces are largely incapable of defeating the Taliban without substantial closer support from the western coalition, which western military planners know comes as a substantial cost.