Excerpts from FIFTY YEARS OF TYRANNY: THE INTOLERABLE LEGACY OF THE NAZI-SOVIET AGREEMENTS OF AUGUST 1939

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href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=89-50″>(No. 89-50, 28
August 1989)

[In August 1989, on the occasion of
the fiftieth anniversary of the notorious
Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact, the
Center published a paper calling
attention to the accord that immediately
preceded and, in fact, made the
Non-Aggression Pact possible — the
Nazi-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1939.
Highlights of this paper, seem worth
repeating on the occasion of the new
German-Soviet understandings.]

  • The Trade Agreement of 1939
    featured a number of momentous
    provisions, some of whose terms
    were kept secret, including the
    following:

    • Germany granted
      the Soviet Union a
      merchandise credit of 200
      million Reichsmarks
      (worth billions of
      dollars in today’s
      terms), to be financed by
      the German
      Golddiskontbank.

      This loan would be 100%
      guaranteed by the German
      government and entail an
      interest rate of only 5
      percent (average 7 year
      maturity), of which (in
      accordance with a secret
      protocol) 1/2 percent was
      to be refunded to Soviet
      special accounts in
      Berlin.
    • The credit was to be used
      to finance Soviet
      orders in Germany to
      include machinery,
      industrial installations
      and certain armaments
      .
    • The credit was to be repaid
      by Soviet raw materials

      with delivery to start
      immediately upon
      signature. Such materials
      would include items vital
      to the German agenda of
      the time — namely,
      preparing its military
      for war with imports of
      phosphate, platinum,
      petroleum, cotton and
      feed grain.
  • A senior German negotiator
    reported to Berlin his estimate
    that the agreement had an
    anticipated trade value on the
    order of 1 billion Reichsmarks
    and added that: “Apart from
    the economic import of the
    treaty, its significance lies in
    the fact that the negotiations
    also served to renew
    political contacts
    with
    Russia and that the credit
    agreement was considered by both
    sides as the first decisive
    step in the reshaping of
    political relations
    .”

* * *

  • …It should be recognized in
    the West, and particularly in
    West Germany, that the technical
    structure of current Soviet-West
    German trade and financial
    relations is similar to the
    bilateral trade agreement of
    1939. Albeit that the sharp
    ideological difference between
    the Germans and the Soviets of
    the earlier era was one of
    fascism versus communism whereas
    it is now one of democracy versus
    Gorbachev’s version of Marx and
    Lenin’s teachings, the notion
    persists that trade and credits
    between the two countries can
    overcome such political
    differences
    .

  • Now, as then, manufactured goods,
    technology and generous credit
    terms are basically bartered for
    Soviet raw materials, notably
    energy resources. Similarly, many
    important details of current
    German-Soviet trade and financial
    flows are kept secret, just as
    was done in 1939. Enough is
    known, however, to raise serious
    concerns that West German trade
    and credit is primarily directed
    toward bailing out the Soviet
    Union’s backward economy, rather
    than toward encouraging — to say
    nothing of being in any way tied
    to — systemic economic and
    political reforms in the USSR.

* * *

  • It is time…that the secret aspects of
    the German-Soviet economic and financial
    relationship are replaced by full
    transparency and data disclosure. The
    Western democratic allies require a true
    sense of the dimensions and terms of this
    relationship. A new, more open approach
    by Bonn on these matters would greatly
    advance prospects for the coordination
    and constructive use of Allied economic
    and financial leverage needed to bring
    about the true transformation of the
    Soviet system to one embracing democracy
    and free markets and committed to peace.
Center for Security Policy

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