Baker’s ‘Open Door’ Policy on Negotiating an End to the Gulf Crisis

(Washington, D.C.): If any explanation
were needed why Saddam Hussein has not
taken seriously the warnings from the
Bush Administration about the imminence
of war, one could do worse than examine
the signals sent by Secretary of State
James Baker in the past forty-eight
hours.

On Sunday, Secretary Baker was pressed
by Sam Donaldson on ABC’s This Week
with David Brinkley to define
whether the Bush Administration was
prepared to be drawn into a series of
meetings with Iraqi officials in the
aftermath of tomorrow’s Baker-Aziz
session in Geneva. At last, after
repeated queries about a follow-on
encounter with Saddam in Baghdad or
elsewhere went unanswered, the following
exchange occurred:

Donaldson: “Next
Wednesday…that’s it as far as
any further meetings, certainly
at a high level, between U.S.
officials and Iraqi
officials?”

Sec. Baker: “…That’s
right, and we haven’t had one
proposal from the government of
Iraq —

Donaldson: “So you are not
closing the door?”

Sec. Baker: “…I am
closing the door.”

By the time Secretary Baker got to London
late Sunday night, spin control
had been applied to his traveling press
entourage. The Wall Street Journal,
for example, reported on Monday morning
that, while there would be no meeting in
Baghdad, “in a briefing for
reporters aboard his aircraft en route to
London…Mr. Baker left the door open
a crack for a different kind of
diplomatic follow-up that could produce a
face-to-face talk with the Iraqi leader. He
refused to rule out meeting with Saddam
Hussein in a location other than Iraq.“
(Emphasis added.)

Unfortunately, the
impression conveyed by this statement —
that President Bush has only ruled out a
meeting between Mr. Baker and Saddam in
Baghdad — is but the latest in a
series of mixed signals that have
confused domestic and foreign audiences
about the Administration’s determination
to bring the Iraqi leader to heel even as
they have emboldened him.

Among such signals have been those
sent by U.S. officials, including the
President and the Secretary of State,
about the benefits that would accrue to
Saddam Hussein if only he will
withdraw from Kuwait. The benefits
appear to involve:

• A commitment not to
  attack Iraq: How
  sweeping or open-ended this
  pledge might be is not yet clear.
  It begs the question, however:
  Could such a commitment, in
  effect, make the United States
  the guarantor of Iraqi security
  against a possible attack by an
  American ally — namely, Israel?
• No war crimes trials:
  It would be absurd to press to
  prosecute junior officers and
  soldiers for the rape of Kuwait
  when the chief war criminal,
  Saddam Hussein, is being offered
  security guarantees.
• No reparations:
  Notwithstanding the U.N.
  resolution calling for Iraqi
  compensation of those who have
  suffered from its aggression, it
  appears that the United States is
  now willing to leave the matter
  of reparations to negotiations
  between the affected parties.
  Given their relative negotiating
  positions, such an arrangement is
  tantamount to allowing the Iraqis
  to dictate terms to the prostrate
  Kuwaitis.
• Oil and territorial
  concessions: The Bush
  Administration has also made it
  clear that it has no objection to
  Kuwait granting Iraq its pre-war
  demands in such negotiations,
  once Saddam Hussein has withdrawn
  fully from Kuwaiti territory.
  Needless to say, such a position
  makes a mockery of the pose
  struck by the United States and
  its partners in the anti-Iraq
  coalition that aggression must
  not be rewarded. Worse yet, if we
  are prepared to accept a final
  arrangement whereby Iraqi troops
  occupy islands or other territory
  belonging to Kuwait, maintaining
  that anything less than complete
  withdrawal will be a casus
  belli is probably
  unsustainable politically.
• Breaking Israel’s Knees:
  Perhaps most insidious of all for
  long-term U.S. interests in the
  Middle East is the Bush
  Administration’s transparent
  willingness to get a so-called
  International Peace Conference
  underway to address the
  Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
  Having embraced in principle this
  initiative — whose express
  purpose, and only possible
  outcome, will be to compel Israel
  to make dangerous territorial
  concessions — the U.S.
  government’s current efforts to
  deny Saddam Hussein credit for
  launching this diplomatic assault
  on Israel (read
  “linkage”) and to
  sustain its present caveats and
  preconditions will become
  untenable.

The Center for Security Policy
believes that Saddam Hussein is correctly
interpreting such signals as signs of a
lack of American resolve — which he can
attempt to exploit to his political,
strategic and military advantage. There
is no practical difference
between offering the above concessions to
Saddam as a reward for withdrawing from
Kuwait and granting them beforehand as an
inducement to such a withdrawal.
In fact, it is an act of the rankest
cynicism to suggest otherwise.

If the Bush Administration wants to
produce a genuine solution to the crisis
and have the Baker-Aziz meeting produce
the desired results, it must — to use
Secretary Baker’s words — close
the door on further diplomatic
parlays. It must also define terms for
peace that do not invite Saddam to
believe that he can get still more
favorable concessions by dragging out the
crisis.

The President must, instead, define
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s
regime and military power as the problem
— not the occupation of Kuwait. The
object of the war, if it must occur,
should be to deal with that problem and
deal with it decisively: precipitating an
end to Saddam’s tyrannical rule;
neutralizing his power-projection
capabilities; and, as a result, creating
conditions likely to result in the
liberation of Kuwait and improved
prospects for peace in the region.
Diplomacy should have no less clear-cut
goals; if it cannot serve them it should
be swiftly set aside.