French poetry and sleeper cells

According to ABC News, the U.S. has intercepted encrypted communications believed to have originated in Iran that may serve as “an operational trigger” for “sleeper assets” outside the country. This information was contained in a federal government alert sent to law enforcement agencies and obtained by the network.

The alert cites “preliminary signals analysis” of a transmission “likely of Iranian origin” that was relayed across multiple countries shortly after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, was killed in a U.S.-Israeli attack on Feb. 28.

According to ABC News, the intercepted transmission was encrypted and appeared to be intended for “clandestine recipients” who possess the encryption key, a kind of message intended to impart instructions to “covert operatives or sleeper assets” without using the internet or cellular networks. It’s possible, according to the alert, that the transmissions could “be intended to activate or provide instructions to prepositioned sleeper assets operating outside the originating country.”

“While the exact contents of these transmissions cannot currently be determined, the sudden appearance of a new station with international rebroadcast characteristics warrants heightened situational awareness,” the alert said. This suggests that the transmission itself was unreadable by U.S. intelligence and that the alert was based simply on the nature of the transmission and its point of origin.

All of that, unfortunately, sounds exactly right. Since the onset of the current hostilities, there has been significant concern in the media about the possibility of the Iranians sending teams into the United States or activating “sleeper” cells inside our country to stage attacks. Let me explain how this actually works.

The Iranians could certainly attempt to insert teams of operatives into the United States after the war began. That would not be the smart way to do it, however, and it would not be consistent with their known method of operations.

The Iranians almost certainly put operatives into the United States many years ago, likely in cooperation with groups like Hezbollah. We have, in fact, on several occasions wrapped up some teams on our soil. These teams “sleep” in the sense that they do not stage attacks until directed to do so, but that does not mean they simply sit idly in the interim.

Pending orders to attack, these teams identify and case targets to be struck. That means they observe these targets and acquire all the information necessary to craft attack plans. They visit the targets. They take photographs. They draw sketches. They make ‘book’ on security guards, locks, alarms, surveillance cameras, etc.

Then these teams prepare attack plans based on their casing. If the idea is to blow something up, they decide how much of what explosive is needed and what type, where to emplace it, when to emplace it, etc. All of this is reduced to writing and formally compiled. These plans are also regularly updated to make sure that nothing has changed at the target location.

Finally, these teams acquire the weapons, explosives, and other gear they need. This is done slowly and carefully to avoid detection by our police and intelligence agencies. Then all the material acquired is cached. It is stored in a secure location from which it can be retrieved on a moment’s notice.

Once all this preliminary work is done, all that is required from higher headquarters is a go signal. This does not have to be anything sophisticated, and it may be transmitted in the open as a one-way transmission. The team hears the transmission and goes into action. No acknowledgement is required.

The Allies in the Second World War used this kind of transmission to send signals to the French Resistance and British and American operatives inside occupied France. They were often sent as messages over open radio channels. The Germans could hear them, but they had no way of knowing what they meant or to whom they were directed.

The most famous of these transmissions is probably the reading of “Chanson d’automne” (Autumn Song) by Paul Verlaine by the BBC on the air prior to the Normandy landings. The first three lines signaled that the D-Day invasion was imminent, while the next three lines ordered immediate sabotage operations.

We apparently don’t know what the intercepted Iranian transmission said or what it meant. Let us hope that it was not the functional Persian equivalent of a French poem and that teams hiding in our midst are not about to strike.

Originally published by AND Magazine