Clinton Policies Would Disarm U.S. Space Capabilit

By Frank Gaffney
Defense News, 17-23 November 1997

Of all the wrenching challenges facing the U.S. military, one that threatens to do particularly serious and lasting harm to its ability to fight and win the nation’s next war is going practically unremarked. On Oct. 14, President Bill Clinton exercised his line-item veto, for the first time, on policy grounds, to eliminate three programs essential to the future U.S. capability to exercise military control of space.

The programs in question are the Clementine II asteroid intercept experiment, the Army’s Kinetic Kill Anti-Satellite Weapon and the Military Space Plane. These technology development initiatives have the potential to afford the armed forces the means to exercise space dominance. Recent war games have established that such a capability will be decisive to the future conduct of terrestrial operations.

The president’s veto message nonetheless declared that, “I have been assured by the secretary of defense that none of the cancellations would undercut our national security or adversely affect the readiness of our forces or their operations in defense of our nation.”

In order to conform to such an irresponsibly naive, if not Luddite, view, the Air Force has responded to the veto by rewriting its doctrines, mission requirements and budget requests to delete references to the need for such capabilities.

As a result, what proudly was declared as recently as a month ago to be the visionary “Air and Space Force” for the 21st century is rapidly mutating into an Air and No Space Force. If allowed to proceed unchecked, the Pentagon will be unable to assure its ability to operate robustly in space and, if necessary, deny such an ability to an adversary.

The impetus behind the president’s space control veto, and the Air Force’s scorched-earth reaction to it, appears to be political. In mid-September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed that the United States and Russia initiate negotiations leading toward a series of antisatellite (ASAT) bans. The White House evidently has accepted, despite the fact that the U.S. military cannot permit hostile satellites to be used in time of war to locate, track, target or enable attacks upon American forces.

While some argue it would be worth foregoing such capabilities if attacks upon U.S. satellites could be precluded, a study submitted to Congress 13 years ago by President Ronald Reagan established there was no way to verify an antisatellite prohibition.

As a result, the sort of ASAT negotiations the Clinton White House already quietly has begun with the Russians likely are to produce the worst of both worlds — limitations that will inhibit, if not preclude, American space control capabilities without significantly diminishing the threat posed to vital U.S. space assets.

This prospect must focus the minds of the U.S. armed forces. After all, few, if any, competent military officers believe the United States will be able to conduct successful terrestrial operations in the future without enjoying unhampered use of space, and the ability to deny it to adversaries.

The question of space control represents a sort of IQ test — short for integrity quotient — for today’s uniformed leadership. Those responsible for preparing to fight the nation’s wars must not shrink from offering their candid, professional military advice just because it runs counter to the president’s perceived political imperatives.

For its part, Congress must afford them opportunities to do so in a manner consistent with officers’ constitutional oaths and in keeping with the imperative of civilian control of the military.

A cautionary example of what can happen when such advice is not forthcoming occurred on Nov. 10. In an appearance before the House National Security military research and development subcommittee, the director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), Air Force Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, clung to the White House policy line when he knew the facts to be otherwise.

Subcommittee Chairman Curt Weldon took him to task for failing to testify honestly concerning additional steps Weldon previously had been told by BMDO could be taken to enhance a variety of U.S. theater missile defense programs.

In an interview conducted the day after Weldon disgustedly gaveled the hearing to an early close and sent Lyles packing, he put the U.S. military on notice:

“This administration is more [concerned] about having generals and admirals be ‘politically correct’ than it is about having generals and admirals tell the honest story to the Congress and the American people about the severity of threats that are emerging. I don’t want to over-state the threat, but I don’t want some general looking to get his fourth star . . . coming in and trying to be careful about what he says, as opposed to us being able to protect our kids.”

It behooves legislators and military leaders to enter into an honest dialogue, and if necessary, protect the latters’ careers from retribution by political commissars in the executive branch.

The place to start would be a public discussion of the unvarnished facts concerning the U.S. need for space dominance, and what will be required to assure it.

Frank Gaffney is director of the Center for Security Policy, Washington.