Print Friendly, PDF & Email

By WILLIAM SAFIRE
The New York Times, November 24, 1994

As soon as he arrived at the dinner for him at the Israeli Ambassador’s residence, Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin took me aside to chastise me for opposing his desire for U.S. troops on the Golan
Heights.

“The whole idea was Bush and Baker’s,” he insisted, as if that were in its favor. “They proposed
a whole division.”

To check out that secret proposal to commit 15,000 troops, I walked over to Dennis Ross,
who had been Secretary of State James Baker’s top Middle East aide, and continues in that post
under Warren Christopher. “Source says back in ’91 you guys promised a whole division on the
Golan — true?”

“An American military presence was discussed with Prime Minister Shamir,” Ross admitted,
“but no numbers were ever used. Shamir said, ‘Very interesting, I’ll think about it,’ and later turned
it down.”

Went back to Rabin and related the response. “Not only did they promise a division,” he said,
reddening, “but a security pact as well. You don’t believe me? Ask Shamir!”

(Next day I called Shamir, who said, “I always opposed U.S. forces to defend Israel, and I don’t
remember any such proposal to me, because I always opposed withdrawal from the Golan.” Three
memories conflict; go figure.)

At the dinner table, with Secretary Christopher between us, Rabin charged I had been
“brainwashed by the Gang of Three” (a trio of Likud spokesmen). He suggested that my Times
colleague Abe Rosenthal and I should read Evans and Novak. (Gee, what a turnover in the Amen
Corner.)

I was deeply perturbed — not at my old friend Rabin, with whom I can disagree without rancor
— but at my lack of notepaper at a newsworthy moment. Chris came to the rescue, slipping me
one of the index cards he had used for his toast.

Did Israel really need the Americans on the border to make a deal with Syria?

“The gap in our negotiations,” the Prime Minister said, lighting a cigarette that nearly
asphyxiated Donna Shalala, seated to his right, “is not related to the presence of American troops.
It is not a major issue.”

Great, said I; if it’s no big deal to the Syrians, and it’s so disruptive to Israelis and Americans,
then why not drop it?

“It could become one,” he replied.

C’mon, Yitzhak, don’t you want those U.S. troops on the Golan to sell your withdrawal from
the Golan to Israelis?

“If I listened to public opinion, I wouldn’t do anything,” he countered gutsily. “As long as I have
a majority of one, I’ll continue.”

Secretary Christopher, taking Rabin’s side in this dinner-debate, asked what my reasons were for
opposing U.S. “monitors.” I said I’d answer that in a column, and he smiled, “I withdraw the
question.”

Some reasons are: (1) the U.S. would then become “neutral” in the struggles between Syria and
Israel, in lieu of continuing as Israel’s ally — a State Department Arabist’s evenhanded dream; (2)
the U.S. troops would become targets of terrorist attempts to upset the peace process; (3) Israel’s
freedom of action would be compromised, with no pre-emptive action possible without U.S.
permission; (4) America’s admiration for Israelis as militarily self-reliant would be replaced by
resentment about risking U.S. lives patrolling their borders.

Rabin brushed all that off. “Menachem Begin set the precedent by arranging for American
monitors in the Sinai,” he argued. But wouldn’t Golan units be at much greater risk? Chris slipped
me another index card. “Just the opposite,” Rabin held. He waved aside what happened to U.S.
marines in nearby Lebanon.

I tried to tell him that if he bottomed his negotiation with Syria on being able to deliver
American troops to the Golan, the negotiation would fail. Bill Clinton, who has foolishly promised
both Rabin and Hafez al-Assad to “make the case” for a permanent American border patrol,
would lose that case.

Why are senators holding credentials as unwavering supporters of Israel — Moynihan, D’Amato,
Packwood — against an American tripwire on the Golan? Why are they joined by most of Israel’s
strongest defenders in U.S. media?

We’re not against risks for peace; we’re against imperiling the alliance between Israel and the
U.S.

Center for Security Policy

Please Share:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *