Castañeda’s Legacy for U.S.-Mexico Relations

Another area of perhaps unnecessary irritation between both countries occurred during the UN Security Council debate on a resolution on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, in the fall of 2002. Mexico played an active role in that debate, perceived by many as assisting France and Russia in placing obstacles in the proposed wording of the resolution by Washington. However, even after the United States and France had reconciled their respective positions to present a common resolution, in a speech read before the National Assembly of France in November of 2002, Fox spoke critically of the United Statesand of its “propensity” to act unilaterally. The leading Mexico City daily Reforma, wondering what may have compelled Fox to act this way and how Washington may react, mentioned in an editorial that “the government of change is studying the rhetoric of the 1970s.”^[xxix]

Castañeda spent much energy attempting to monopolize Mexico’s foreign relations, oftentimes engaging in almost comical skirmishes with departments that share these responsibilities (such as the Economy Secretariat).  He persuaded Fox to close independent initiatives, such as the very popular Office of Migrant Affairs headed by Juan Hernández, as well as the Plan Puebla-Panamá, an initiative to develop the south of Mexicoand Central America. Those programs were folded into the Foreign Ministry, despite complaints from migrant leaders^[xxx] and private concerns by Central American governments (particularlyEl Salvador and Nicaragua) that remember Castañeda’s meddling in their internal affairs in the 1980s in favor of their anti-constitutional insurgencies.

In addition, Castañeda’s close friend and ally Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (another product of the PRI and the illiberal Left) became National Security Advisor of the president, with ambitions to create an all-powerful Security Council with control over the armed forces and the political police. He was outmaneuvered by the PAN interior minister, Santiago Creel, who gradually took over Zinser’s functions. Castañeda and Zinser were to have a public and vicious falling-out later, when the latter served as ambassador in the UN. (Zinser died in an accident in 2005.)

There was speculation as to why, in his quest for the presidency, Castañeda spent much more time attempting to monopolize the foreign relations of Mexico than in attempting to court or create a political party. Perhaps the reason is that Castañeda seemed to continue believing in the “dependency” model of development, a worldview espoused by the radical illiberal Left in the 1970s (whose main author was the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch).  According to this perspective, the “Periphery” (Third World countries) are bound to exploitative trade arrangements with the “Center” (the United States). This model has been abandoned by several of its original adherents, including the former Brazilian president Fernando Hernique Cardoso. Castañeda seems to believe, however, that whoever controls the umbilical cord that connects the Periphery (Mexico) with the Center, will effectively control the Periphery. His drive to control Mexico’s foreign relations (including foreign economic relations and relations with migrants) seems to obey this mental model. It has been speculated in Mexicothat Castañeda ironically perceived that his ticket to the presidency lay somewhere in Washington.^[xxxi]

Castañeda’s Policies towards the Region

The shift in Mexico’s foreign policy towards the United States during Castañeda’s years as top diplomat received some attention as it became more confrontational and controversial.  Less attention was paid though to his no-less-troubling approach towards  other countries in the hemisphere, in particular Cuba, Colombia and Nicaragua.

In Cuba, there are indications that Castañeda’s putative falling out with Castro may not have been a true break with the Mexican’s own communist past in favor of an embrace of democracy and anti-Castro Cuban dissidents, as it is often portrayed in the United States and even in Mexico. It is known that a part of the Cuban Communist nomenklatura, worried about losing everything during a regime change on the island, would prefer the “Ceausescu scenario” in order to preserve their power and privileges. In Romania, in December of 1989, the second echelon of the Communist Party executed Nicolae Ceausescu in order essentially to sequester the anti-communist revolution and remain in power under a different (i.e., “social democratic”) banner, dividing among themselves the spoils of the subsequent botched privatization and marketization – with international approval and recognition.

Fox’s meeting with Oswaldo Payá and other dissidents during his visit toCubain early 2002 was portrayed as evidence of his commitment – and his foreign minister’s – to a Free Cuba.  In fact, it was more the result of lobbying by PAN officials, namely Cristian Castaño and René Bolio, and their friends in the exiled Cuban community inMiami. Castañeda only reluctantly acquiesced to the idea.

Instead, Castañeda seemed to be assisting that part of the Cuban nomenklatura that was attempting to remove Castro from power to prolong its rule. The pointman in this campaign seemed then to be the former foreign minister of the island, Roberto Robaina González, who has a personal friendship with Castañeda. People in Castañeda’s office have mentioned that the foreign minister continues to meet privately with Cuban embassy and other officials close to Robaina.

In that scenario whereby Castro died or was overthrown in a palace coup, Castañeda may have strived to quickly legitimize the new regime, both with Mexican diplomacy as well as lobbying in European capitals and in Washington. This would have given a chance to the (by then presumably re-named) Communist Party to consolidate itself before the long-repressed and pro-democracy dissidents got sufficiently organized to challenge them. While this strategy worked inRomaniain 1989 and 1990, it backfired in other countries where the communists attempted the same gambit. Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany saw attempts at palace coups fail when the democrats in those countries refused to be appeased and rallied to win power.