US Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030. A well-intentioned act of self-harm

How is it that successful organizations end up committing self-harm—and often in attempts to adapt and keep up with the times? I don’t really know why, but suspect the ancient Greeks and Indians knew all about this aspect of the human experience and human nature.

I had occasion to work for two such outfits—Motorola and the United States Marine Corps.

FIRST MOTOROLA

It was one of America’s most respected companies for decades. Indeed the name evoked American technological and manufacturing prowess and dominance. But by the late 1990s it was stumbling. And during the 2000s it started a downward spiral to the point where now it’s barely a husk of what it was, and a big chunk of old Motorola is Chinese owned.

Motorola’s decision to go into the PRC big-time (with US government encouragement) shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre didn’t help. Nor did adopting hare brained new-age Human Resources schemes—ironically resembling the Marine Corps’ new “Talent Management” mantras.

But one of the killer blows was Motorola spinning off its semiconductor business. The company was a world leader in the industry—and had a leading role in the development of the “chip.” As one engineer put it: “when a semiconductor factory is firing on all cylinders it’s close to having your own printing press printing money.”

Unfortunately, management and financial whiz kids convinced Motorola’s leadership that chips were a “commodities” business and there was no need to actually produce your own semiconductors. Better to outsource the work to others (who could make chips cheaper than you could), and just be a “knowledge company”—leveraging others to do the hard work of making things while collecting royalty checks.

It was akin to chopping off one’s left arm because it gets tired after a while.

But this is what the smart guys insisted was the future for all businesses—and Motorola had no choice but to adjust. It was an alluring scenario and Motorola fell for it.

These days, few Americans under the age of 50 even know what Motorola is.

NOW TO THE MARINE CORPS…

Then-Marine commandant, General David Berger introduced a new plan for the Marines called Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) in 2019. He aimed to make the Marine Corps into a more mobile force, operating in smaller “low-signature” units in austere coastal locations and using long range missiles to dominate the nearby sea—thus facilitating broader naval campaigns.

Although proponents later argued this concept applies anywhere on the globe, FD 2030 was rolled out with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a future war in the Pacific in mind.

To this writer at least, the plan was a breath of fresh air.

THE WAY IT WAS

The Marine Corps was finally paying attention to the Asia-Pacific—and to China in particular. Until then the focus was the “sandbox”—Iraq and Afghanistan. Asia was a backwater. Top Marine commanders in Hawaii would return from Washington irked by the lack of interest in the region.

Even worse, call the People’s Republic of China an adversary and the courtiers at Headquarters Marine Corps would come after you.

Indeed, at the Marine Corps’ Pacific headquarters some staff officers downplayed the China-threat and were content with business as usual. The Marines even turned down opportunities to establish a presence in certain regional countries, and the idea of sending a half-dozen young Marine officers to key locations in the region to “influence” was forcefully rejected. Haven’t got six officers to spare, you know, and what use would they be anyway?

The Marines needed some new thinking—starting with recognizing China as an adversary.