Assessing Risk in The Israeli-PLO Deal

Evaluating the Israel-PLO agreement requires weighing hopes against risks,
for Israel’s concessions could someday endanger its security.

The hopeful argument runs along the following lines: (1) The concessions may
actually pacify old enemies, removing the motive for attacks on Israel. (2)
A serious military or terrorist threat can develop in relinquished territories
only if the specified security arrangements are violated, in which case Israel
will promptly take remedial action. The agreement provides that Israel will
remain responsible for defense against external threats and for the overall
security of Israelis. And (3) in all events, whatever the Palestine Liberation
Organization’s good faith or lack thereof, Israel is strong and can handle any
threat from those territories.

One finds intense desire among Israelis that this first proposition will eventuate.
But in a risk assessment, the essential question is not whether Israel would
be safe if its enemies are appeased, but what are the dangers if those enemies
remain ambitious and hostile.

It is natural that the Israeli government pledges to enforce rigorously the
security provisions of any peace agreement. Every party to a peace or arms control
agreement makes such a pledge. But the record of such agreements between democratic
and nondemocratic countries calls for a discounting. The World War I Allies
said they would enforce the Versailles Treaty provisions on limiting the size
of the German army and demilitarizing the Rhineland. They did not. Though the
U.S. government promised to enforce its various arms control agreements with
the Soviet Union, Soviet violations were numerous and material, and the United
States did nothing but complain (and little of that). The Israeli government
said it would insist on compliance with all the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty, but important compliance problems have remained unresolved for
years.

The pattern in such cases is that, when the nondemocratic treaty party violates
the agreement, the democratic party, ever reluctant to provoke a confrontation,
tends at first to ignore or belittle the evidence, then occasionally makes excuses
for the other side, then says the violations are unclear or, if clear, are not
enormously important. Those advocating a response to the violations are ridiculed
as legalistic. Even if the violations are clear and important, the government
of the democratic party will lament that its options are limited and unsatisfactory
for it certainly does not want to overreact. It does not want to risk a war
over an action by the other side that falls short of immediate preparation for
war. The upshot is that the violation often stands.

This is not to say Israel will necessarily remain passive in the face of threatening
developments or serious treaty violations. But, when the time comes, Israel
will find it is no easy matter to reverse such developments or violations simply
because it may have a legal right to do so.

As for the proposition that Israeli strength ensures its ability to handle
threats from the territories, it is hard to contradict the point so long as
current circumstances prevail: Egypt maintains peace with Israel. Iraq remains
a stricken pariah. Syria lacks a great power sponsor. Jordan is weak and cautious.
The Palestinian Arabs are politically divided, financially strapped and sit
in the doghouse in the Arab world because of their support for Saddam Hussein.
In light of such current realities, it is likely that Israel’s Defense Forces
could secure the state against existential threats even if withdrawn from most
of the territories and even if the new authorities there remain hostile to Israel.
But this begs the question: Are the current favorable circumstances permanent?
And, if not, are they likely to change in desirable or undesirable ways?

Unfortunately, the big picture in the Middle East is deteriorating. The trends
are not toward peaceful politics, liberal democracy, toleration and prosperity.
On the contrary, Is-lamist movements, espousing violent, anti-democratic, anti-Western
enmity and jihad, are gaining popularity throughout the region, exacerbating
the region’s structural economic problems. Islamist activities in Jordan, Algeria,
Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon and elsewhere warn us against assuming that the Middle
East will be stable in coming years or that Israel’s concessions can turn the
tide of radical Islam. The risks inherent in Israel’s concessions must be assessed
in light of the possibility, grim though realistic, that within five to 10 years
Khomeini-style Islamist regimes may be running Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Syria and whatever new state is created for the Palestinian Arabs.

If this bad case materializes, the benefits to Israel of escaping the "occupation"
may look meager compared to the resulting security threats. Will the strains
of occupation have been replaced by the strains of living within once-again-insecure
boundaries? Less territory, for example, means less mobilization time, which
may necessitate, as threats increase, a larger standing army and less reliance
on reserves. And the increased danger of getting cut in half may require increased
reliance by Israel on destabilizing pre-emption strategies.

It would be an enormous blessing if the new Israel-PLO agreement ended the
conflict between Arabs and Jews. But history casts doubt on the notion that
the anti-Zionist cause, embodied in the Palestinian Arab national movement,
would permanently abandon its traditional principles in favor of severely limited
sovereignty in a small segment of Western Palestine.

National security analysts must evaluate the risks of the Israel-PLO deal on
the conservative assumption of continued hostility and an increase of Islamist
political power in the region. From that point of view, Israel is assuming very
serious risks in seeking peace with the PLO, for the Israeli concessions may,
under changed circumstances in the future, affect the state’s ability to protect
itself in war. And the legal safeguards intended to mitigate those risks can
be expected to prove far less effective than hoped for.

To be sure, the status quo too has its burdensome and worrisome features. But
as they work to define the full extent of their concessions to the PLO, Israeli
officials will have to keep hopes in check and protect against trading current
problems for worse problems.

Copyright 1993 News World Communications, Inc.