Christopher-Perry Join The Debate On Missile Defense: Will The House Defend Clinton’s Program — Or Defend America?

Yesterday, the Secretaries of State and Defense used the unusual vehicle of a jointly signed op.ed. article in the New York Times to express the Clinton Administration’s adamant opposition to H.R. 7 — the National Security Revitalization Act promised by the Contract With America. Leading the list of reasons that Warren Christopher and William Perry argue justifies the defeat of this legislation is H.R. 7’s commitment to protect the people of the United States against ballistic missile attack.

Specifically, the National Security Revitalization Act would establish the policy of the U.S. government to be to provide at the earliest practical moment a highly effective anti-missile defense for the American people, their forces overseas and their allies. It goes on to direct the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a plan for fielding such defensive capabilities within sixty days of enactment of this legislation.

‘See No Evil’

Mr. Clinton’s Cabinet officers object to what they describe as an effort to "return the United States to a crash-schedule deployment of a national missile defense" on the grounds that such a deployment is "not justified by any existing threat to our nation’s security." This statement appears to reflect an ideological predisposition rather than a clear-eyed vision of strategic realities. It is rooted in the erroneous assumption that the only threat Washington need concern itself with is that arising from the world-wide proliferation of missiles of too short a range to strike the United States. The corollary to this notion is that it will take years for intercontinental-range missiles (ICBMs) to be developed by the many rogue states actively seeking ballistic missile capabilities.

In fact, nations bent on acquiring such lethal weapons no longer have to develop them indigenously. Now, they have the option of simply buying even long-range missiles — and, in all likelihood, weapons of mass destruction to go with them. For example, the Russian government of Boris Yeltsin is actively marketing to anyone with the cash to buy it a so-called "space-launch" version of Moscow’s SS-25 ICBM. China is also offering the CSS-4, a Titan II class rocket. In unfriendly hands, these missiles could deliver a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon on the United States from anywhere on earth.

What is more, these two countries — which are in possession of significant numbers of intercontinental-range missiles capable of hitting the United States — are in the midst of serious leadership crises. Grave political instability could result. No one can guarantee that such instability will not translate, in due course, into a breakdown of discipline and control over their respective nuclear forces. Under present circumstances, in which the United States lacks any national missile defense, even the accidental launch of one of these missiles would be catastrophic.

The relevant question of course should not be not whether there is an "existing threat" to our nation’s security that justifies a deployment of anti-missile defenses.

The real issue is: Will missile threats to the American people be put into place before defenses against them can be? Unfortunately, given the ease with which potential adversaries are now able to acquire ever more dangerous ballistic missiles and related technology and given the Clinton Administration’s indifference to the implications of this trend, the answer is likely to be "Yes" — unless this Congress acts.

The ‘We’re Broke’ Excuse

Secretaries Christopher and Perry go on to assert that the sort of deployment of missile defenses promised in the Contract With America and envisioned by H.R. 7 would "divert billions of scarce defense dollars and other resources from more pressing needs, particularly in the area of theater missile defense." This is, in short, a canard.

For one thing, vastly more could be done to defend America within existing defense resources. This could be achieved if only the United States ended its wasteful and futile practice of trying to make programs aimed at protecting against missile attack conform to an arms control treaty that essentially prohibits such protection. There is ample basis for doing so: The Soviet Union — the other party to that agreement (i.e., the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) — no longer exists. Even before it dissolved, the USSR repeatedly violated this accord. And clearly, it is no longer consistent with America’s vital interests that its people remain vulnerable to missile strikes from any quarter.

For another, were the Clinton Administration to refrain from negotiating new limits on theater missile defenses (nominally for the purpose of arbitrarily "demarcating" the distinction between anti-short-range systems and anti-long-range systems), U.S. theater defenses could be optimized to provide protection against all classes of ballistic missiles, at least under certain circumstances. In this manner, economies might be made in the number and capabilities of systems acquired for national missile defense.

Finally, under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government has no "more pressing need" or higher obligation than to provide for the common defense. Since protection of the Nation against missile attack is the one area in which there is no defense, fielding such a capability has to enjoy high priority. What is more, by investing in and deploying effective missile defenses, Washington may be able to dissuade potentially threatening countries from pursuing ballistic missile technology — thereby materially reducing the threat posed by such nations and attenuating both the probability and possible costs of conflict with them.

A New Ballgame: Perry Has An Option

In recent weeks, the Defense Department has begun to float its own idea for providing an emergency defense against a very limited ballistic missile threat. For example, Secretary Perry has alluded rather generally to such a capability in his past few congressional appearances. Then last week, a memorandum was circulated by Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch that put some flesh on the bones.

According to the Deutch memo, the idea would be to modify somewhere between 20-50 Minuteman III ICBMs to carry an exoatmospheric-kill vehicle. If operated from a single site (perhaps in Grand Forks, North Dakota) in conjunction with one or more new, ground-based radars and other, existing early-warning radar systems, these weapons would have the ability to provide some protection to most of the continental United States. The coastal areas and Alaska and Hawaii would likely remain virtually undefended, however, particularly against sea-launched ballistic missile attack.

According to the Deutch memo, this "Emergency Response System would take two years to develop (at a cost of $2-4 billion) and two years to deploy (at a cost of $3-6 billion)." Given the extent to which the Clinton Administration has eviscerated virtually every program associated with defending the United States against missile attack, this Rube Goldberg system is presumably what Messrs. Christopher and Perry have in mind when they assert that: "We are conducting a broad research and development program that will, in a few years, be able to deploy a national missile defense system whenever a threat emerges."

If, in fact, the Administration is prepared to recommend such an approach, it will completely undercut the arguments now being made by opponents inside and outside of the executive branch: According to Dr. Deutch, the "Emergency Response System would not be compliant with either the ABM or START Treaties." Assuming that President Clinton is willing to spend as much as $10 billion over as long as four years to field such a system — even though it is designed to provide only very limited protection to significant parts of this country — then clearly the Congress should feel free to decide how much more capability could be acquired for that sum or less and at an even quicker pace.

The Bottom Line

On 8 February 1995, Defense Daily reported that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell (USA, Ret.) "believes political, budget and security factors have combined to make national missile defense a thing of the past." According to the trade publication, Gen. Powell contends that, "while a national missile defense to protect the entire nation would be too expensive and impractical, the U.S. should invest in technologies that could lead to limited defenses."

Interestingly, the article also notes that Gen. Powell acknowledged having previously erred in recommending force and budget reductions that were too great: "’I was a part of [the planning for the reduced forces],’ he said. In retrospect, the reductions were too large, making it too difficult to fight and win a pair of nearly simultaneous conflicts, as envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review."

The Center for Security Policy commends Gen. Powell for admitting responsibility for a previous and strategically serious mistake. It believes, however, that he — like the Clinton Administration — is making an even greater error today by eschewing the earliest practical deployment of highly effective missile defenses for the United States and its people, as called for by H.R. 7. The Center hopes that a strong bipartisan majority will ensure that the House of Representatives does not make a similar mistake in its action on this critical legislation tomorrow.

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