CENTER ROUNDTABLE: THE U.S. STILL NEEDS A TOP-FLIGHT UNDERSEA WARFARE CAPABILITY AND THE ROBUST INDUSTRIAL BASE IT REQUIRES

(Washington, D.C.): Congressional action this week may do
much to determine not only the future size and complexion but
also perhaps even the viability of the United States’ undersea
warfare forces. The Senate Armed Services Committee is scheduled
to “mark-up” the FY 1996 Defense authorization bill and
its members — like their House counterparts — may seek
significant changes in the Clinton Administration submarine
modernization program. Consideration may also be given to
postponing the Administration’s plan to “stand-down”
four U.S. ballistic missile submarines.

Last fall, as these controversial ideas were beginning to
circulate in official Washington, the Center for Security Policy
convened the second in a series of High-Level Roundtable
Discussions involving senior policy-makers — both past and
present — to consider them. This day-long session was held on 20
October 1994 and addressed “The Future of U.S. Strategic and
Tactical Undersea Forces.” Among the more than fifty
participants were: former Secretaries of Defense James
Schlesinger and Caspar Weinberger; the former Director
of Naval Nuclear Reactors, Admiral Kinnaird McKee; former
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Vice
Admiral Al Burkhalter; former Under Secretary of Defense Don
Hicks; and former chief strategic arms negotiator, Ambassador
Linton Brooks.

The Center today released a seven-page summary of this
Roundtable Discussion. The summary offers a powerful rebuttal to
those who argue that the United States need no longer worry about
the deterrent credibility and survivability of its
submarine-based forces. It also makes clear that such
requirements cannot be satisfied on an on-going basis unless the
U.S. retains a robust, competitive industrial base capable of
performing the associated research, development, procurement and
maintenance. Highlights of this summary include:

• There are two direct threats to the U.S.
  undersea force: (1) An undiminished — and improving —
  Russian submarine development program; and (2) the
  proliferation of state-of-the-art diesel submarines, most
  often sold by Russia to dangerous countries in regions of
  strategic interest to the U.S. (e.g., Northeast Asia, the
  Persian Gulf, Latin America, etc.)
• In the period 1982-1991, the United States produced 37
  submarines; in the period 1992-2001, only four U.S.
  submarines are planned, and that could fall to three.
  This represents a 90% drop in production. As a result,
  skilled welders, nuclear engineers, naval architects and
  other specialists in submarine production are moving into
  the civilian sector. Many of them will be unavailable to
  build the next generation of nuclear submarines when they
  are needed. The fall-off in capability in the submarine
  sector is faster than in other military/industrial
  sectors because of the drastic reduction in construction.
• In the absence of sound strategic planning, the Navy
  is losing the ability to produce submarines. Vendors
  and contractors are taking themselves out — or are being
  forced out — of competition for government contracts.
  The industrial base is being ignored in decision-making
  about the needs of the submarine fleet. Because of the
  budgetary restraints being imposed by the Clinton
  Administration, the Navy is no longer making long-term
  investment decisions essential to preserve an effective
  underwater fleet and the industrial infrastructure needed
  to support it.

Click here to obtain a copy of the summary of
the High-Level Roundtable Discussion on the Future of the
Undersea Forces.