Full Remarks By Frank J. Gaffney before The Heritage Foundation

Washington, D.C.
16 January 1996

“Clinton’s Challenge To Congress On Peacekeeping:
Dealing With A Counterculturalist-In-Chief”

President Clinton’s just-completed trip to Bosnia affords an excellent backdrop for today’s
discussion of peacekeeping and the respective powers of the executive and legislative branches.

As I listened to Mr. Clinton calling the troops “warriors for peace” and promising them medals for
participating in a “major non-combat operation,” the leitmotif of his Administration’s approach to
the American military came into sharp focus: This President is committed to mutating the U.S.
armed forces from first-class war-fighting machines and instruments of national power-projection into something altogether different — a sort of armed AmeriCorps. Its most
legitimate, if not principal, mission would be that of a glorified constabulary, available to monitor
Solomonic peace agreements wherever they can be fashioned around the world.

This sort of mutation fits the “counterculture” mindset of the 1960s that proved such a profound
influence on the outlook of this President and many in his Administration. Indeed, as the
President moved through carefully choreographed photo opportunities among the troops he has
dispatched to “enforce” just such a deal for Bosnia, one might have been forgiven for expecting
him to start placing flowers in the barrels of their M-16s!

Symptoms of the Clinton Agenda

If one believes — as contemporary critics of the Vietnam War, like Mr. Clinton, are inclined to do
— that excessive American power makes the United States a menace to world peace, then if
follows that diminishing that power will reduce the likelihood that future Vietnams will occur.
Defense budget cuts greatly reducing force structure and deferring needed military
modernization programs represent an important ingredient in such a stratagem. Other
changes directed by what might be called the “Counterculturalist-in-Chief” that are
affecting the character and use made of remaining national security assets are also
noteworthy.

These include:

• Adopting policy guidance — among other things, in the secret annexes of Presidential
  Decision Directive 25 — ascribing a clear priority to multilateral peacekeeping operations
  as a tool of American diplomacy. Even a long-time friend of President Clinton, Dr. Michael
  Mandelbaum, has been moved to assail the resulting approach to international affairs, calling it
  “foreign policy as social work.”
• Establishing military service in peacekeeping operations as a prerequisite to career
  advancement. To some extent, this incentive program follows the highly successful model
  employed to induce up-and-coming officers to seek previously undesirable “joint” service
  assignments.
• Giving priority to training for peacekeeping missions. This step reflects the reality that
  such missions require different skills and tools than those associated with the combat arms. In
  fact, such training comes at the expense of readiness for war-fighting.
• Diverting billions of dollars from Pentagon operations and maintenance accounts to
  underwrite peacekeeping and other “warriors for peace” missions. The military is, in
  theory at least, reimbursed for such expenditures by subsequent appropriations. In practice,
  however, the impact of these funding diversions is often to disrupt — or at least defer —
  traditional training and maintenance activities, thereby compounding the adverse impact of
  peacekeeping assignments on military proficiency and readiness.

The sorts of non-military missions fancied by the Clinton Administration have another,
largely unaddressed impact on the armed forces: the wear-and-tear they exact on
materiel and personnel. The effect is particularly acute on airlift assets and Marine
Corps units that have been repeatedly called upon to provide humanitarian, logistical
support, rescue and other intensive operations in mostly non-combat settings.

• Asserting the President’s authority unilaterally to commit U.S. troops to peacekeeping
  operations, effectively relegating congressional action — if any — to an after-the-fact
  rubber-stamp activity. This was the practice in Haiti and Bosnia. Last week, Secretary of
  Defense Perry signaled that it would also be the case with respect to the Golan Heights in the
  event of an expected agreement between Syria and Israel.
• Making U.S. intelligence resources and assets available to users who may compromise
  their capabilities, or at least render them less available for vital national security
  functions. For example, the Clinton Administration has made something of a fetish of
  intelligence-sharing with the United Nations, an institution demonstrably incapable of
  protecting American intelligence sources and methods — and generally unwilling even to try.
  Counterculture nostrums about the superior status of the UN may explain why the
  Administration has adamantly refused to require the Secretary General to cooperate in even
  such rudimentary security measures as background checks and safe handling of classified
  information. (After all, these measures are being employed, for example, to protect U.S.
  secrets shared with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.) In this regard, it was revealing
  that the newly-appointed Deputy Director for Intelligence recently told the New York Times
  that he once thought the CIA was the source of all evil in the world.

The Clinton Administration has also seen fit to divert technological assets acquired
over many years and at enormous expense from the business of intelligence collection
to counterculture priorities like environmental monitoring. For example, it is making
overhead reconnaissance assets and the Navy’s hydrophone arrays available to
scientists tracking, respectively, planetary and oceanographic phenomena.

Other Factors That Advance the Counterculturalist Agenda

Passing mention is also due to three other factors that have served to date to advance the Clinton
Administration’s counterculture agenda — the respective roles played by the military itself, by
multilateral institutions and by the Congress.

First, the mutation of critical national security capabilities has been abetted by a U.S.
military leadership that is: politically attuned to the proclivities of its civilian masters;
insecure about its mission and future after the end of the Cold War; and traumatized by its
perception of the lesson of Vietnam. That lesson seems to be that only a massive use of U.S.
ground combat forces will ensure a satisfactory and prompt conclusion to most international
conflicts. Unless the United States is willing to undertake such a step, these conflicts are likely to
become quagmires for which the military will be blamed and that should be avoided. These
impulses in the armed forces have clearly served to exacerbate the effects of the Clinton
counterculture philosophy.

Second, in the event the Clinton Administration’s unilateral steps fail to curb what its
counterculturalists perceive as the inherent malevolence of the U.S. military, there is a
further hedge: Subordinate American activities to the United Nations or other multilateral
institutions. By insisting on Security Council mandates for U.S. actions or placing U.S. troops
under the command of UN military and/or political authorities, an ultimate check can be instituted
on the possible “abuse” of American military power.

As a result, even in circumstances — like Bosnia — where the abysmal performance of UN forces
obliged the Clinton Administration to eschew a United Nations command structure for its
peacekeeping force, it nonetheless sought a Security Council mandate for the operation. In
accordance with the UN charter, the much ballyhooed NATO mission is therefore legally
subordinate to the United Nations.

Third, the Congress may not have liked the fait accompli it was handed on a U.S. troop
deployment in Bosnia. But it bears some responsibility for that unhappy state of affairs.
After all, this was the predictable result of accepting the Clinton Administration’s argument that it
was “premature” to discuss the idea of deploying U.S. troops in a dangerous situation — until
there was an agreement providing for such a deployment. At that point, of course, it is said to be
too late to oppose the idea.

Unfortunately, the same ruse is being used to parry congressional objections to another dubious
Clinton commitment — the deployment of American forces on the Golan Heights. For nearly two
years, the Administration has been demurring about its readiness to dispatch U.S. troops there as
part of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. Then, last week — i.e., shortly after Congress
was obliged to rubber-stamp the Bosnia deployment — Secretary of Defense William Perry
confirmed that an American mission on the Golan is indeed in the works. Mr. Clinton has
assuredly construed the Congress’ hapless and tardy opposition to his Haitian and Bosnian
initiatives as proof that he can similarly disregard the legislative branch on the Golan and other
aspects of his counterculture agenda.

What is to be Done?

The Clinton mutation of the U.S. military makes it all the more urgent for Congress to establish its
opposition to this practice — and its various manifestations. A place to start would be by
establishing that the President may not assume responsibilities for international
peacekeeping operations without prior congressional authorization and appropriations.

The need for such legislation is clear given recent experience with existing law. According to the
UN Participation Act (initially adopted in 1945 and amended in 1949), Congress has pre-delegated only limited authority to the President to enable U.S. participation in peacekeeping
operations. In its Section 7, the Act imposes a world-wide cap of 1,000 troops and stipulates that
they are to be used exclusively as non-combatant guards or observers in what the UN Charter
defines as Chapter 6 situations. These are circumstances where the parties to a conflict have
agreed to terminate it and there is a peace to monitor.

In Chapter 7 situations — i.e., where no such agreement exists and there is a threat to
international peace — the President is not delegated the authority to act unilaterally.
According to the UN Participation Act’s Section 6, in these circumstances the President is
supposed to make an agreement with the UN governing, among other things, the use to
which U.S. forces are to be put. That agreement then must be statutorily approved by
Congress.

The case of Specialist Michael New, the Army medic who challenged the legality of the order
directing him to don a UN uniform to serve in the UNPROFOR/UNPREDEP mission in
Macedonia, has shed important light on the Clinton Administration’s response to the UN
Participation Acts’ constraints: In a 9 July 1993 letter to the Congress, Mr. Clinton described the
Macedonia mission as a “Chapter 6 operation” and invoked his authority to deploy forces
pursuant to Section 7 of the UN Participation Act. In fact, the UN mandate under which this
operation — and the larger Bosnia Protection Force mission of which it is a part — has repeatedly
(and correctly) been classified is as a Chapter 7 operation.

Interestingly, the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense authorization bill provides further evidence that all is
not right with the Macedonia operation. In the course of the House-Senate conference committee
on this legislation, language requiring a presidential finding that peacekeeping operations under
foreign command were in the national interest was modified: The Macedonia mission was
explicitly excluded. Ironically, President Clinton’s decision to veto this bill — largely on the
grounds that it would require the deployment of national missile defenses — offers an opportunity
for Congress to look into the actual status of the peacekeeping operation in Macedonia. If it
does so, it may help establish the correctness of Spec. New’s contention that the order he
refused to obey was, in fact, an illegal one.

Conclusion

As one who has had the privilege of serving in both the executive and legislative branches, I am a
strong believer in the separation of powers. I am convinced that the President must have the
authority and the latitude to deploy U.S. military forces overseas in emergency situations.
If need be, those forces must be able to engage in combat to defend America’s vital
interests.

In other circumstances, however — where no such emergency conditions apply and
especially where it is debatable that U.S. vital interests are in immediate jeopardy — it
seems to me essential that the President obtain prior congressional authority before
committing American troops. Peacekeeping operations fall in this category.

In the weeks before the Dayton Deal was struck, the House of Representatives adopted statutory
language authored by Rep. Joel Hefley, Republican of Colorado. This legislation would have
prohibited the use of Defense Department resources for a Bosnia deployment in the absence of
express congressional authorization of such a deployment. Unfortunately, the Senate declined to
take up this legislation until after the Dayton agreement was initialed. Even if it had become law,
the Hefley measure would not have precluded the President from making a commitment to deploy
forces in Bosnia — leaving Congress in the final analysis with the same unhappy choice it
ultimately faced: Repudiating the international pledges of a sitting President of the United States,
with all that would imply for American credibility and leadership around the world.

Obviously, the way to avoid such an unpalatable — and, as a practical matter, politically
impossible — situation would be for Congress to stipulate that the President may not commit
U.S. forces to deployments overseas in non-emergency situations in the absence of a specific
appropriation to pay for such deployments. This approach would foreclose Mr. Clinton’s
practice of making a commitment and using the Pentagon’s O&M account as a slush fund to pay
for it until Congress is induced to clean up his bills, if only to make the Defense Department
whole. Such an approach also seems to me to be consistent with the “power of the purse” vested
by the Constitution with the Congress. It would, however, clearly afford the executive branch the
latitude to take decisive military action where circumstances demand it.

Of course, the institution of arrangements like these would not, in and of themselves, correct
other aspects of the Clinton counterculture agenda regarding American security policy and the
tools with which it can be executed. Such a step would, however, mark a dramatic departure
from the direction that agenda is currently leading the United States. The mere act of debating
legislation along these lines, moreover, would help illuminate the urgent need for corrective action
on the broader Clinton agenda. And, as President Clinton has recently pointed out in the context
of the policy differences at the heart of the budget impasse: Isn’t making major policy choices
what elections are all about?

— End of Full Remarks —