Apres Moi, Le Deluge’: Chirac Was Right To Conduct Nuclear Tests; Must Not Be Allowed To Preclude The US Right To Do So

(Washington, D.C.): Last July, French President Jaques Chirac displayed commendable courage and commitment to the principled pursuit of sound national security policy when — in the face of nearly universal and often vitriolic condemnation — he announced that France would resume a program of limited underground nuclear testing. This decision was based on the reality that for the maintenance of an effective, safe and reliable — and therefore credible — nuclear deterrent, it is necessary to perform periodic detonations of actual weapons. ⁽¹⁾

Earlier this week, on the verge of a state visit to Washington, Chirac announced that he had halted this testing program and brought about "the definitive end of French nuclear testing." He further announced that France would engage itself fully in efforts currently underway in Geneva to bring about a comprehensive nuclear test ban. It is astounding and regrettable that a man who just six months ago seemed to stand for the principled stewardship of his nation’s nuclear deterrent has now apparently embraced the most extreme anti-testing agenda. President Chirac has even gone so far as to call for the inclusion of a "zero option" into any Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). According to this formula, no tests would be allowed — even those of sufficiently small yield as to be impossible to detect if done in violation of the Treaty.

So zealous has M. Chirac become that he reportedly is now objecting to the inclusion of a "supreme national interest" provision in the CTB Treaty. Such an escape clause would allow a party to the agreement to resume its nuclear testing program if tests were deemed absolutely necessary to its security. The latest French stance would appear to conflict with a promise made to the U.S. military by President Clinton in August 1995. In order to obtain the support of senior Pentagon officials who were concerned that a "zero option" test ban would, over time, jeopardize the U.S. nuclear deterrent, Mr. Clinton pledged to insist that the CTB would include a "supreme national interest clause."

‘Bait and Switch’?

At the time, the Clinton commitment rang hollow to anyone familiar with his record on arms control. In fact, even as he was pledging to get out of one treaty if the need should arise, he was strenuously opposing efforts that would lead to the exercise of a "supreme national interests clause" contained in another arms control agreement — the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In fact, so adamant is his opposition to the deployment of defenses made necessary by the emerging ballistic missile threats to U.S. "supreme national interests," that Mr. Clinton subsequently vetoed the FY1996 Defense authorization bill because it provided for the nationwide deployment of anti-missile systems.

Senator Jon Kyl — a long-time member of the Center for Security Policy’s Board of Advisors who is rapidly emerging as the Senate’s most thoughtful expert on national security matters — recently noted that the Clinton Administration’s pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban is but one manifestation of a more far-reaching policy aimed at wrecking the industrial infrastructure that supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent. In an 18 January speech before the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in Monterey, California, Sen. Kyl said:

"The policy trend affecting the DOE weapons complex has set the nation’s nuclear stockpile on a dangerous path to atrophy and ineffectiveness. The Administration undercuts nuclear deterrence by refusing to support the need for a nuclear weapons production complex to manufacture and maintain our nuclear deterrent. At the same time, it refuses to accept mutual assured survival and embrace ballistic missile defenses. In effect, what this administration has done is to select neither strategy and has left the security of the United States to the good intentions of our political enemies."

Unfortunately, President Clinton’s determination to achieve "denuclearization" and the practice of some of his top arms control officials of conniving with negotiating partners to induce changes in Administration policies of which they do not approve gives rise to a sneaking suspicion: CTB purists on the Clinton team who opposed the "escape clause" initiative and wanted it dropped, may have persuaded the Chirac government to insist on that outcome by promising to mute U.S. criticism of France’s abbreviated 1995 nuclear test program. ⁽²⁾

The Bottom Line

If President Clinton were truly interested in protecting America’s supreme national interests, he would not support a Comprehensive Test Ban in any form. This is so because the periodic testing of America’s nuclear arsenal is absolutely necessary since: only actual tests can ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; actual tests are needed to improve the safety, security, survivability and effectiveness of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal; only actual tests allow the U.S. to understand fully the effects of a nuclear environment on military systems; and only by conducting periodic tests can the U.S. make improvements to the deterrent capabilities of its nuclear arsenal in light of emerging threats.

In light of these considerations, a permanent Comprehensive Test Ban that denied the United States the right to withdraw — irrespective of the damage that might be entailed for its national interests — would be totally unacceptable. Senator Kyl and his colleagues should serve notice on Mr. Chirac when he makes his appearance before a Joint Session of Congress: The United States Senate will not ratify an agreement that would deny this country the right to take whatever steps are deemed necessary to preserve its nuclear deterrent capabilities — including the sorts of steps France has felt obliged to take by conducting a series of underground nuclear tests over the past five months.

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(1) See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled Vive la France! French Determination to Perform Necessary Nuclear Testing Should Be Wake-up Call to U.S. (14 July 1995, No. 95-D 47).

(2) See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled "Having it Both Ways": Clinton’s Assault Would Gut Nuclear Deterrent and Prevent Missile Defense (13 August 1995, No. 95-D 55).