Counterpropaganda: An Important Capability for Joint Forces

Next, the Joint force must have a way to identify opponent propaganda from other forms of information in the operating environment.  Propaganda is likely to be subtle and nuanced, and in today’s operating environment, misinformation and disinformation may be intermixed with the propaganda.  To separate out the propaganda, it is necessary to identify adversary capabilities to develop and spread propaganda, as well as the receptiveness of key target audiences to the adversary’s lines of persuasion.  Under normal circumstances this is a PSYOP task, conducted using objective analysis, subjective analysis, or source-content-audience-media-effects (SCAME) analysis for individual pieces or instances of opponent propaganda and series analysis to grasp the operational impact of the opponent’s propaganda.⁷ The IO staff can facilitate these analyses by assisting intelligence and PSYOP personnel in the collection of suspected propaganda, as reflected in FM 3-05.301: “PSYOP forces do not have the organic ability to collect all available information.  In addition, PSYOP personnel may be lured by the obvious propaganda appearing in the AO and miss collecting the more subtle and potentially effective propaganda being disseminated through the local media.”⁸

A possible staff solution is to assemble a working group consisting of a handful of personnel from the IO, PSYOP, public affairs (PA), and intelligence staffs who can use fuse two core analytical functions – propaganda analysis and media analysis – with the current intelligence estimate.  Although the exact functions of the working group are variable by echelon and mission, in general it must acquire and document suspected opponent propaganda in each sub-sector of the operational area, preferably at regular, periodic intervals.

Another task of the working group is to fuse the PA media and PSYOP propaganda analyses.  Because propaganda is often carried by news media in opinion-editorials, news articles and broadcasts, and publicized as “newsworthy” events, it is useful to examine the media within the framework of propaganda analysis.  Additionally, news clips and images may appear in propaganda products if the adversary attempts to exploit the credibility of news organizations in the eyes of the target.

Finally, a database should be constructed to catalog and share identified propaganda with higher and lower echelons of command in order to provide a common view of opposing information in the operating area.  In sum, these efforts can establish propaganda trends and patterns and provide long-term outlooks that will carry over beyond the tour of duty of rotating personnel.

The culmination of the working group’s efforts is an understanding of how the opponent is affecting the content and flow of information in the operating environment, how its propaganda impacts the various target audiences, and perhaps most importantly, what needs of the target audiences are being preyed upon by the propagandists.