Excerpts from “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”

By John F. Mearsheimer href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾
Foreign Affairs , Summer 1993

The conventional wisdom about
Ukraine’s nuclear weapons is
wrong….[P]ressing Ukraine to become a
non-nuclear state is a mistake.

A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two
reasons. First, it is imperative
to maintain peace between Russia and
Ukraine. That means ensuring that the
Russians, who have a history of bad
relations with Ukraine, do not move to
reconquer it. Ukraine cannot
defend itself against a nuclear-armed
Russia with conventional weapons, and no
state, including the United States, is
going to extend to it a meaningful
security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear
weapons are the only reliable deterrent
to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is
to enhance stability in Europe, the case
against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is
unpersuasive.

Second…pursuing a
confrontation with Ukraine over the
nuclear issue raises the risks of war by
making the Russians more daring, the
Ukrainians more fearful, and the
Americans less able to defuse a crisis
between them.

* * *

There are…good reasons to fear that
[relations between Russia and Ukraine]
might deteriorate. First, the situation
between Ukraine and Russia is ripe for
the outbreak of security competition
between them….Second, there is the
danger of hypernationalism, the belief
that other nations or nation-states are
both inferior and threatening and must
therefore be dealt with harshly….Third,
several…disputes are already on the
horizon: ownership of the Black Sea
Fleet, control of the Crimea, ownership
of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal and a host
of economic issues stemming from the
breakup of the Soviet Union….Fourth,
there is the problem of mixed
populations. Roughly 11.5 million
Russians live in Ukraine (comprising 22
percent of Ukraine’s population) and
approximately 4.5 million Ukrainians live
in Russia.

* * *

A Ukrainian conventional deterrent is
not a viable option because Ukraine
cannot build an army powerful enough to
stop a Russian attack….A
security guarantee from the West is
theoretically possible but not a
practical strategy for maintaining
Ukrainian sovereignty. Extending
deterrence to Germany during the Cold War
was a demanding and expensive job;
extending deterrence further east to
Ukraine would be even more difficult.
Neither America not its European allies
are eager to take on an expensive new
commitment; on the contrary, NATO’s power
is shrinking rapidly.

* * *

Ukrainian nuclear weapons would be an
effective deterrent against a Russian
conventional attack or nuclear
blackmail….There is a second
reason to favor a Ukrainian nuclear
deterrent: it is inevitable….American
opposition would raise the risk of war
between Russia and Ukraine….America and
its allies may complain about Ukraine’s
new posture, but they would not have to
live with the consequences of a Russian
attack if deterrence fails.

* * *

Once the Russians learn that Ukraine
is keeping its nuclear arsenal, they will
doubtless consider launching a preventive
war to eliminate it before it becomes
fully operational. But this is an
unattractive military option. It
would be a difficult task with
conventional means, since Ukraine
inherited substantial conventional forces
from the Soviet military, which would
enable it to put up formidable
resistance. The Russians might launch a
nuclear strike against the Ukrainian
arsenal. The probability of Ukrainian
nuclear retaliation would be small, but
the Russians could never be sure that
Ukraine would not launch some nuclear
weapons back at them, causing cataclysmic
damage, even if the retaliation was
ragged. Also radioactive fallout from an
attack on Ukraine would contaminate
Russia as well.

Thus military calculations
alone should suffice to deter the
Russians from launching a preventive war.
Nevertheless, it is important that every
element in the deterrent equation work to
prevent war from breaking out. Strong
American and European resistance to
Ukraine’s decision to be a nuclear state
is likely to isolate Ukraine
diplomatically and weaken deterrence.
An American-Ukrainian confrontation over
Ukrainian nuclear weapons could encourage
the Russians to believe that they could
destroy those weapons by force without
doing much long-term damage to Russian
relations with the West.

* * *

A nuclear Ukraine will corrode the
legitimacy of the NPT [Nonproliferation
Treaty], but this damage can be limited
if the United States reverses its
1991 policy of labeling Ukraine a
potential proliferator and instead redefines
Ukraine as a nuclear inheritor, and
hence a special case.
Regardless, preventing war between Russia
and Ukraine is more important than
preserving the NPT.

The START treaties are vestiges of the
Cold War order. If a Ukrainian nuclear
deterrent threaten them, they should be
renegotiated to accommodate a nuclear
Ukraine. After all, America’s
ultimate goal is to create peace and
stability in Europe, not ratify arms
control agreements for their own sake,
especially those created for another
time.

* * *

The safest strategy is to make
Ukraine a responsible nuclear power before
serious trouble starts between [it
and Russia], and not have to attempt this
in the middle of a Russian-Ukrainian
crisis.

There will certainly be an outcry in
Russia if Ukraine retains its nuclear
weapons….If nuclear deterrence works,
and there is ample reason to believe it
will, the Russians will protest loudly at
first, and increase their military
spending somewhat. With time, however,
they are likely to accommodate themselves
to Ukraine’s nuclear weapons and the
stability they bring to the region.

* * *

[The United States] should tone down
its warnings of the dangers of a nuclear
Ukraine and move toward an agnostic
public posture on the issue. It is
probably best if Ukraine develops a
full-fledged nuclear capability gradually
and quietly. During that process, the
United States should strive to stay on
good terms with both sides, so it can
help diffuse disputes that arise between
them. The United States should
recognize that Ukraine is going to be a
nuclear power, irrespective of what the
West does. It is in America’s interest to
help make that happen smoothly.

1. Dr.
Mearsheimer is a professor of Political Science at the University
of Chicago. (Emphasis throughout is added.)