A surge is not enough
The United States is at a critical juncture in Afghanistan, with a resurgent Taliban, popular support for the war waning, and the cost of the war steadily rising, the President’s new Afghan strategy is all the more crucial. The right strategy can lead to short-term progress and set the conditions for long-term success. However, the wrong strategy could waste precious lives and treasure, significantly increase instability in Afghanistan, and ultimately hasten an ignominious withdrawal. Much is at stake and this may be the last chance for the US in Afghanistan.
Yet the President’s announcement on Tuesday, like the previous national and media debate focused almost entirely on the size and cost of the military surge. While the size of the surge is a key issue, it is not however, the most important factor. We absolutely do need more troops in Afghanistan in order to stabilize the deteriorating security situation, however the much more important issue is what we will do with the limited amount of time our troops will buy for us over the next two summers.
The bottom line is that unless we, the US and the international community, accept and are willing to make a long-term commitment to the fundamental rebuilding of Afghan society, the window of opportunity created by the surge will likely be lost and failure will almost certainly follow.
Additional troops employing the right tactics will certainly make a significant difference in the short term but the battle cannot be won exclusively on the battlefield. This is a competition for the support of the Afghan people. Unfortunately, we are losing that competition because the Afghan Government is failing its people in almost every respect. Most importantly, it is failing to protect them and it is failing to provide for them. Our national strategy must therefore address three key areas – security, yes but more importantly governance and development. Unless Afghanistan has a functioning and reasonably honest government that can protect and provide for its people, then U.S. objectives will not be realized.
Based on interviews conducted with over 100,000 influential and ordinary Afghans over the last 12 months and the personnel observations of our experts, Glevum Associates has identified six key requirements that we believe must be addressed alongside the deployment of more troops:
1. The US-led Coalition must force through fundamental top to bottom anti-corruption measures and a robust monitoring system in key Afghan ministries. Token measures from President Karzai will not suffice–unless the epidemic government corruption is dealt with quickly, Afghan public support will continue to evaporate. Additionally, if we do not support the introduction of comprehensive anti-corruption measures, we will increasingly be seen by the Afghan people as propping up a corrupt and dysfunctional Government. Key elements of this anti-corruption strategy must include:
(a) The removal of all known corrupt senior officials, in all key ministries, and the prosecution of the most obvious and prominent offenders. Making an example of well known corrupt senior officials will buy time with the Afghan public, which can be used to implement far-reaching reforms.
(b) It is essential that this campaign focus on the prosecution of those committing "strategic corruption" -meaning that level of corruption that prevents national level programs from succeeding, or diverts money from large-scale security and development initiatives.
(c) While going after the big fish, measures should be enacted at all levels to change the culture of corruption to a culture of lawfulness.
(d) When introducing reforms, the culture of impunity for the rich and well connected must be ended and there must be dire consequences for corruption: anti-corruption measures without accountability and punishment will be ineffective and distrusted.
(e) The enforcement of anti-corruption measures will quickly become politicized, i.e., investigators and prosecutors going after their enemies while protecting their benefactors. This has to be resisted with direct international supervision of the reform and anti- corruption program.
(f) We need strong civilian mentors in key ministries. Experienced senior advisors who can stay for 12 months or more and who can both improve performance and keep Afghan officials honest.
(g) We support the establishment of independent audit offices and internal affairs organizations in key ministries and at each level of Government. These entities must properly resourced and empowered by President Karzai to seek out, remove and punish proven corrupt officials without interference.
(h) Anti-corruption efforts must be entirely transparent and well publicized to gain public support and counter Taliban propaganda.
(i) The population must be involved throughout the process through the creation of independent complaints committees at all levels of Government.
2. We must force President Karzai and the Afghan parliament to exceed to the devolution of power and governance from Kabul to the lowest levels of Afghan society. We must insist that the Afghan Government agree to hold provincial, district and local elections within the next two years and we must monitor this election program to ensure its integrity. Most Afghans and almost all of the Pashtun do not trust the Karzai appointed officials at any level of Government and there is little public accountability. Such elections will make it far easier for the Afghan people to hold their elected officials accountable and will help reduce corruption. Elections will also offer a legitimate path to local power for reconciled former Anti-Government Elements (AGEs). Backing unelected local power structures may buy some time in some areas but in the long term it undermines not enhances effective governance. Only local elections can succeed in extending good governance to all areas of Afghanistan and will go a long way to end the abuse of power by Kabul based politicians and bureaucrats.
3. We must support the careful reform and gradual expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), as well as the wider justice sector to include the Ministry of Interior, the judiciary and the prison system. Without reform, simply increasing the size of the ANA and ANP will magnify their many shortcomings and undermine their limited strengths. Reform and expansion measures should include:
(a) The generation of larger formations, especially ANA infantry, not the creation of more formations, given the dearth of competent ANA and ANP leaders
(b) We must take immediate action to improve existing ANA leaders-e.g. enlisted to officer accession program, advisor monitoring of command screening and promotion processes, and a dramatic increase in school quotas.
(c) We should assist the Afghans to commence a campaign to instill core values and reduce corruption within the ANA and ANP. We could then make the ANA an example of a non-corrupt Afghan institution.
(d) The ANA and ANP should be partnered with Coalition units and formations with an eye toward transitioning battlespace to the ANA as quickly as possible. However, we also need to avoid over-partnering, with the Afghans happily leaving all the tough tasks to us.
(e) We must not use partnered coalition units as a substitute for competent advisors.
(f) The coalition must place more competent and experienced leaders in ANA and ANP advisor roles. This must include senior military advisors and more civilian advisors at all levels from bureaucrats to lawyers, judges and police officers
(g) It is essential to develop a construct to transition battlespace to the ANA now. Their good enough is good enough.
(h) Evaluate all ANA and ANP commanders based on their performance not connections.
(i) Introduce better measures of performance and effectiveness. The Capability Milestones rating alone is an inadequate measure of success.
(j) ANA must be given COIN enablers: Afghan PRTs, funds for development projects, and access to non-governmental organizations.
(k) The illiteracy, cronyism and corruption in the ANP and to a lesser extent in the ANA must be addressed.
(l) Training and education at all levels must be improved, expanded and extended and must be a requirement for career progression.
(m) The ANA should take the lead in the COIN fight while the police should focus on community policing.
(n) Independent Internal Affairs organizations need to be resourced, monitored and supported.
(o) Police complaints committee needs to be established and given real authority and power.
4. We must support the commencement of a proactive AGE reconciliation program and create a path for them to legitimate power through local and district elections. There can be no peace in Afghanistan without reconciliation of the reconcilable. There is peace in Northern Ireland today because of a successful reconciliation program, that included a distasteful but necessary amnesty, and because terrorist leaders were co-opted into the political process.
As Tony Blair said, "we took the violence out of the politics in Northern Ireland". This peace process needs to be replicated in Afghanistan no matter how unpopular with some Afghan leaders.
5. The International community must support a well coordinated and well funded UN led national development program, focusing on infrastructure, jobs, education and healthcare. Afghans will simply not support their Government in sufficient numbers unless their quality of life improves. In survey after survey, average Afghans argue that the lack of jobs, food, healthcare and education creates far more instability than the Taliban. We do not have to fix all of Afghanistan ills but we must show the people that the country is moving in the right direction and give them hope that their quality of life will improve and they will be safer if they support their government. Most of these programs must be micro rather than macro projects and they must involve ordinary Afghans to ensure that they are stakeholders in their own future. The successful National Solidarity Program (NSP), administered by local Community Development Committees (CDC) is the model to be emulated and expanded.
6. Finally, it is just as important that the extra troops we deploy do the right thing. More troops doing the wrong thing will only make matters worse. We must therefore support General McChrystal’s focus on population protection rather than killing insurgents. In the short-term, this strategy may result in more American casualties. We therefore need to fortify our national resolve for more losses before the situation improves. However, as Iraq has shown, our casualties are reduced exponentially as the situation improves and the local population willingly provides critical intelligence and even takes the fight to the enemy themselves. In addition, the following concepts must be implemented:
(a) Our troops must focus on securing insurgent strongholds only where we have the capacity to usher in development shortly thereafter. Killing bad guys achieves little if the local community does not feel secure and that their quality of life does not improve.
(b) We must adjust the "clear, hold, build" construct to "secure and develop", a near simultaneous approach combining military operations and development to permanently win over the population. Only with the population as part of the solution, can we transform the rural areas. The positive impact of the NSP/CDC approach shows this can work.
(c) The population favors ANA security over coalition security. The ANA therefore has to be pushed out front and given lead security responsibility in certain areas within their capability– now. Their best is often good enough, even when it falls well below our own minimum standards.
These measures cannot be excluded from President Obama’s strategy and left to others to "sort out later." President Obama must put the authority of his office behind these measures and make it clear to President Karzai that future US support is conditionally based on the full implementation of these measures. Without drastic reform and a new approach to counter the Taliban, nothing will change and international, US domestic and Afghan support for the Karzai Government will continue to dissolve, leaving it controlling Kabul and little else.
If we do not have the will or influence to force through these essential measures, then we should leave now. We believe that these measures can be integrated into a sensible US strategy. However, if the Karzai regime will not support these measures then they are beyond hope.
Rest assured, a surge for 18 months will open a window of opportunity but without parallel development and a major effort to reform the Afghan Government, the sacrifice will all be for nothing and we will draw down then, having lost much and achieved little more than if we withdraw now.
Prepared by Glevum Associates, LLC
1875 I Street NW, 5th Floor
Washington DC, 20006
www.glevumassociates.com
About Glevum: Glevum Associates has developed a unique Social Science Research and Analysis (SSRA) concept to capture critical information on the Human Terrain (HT) in conflict and post conflict societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Since June 2008, Glevum has successfully deployed SSRA Research and Analysis Management Teams (RAMT), first in Afghanistan (June 2008) and then in Iraq (November 2008). These teams have successfully managed a comprehensive research program in both theaters to include developing, managing and analyzing dozens of polls, focus groups, depth interviews, and other types of directed Face-to-Face (F2F) research. These teams have also assembled extensive networks of Iraq and Afghan Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to provide the type of critical insights and indigenous perspectives that Western experts cannot offer. Each month, these two-research teams plan, coordinate and manage the execution of over 40,000 polling interviews, over 500 depth interviews and 60 plus focus groups, and provided rapid analysis and reporting of key findings. This vital work supports Defense and State Department clients conducting operational and policy planning across the three critical sectors of security, development and governance.
