Dealing with the haunting legacy

BY: Al Santoli
The Washington Times, April 20, 1993

The debate over a Soviet intelligence document has refocused attention on the haunting legacy
of American prisoners missing in Southeast Asia. A U.S. mission to Hanoi to investigation the
documents has ended in a familiar pattern of denials by Vietnamese officials, token “just
discovered” information and claims of “progress” by American negotiators. However, significant
questions remain unanswered.

The Soviet documents, quoting a 1972 speech by a high-ranking Vietnamese general, Tran Van
Quang, became known by the Pentagon last February. A month later, at the U.S. Embassy at
Bangkok, thousands of original historical and investigative records — vital to resolving the MIA
mystery — were destroyed in a shredder. The document destruction reportedly was overseen by
Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham, commander of the Joint Task Force for Full Accounting, which is
responsible for conducting MIA investigations throughout Indochina.

Protests about the incident from Sen. Robert Smith, New Hampshire Republican, and MIA
families led the Pentagon to order an internal investigation. However, veterans organizations are
calling for an independent inquiry. President Clinton created another controversy by dispatching
retired Gen. John Vessey to Hanoi.

Gen. Vessey was a distinguished artilleryman and staff officer. However, as President Bush’s
MIA envoy he gained a reputation as too willing to accept Hanoi’s duplicity. For example, in
1991 testimony before the U.S. Senate, Gen. Vessey supported Vietnamese claims that “worms”
ate their POW records. A year later, Hanoi admitted to possession of a vast collection of POW
archives and historical records. They still deny access to records of the Enemy Proselytizing
Department, the key organization responsible for foreign prisoners, claiming they were “destroyed
in a fire.” The communists maintained meticulous records in duplicate, with copies stored in more
than one office.

Documents just handed to Gen. Vessey mention only 368 prisoners held or deceased before
1973. This is a mere fraction of the 591 living and 500 bodies already returned, and the 2,200
who are still missing.

Field investigations are repeatedly staged with coached witnesses and animal bones planted at
excavation sites. Since 1991, of 80 flag-draped caskets returned from Vietnam, only 13 have
proved to be Americans. This charade has cost taxpayers $100 million. Unfazed, Gen. Vessey
continued to praise Vietnamese cooperation and advocate giving away the administration’s only
negotiating leverage — the trade embargo.

This is not the first Vessey-Quang meeting. On Jan. 30, 1992, they sat across a table in Hanoi,
where Gen. Vessey conveyed a gift of $1.3 million, primarily to assist communist war veterans.
They did not discuss withheld American prisoners. The current mission is clouded by the
presence of Gen. Needham, State Department official Ken Quinn — a member of the 1977
Woodcock Commission that declared all U.S. prisoners dead – and Andre Savageot, who is under
contract with a U.S. corporation that is lobbying to lift the trade embargo.

Hanoi has denounced the Soviet document by claiming that Gen. Quang was a minor figure as
commander of Military Region 4. However, volumes of official records show that between 1958
and 1974 he was also a deputy chief of staff of the army. His previous role as chief of the Enemy
Proselytizing Department made him an expert on prisoner exploitation. As commander of
Military Region 4, he controlled areas of Laos where a secondary prison system was located.

Pentagon debunking artists claim that some of Gen. Quang’s prisoner count could have been
South Vietnamese or Thais. However, Gen. Quang’s language specifically states “Americans.”
The Vietnamese language is very precise. In all communist documents, South Vietnamese are
referred to specifically as “puppets.” There is no record of South Vietnamese mixed in with
Americans in North Vietnamese prisons.

Recently declassified U.S. intelligence documents support claims of a secret prison system.
Some 80 percent of Americans prisoners in Laos were captured by the Vietnamese or held in
areas under their authority. Post-1975 satellite imagery of prison areas in Laos and Vietnam
contain pictures of distress signals and authenticator codes identified to specific MIAs. A
compelling authenticator and distress symbol and the names of two missing pilots were stamped
out in high grass during June 1992 outside of Dong Mang prison in Vietnam. Despite numerous
Senate inquiries, Gen. Needham’s Hanoi-based task force has yet to visit the prison site.

The Moscow archive documents demonstrate intense Soviet interest in the American prisoners.
U.S. officials continue to deny evidence of Soviet involvement. However, Senate investigators
concur with Gen. Quang that some Americans with technical expertise were taken to secret
prisons. There, Soviet advisers extracted their knowledge.

A series of secret State Department cables between January and June 1967 describe two to six
“wounded U.S. fliers captured in Vietnam and currently held in an East German hospital . . .
including a double amputee,” being offered in trade for a Soviet spy team imprisoned in England.
After five months of negotiations, the British refused to cooperate. The disabled Americans
disappeared.

MIA families disagree with Gen. Vessey’s and the task force’s near-exclusive emphasis on
crash-site excavations. They believe Hanoi should first be required to provide real answers for the
nearly 200 last-known-alive and 1,100 missing men who may have been seen alive. The real
answers are in the records of Vietnam’s Enemy Proselytizing Department and General Political
Directorate. Similar records are contained in the Soviet archives.

The destruction of thousands of pages of U.S. investigators’ hand-written analyses — dating
back to 1970 — by Gen. Needham’s task force further complicates research. The task force has
been severely criticized for a glaring lack of investigative standards. Detachment chiefs and field
team leaders in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are primarily young infantry and artillery officers
without previous intelligence training, no POW-MIA research experience and rudimentary
language ability.

Task force teams often rely upon Vietnamese or Laotian government translators and conduct
interviews in the presence of communist cadres. They simply do not have the ability to perform
quality research or evaluate the status of individual cases. On the other hand, Garnett Bell, the
Pentagon’s most respected MIA expert and Vietnamese linguist, was transferred to a desk in
Bangkok after he spoke honestly at Senate hearings regarding problems with Vietnamese
cooperation. He is no longer involved in field investigations.

Archival research in Hanoi is led by a Defense Intelligence Agency official whose testimony at
Senate hearings was discredited by serious inconsistencies. The agency’s MIA office is controlled
by career bureaucrats whose performance was described in internal evaluations as “unprofessional
. . . never employing the most basic analytic tools . . . [possessing] a mind-set to debunk [reports
of live Americans].” Numerous family members believe the DIA’s primary objective is to protect
two decades of coverup.

After any war, there can never be a complete accounting for all of the missing. However, to
resolve the heartache of MIA families and obtain an honest accounting, the Clinton administration
should expedite the following actions:

• The Vietnamese must produce live men, their remains, or an explanation that withstands
  intense scrutiny, before they receive any U.S. aid or international financing or the trade
  embargo is lifted.
• Gen. Quang is a lifelong communist who cannot be expected to provide sincere testimony.
  Instead, the Vietnamese must provide full on-site access to Enemy Proselytizing Department
  and General Politic Directorate archives. These records must be scrutinized by a no-nonsense
  linguist and POW-MIA expert, preferably Garnett Bell.
• A full and impartial investigation must be conducted into the destruction of the Bangkok
  embassy documents and immediate replacement of those responsible, whether at the Pentagon
  or at CINCPAC in Hawaii.
• The Defense Intelligence Agency MIA office must be revitalized by replacing those managers
  and analysts chastised in the Brooks and Gaines reports and those whose performance and
  Senate testimonies have proved disingenuous.
• Replace task force infantry and artillery officers in Indochina with qualified investigators, and
  employ Indochinese-American translators. Each discrepancy case must be approached like an
  FBI investigation from the time of capture until his release or the return of his remains. All
  means of human and technical intelligence must be fully integrated.
• Task Forces Russia and Full Accounting must be permitted to consult and share information
  related to Indochina on a regular and timely basis.
• A new presidential envoy should be appointed who is above politics and will not permit
  duplicity by Vietnam and Laos.

A full and honest resolution can be achieved only by a hands-on commitment by both the
executive branch and Pentagon leadership. This effort will not only end the suffering of grieving
families. It may help to prevent American servicemen from being left behind again.

Al Santoli is the author of two histories of the Vietnam War and its aftermath. He is a former
assistant to the chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives POW-MIA Task Force.