A Taiwan war could mean US aircraft carriers are ‘going to the bottom’

As tensions with China over Taiwan escalate, U.S. military planners are rethinking the role of aircraft carriers due to advancements in China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems.

-Once dominant in projecting power, carriers now face significant risks in contested areas like the Taiwan Strait.

-Various strategies propose using autonomous drones to create a “hellscape” for Chinese forces or deploying carriers outside high-risk zones to act as reserve forces or decoys.

-The goal is to balance risk with effective defense without exposing these valuable assets to unnecessary losses.

Taiwan Crisis: Can U.S. Aircraft Carriers Still Play a Role Against China?

As the world progresses deeper into a decade of concern, military planners continue to contend with the potential of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has made no secret of his ambitions toward the island nation. Should a military clash begin in the region, U.S. military leadership right now would be faced with several tough choices on how to respond. One of the key decisions would be how to use the U.S. Navy’s carriers. Once invulnerable floating fortresses, rapid Chinese advances in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities leave these vessels facing new and serious risks. As thinking evolves, several theories on potential uses for carriers have begun to emerge.

Carrier Vulnerabilities and Traditional Roles

Naval strategy in the Pacific during the Second World War relied heavily on carriers. Though these vessels remained vulnerable to shore-based threats, across the vast reaches of America’s island-hopping campaign they were able to protect battle fleets and landing forces while projecting power against enemy fleets and positions.

Until the past decade or so, this is the role they would have filled in a conflict with China: sailing with impunity in the South and East China Seas, as well as the Strait of Taiwan, to rout Chinese landing forces and strike strategic locations on the mainland.

Major advances in both the quantity and quality of Chinese anti-ship missile systems have made this strategy untenable. Recent wargames projected the U.S. would lose two carriers at the outset of hostilities simply due to their presence within range of these systems. The saturation of the combat area with A2/AD systems means the Navy will be unlikely to employ carriers in their traditional role. It appears that establishment thinking has begun to understand this and to fight against the inertia of traditional plans to explore new strategies for defending Taiwan.

Outlining Different Strategies

It is widely recognized that allowing China unimpeded access to the Strait of Taiwan to conduct amphibious landings would result in Taiwanese defeat. While the Republic of China Armed Forces possess some capabilities to contest control of the Strait, it is likely these would be reduced to low operation capability shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, thanks to mainland China’s overwhelming quantitative superiority.

As discussed above, conventional U.S. forces are also at risk should they attempt to project power into the Strait. This is why some leaders are looking to lessons from Ukraine to make the Strait a “hellscape” for Chinese forces. In this scenario, the U.S. floods the region with autonomous aerial, surface, and subsurface drones: cheaply made, difficult to detect, and highly lethal. The idea would be to limit the effectiveness of a Chinese landing and to buy Taiwanese and coalition defenders time to move assets into the region to blunt a Chinese assault.

A similar plan envisions drawing high-profile U.S. forces – such as carriers – back to or behind the second island chain. In their place would remain a dispersed, mobile force “to blunt Chinese attacks and reassure allied publics.” These units would serve a similar function to the drones of the “hellscape” strategy, attacking valuable People’s Liberation Army Navy ships while incurring relatively few losses in return. While unable to fully stop an invasion, they could buy time for reserve forces to reach the battlefield.

How Do Aircraft Carriers Fit Into the Equation?

Whatever strategy the U.S. and allies pursue, the role of carriers will need to be re-evaluated. Some thought has already gone into the more granular aspects of strategy, but there is still much room for discussion and debate. From a grand strategy perspective, carriers would be part of an outside force to assist mobile units in the first island chain. In this scenario, carriers would act almost as a reserve force to either plug any gaps on the defensive or exploit gaps on the offensive.

Simultaneously, holding carriers out of harm’s way allows them to act as a “fleet in being” and require the PLA to devote resources to A2/AD instead of offensive capabilities aimed at taking Taiwan.

Finally, some envision upending the use case for carriers entirely and using them as a deceptive force to draw out Chinese resources without undertaking offensive missions essential to the war effort.

Much thought must be given to the use of carriers in a conflict with China. Continued advances in technology, such as the recently unveiled AIM-174B, will also change the calculus around carrier strategy, and planners must stay abreast of such developments.

While losses happen in war, carriers represent a massive investment. The loss of a carrier would be a devastating blow, not only strategically but also to the prestige of the U.S. As such, pursuing an appropriate strategy without succumbing to risk aversion is essential.

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) refuels from USNS Pecos (T-AO 195) by Official U.S. Navy Page is licensed under Attribution 2.0 Generic