GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT (II): LEAK OF INCOMPLETE, FLAWED G.A.O. ANALYSIS ON B-2 AMOUNTS TO POLITICIZED DISINFORMATION
(Washington, D.C.): In a transparent attempt to influence
upcoming congressional action on the B-2 bomber, a draft report
by the General Accounting Office was recently leaked by
Administration officials to several sympathetic reporters. At
this writing, it is unclear whether the myriad errors of fact,
distortions and misleading conclusions will be corrected by the
time this GAO document is completed and released. What is
virtually certain though, is that — thanks in particular to a
journalist with a record of unscrupulous, ideologically driven
and erroneous reporting and his editors at one of the Nation’s
leading newspapers who continue to give his articles front-page
treatment — the facts are unlikely to catch up with the
disinformation.
On 15 July, the New York Times published a Page One
story by Tim Weiner under the headline “B-2, After 14 Years,
Is Still Failing Basic Tests.” It attributed to the GAO a
number of statements concerning alleged inadequacies of the
bomber’s radar equipment, low-observability features,
terrain-following capabilities, performance in critical
developmental tests and tardy deliveries to the Pentagon. The
overall impression left with the reader is one of a program in
disarray, over-budget and failing to meet essential milestones.
Fortunately, the real B-2 program bears little
resemblance to that portrayed by Weiner and the GAO.(1)
The Facts, Ma’am
The Department of Defense was so dismayed by these
misrepresentations about the expected and demonstrated
performance of the B-2 that Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminski felt compelled to
dispute them publicly. The central error is the GAO/New York
Times’ failure to recognize that the B-2 is an evolutionary
program. It involves three distinct stages of aircraft
production — Blocks 10, 20 and 30 — with each stage introducing
ever-improving capabilities. Block 30 aircraft will incorporate
the most advanced design features and equipment now being
developed which will then be retrofitted into earlier versions.
As a result of misunderstanding this evolutionary approach,
the GAO — and its repeaters in the Fourth Estate — have
construed as performance shortcomings, test failures or other
inadequacies what are actually key aspects of the downstream
B-2 program, steps that are planned and in train but not
expected to be in place at this point. The particulars
include the following, together with rebuttals by Under Secretary
Kaminski (emphasis added throughout):
- The GAO/Times story claims that the B-2’s
sophisticated radar has serious problems when flying
through rain. In fact, according to Under Secretary
Kaminski: “The Terrain Following/Terrain
Avoidance radar is performing in rain as expected during
this stage of its development. There is no
indication that the radar’s performance while flying
through rain will not fully meet requirements.“
This is a remarkable achievement, since the Pentagon
notes, “terrain following performance in rain is a
technical challenge for any aircraft, and is an
especially tough one for an aircraft with primary
performance emphasis on low observable features.” - According to the GAO/Times, the B-2 is not nearly
as stealthy as advertised. In fact, according to
Kaminski: “The detectability and survivability
testing completed to date has been entirely successful in
confirming expected B-2 performance. Standard analytical
tools verify that the B-2’s stealth design meets the
operational requirements for survivability.“
This statement simply reinforces what careful monitors of
the B-2 program know. In fact, the stealthiness of the
B-2 was attested to by the Secretary of the Air Force in
1991 and later certified by Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin. - In response to the GAO/Times’ charges of testing
delays and escalating costs in the B-2 program, Dr.
Kaminski says: “The development test program is
scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1997 in
accordance with the plan that has been in place for
nearly four years. The Department expects to complete
the B-2 development and test program within
established budgets and the overall cost cap established
by Congress.” In fact, the Air Force
estimates that the program will be completed under
the ceiling placed on the program; indeed, $1.3 billion
are available in the program for contingencies and
reserves. This amounts to about 20% of total program cost
not yet spent, available for unforseen difficulties that
may arise in the future. - The draft GAO report claims that the B-2 cannot fly
through rain without having its stealthy surface damaged.
But according to Dr. Kaminski, “the surface of
the B-2 has never been dented or distorted in rain.”
The B-2 is coated with a material that “is designed
to absorb the impact of rain at high speeds. It is
designed to wear away over time and be replaced during
routine ground maintenance periods.” - With respect to the GAO’s allegations that the B-2 has
structural problems, Dr. Kaminski replies: “The
B-2 structural design has successfully completed its
structural program including full-scale static and
durability tests. Premature cracking of the aft deck was
discovered shortly after the first flight in early 1990.
A modified design has been qualified by extensive
component testing and verified in flight test. All other minor
structural anomalies found during testing have been
corrected on all operational aircraft delivered to
Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.” In fact, the B-2
has completed one of the most successful structural test
programs in the history of military aviation. - The draft GAO report regards delays in the delivery of
some operational B-2s to the Air Force as an ominous
sign. The Pentagon, however, sees such delays rather as
“testimony to the determination of the
government-industry B-2 team that each and every B-2
delivered must meet contract quality and performance
specification requirements.” - According to Weiner’s article, unnamed Pentagon sources
claim that the B-2 is so maintenance-intensive and
temperamental, that owning a B-2 is like “owning a
Porche.” In fact, during its first year of
operational use, the B-2 achieved a 95% availability to
schedule. Originally, the Air Force planned to fly the
B-2 about once a month. However, the B-2 has proven to be
so reliable and easy to maintain that the Air Force now
plans to schedule it for several sorties per week.
Too Discredited to Be Useful to the Critics?
Was it the shoddiness of the draft GAO report, the lack of
credibility of Tim Weiner or a combination of the two that
prompted a leading opponent of additional production of B-2
bombers, House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich (R-OH), to
omit any mention of this leak in an op-ed article in today’s Washington
Post? Whatever the reason in Rep. Kasich’s case, it is to be
hoped that similar discretion will be exhibited by like-minded
Members of Congress as the House and Senate take up amendments
concerning the B-2 in upcoming legislation.
It is worth noting that the principal objection to the B-2
offered by Rep. Kasich in his op.ed. is that this bomber is
simply too costly in the present era of budgetary austerity. And
yet, additional production of B-2 bombers is accommodated
within the defense resources provided by the budget resolution
adopted largely at Mr. Kasich’s initiative. Even more
interesting, such further production is explicitly called for
in a new book entitled The Peoples’ Budget, for which
Rep. Kasich wrote the forward! This book — which House
Speaker Newt Gingrich has described as “a recipe
for…translating the will of the American people into real
policies and real change” — contends that, even in a
budget-constrained environment, “the [Pentagon’s]
procurement account has to be increased to take advantage of the
benefits of modern technology to support national security policy
objectives. Among the significant programmatic initiatives are
the following:…Resume procurement of advanced low-observable
aircraft, including a B-2 restart…”
The Big Three
Within the past week, three of America’s most influential
opinion-shapers have argued forcefully to continue production of
the B-2 bomber. Highlights of the comments by the editorial
board of the Wall Street Journal, Newsweek‘s George
Will and the Washington Post‘s Charles Krauthammer include
the following:
The Wall Street Journal (17 July 1995):
“The Pentagon says it doesn’t need more than the 20 B-2s
already being built, but this is shortsightedness. It would
mean ending the U.S. long-range bomber program, a unique
American comparative advantage in global politics. No other
country can project power so far from its shores so quickly
as the U.S. can with B-2, which is invaluable in deterring
the likes of Saddam Hussein…“John Kasich and other self-styled ‘cheap hawks’ are
gunning for the B-2 less on policy grounds than to show they
can cut defense as well as domestic programs. Meanwhile, some
in Congress are resorting to the old ploy of leaking a
General Accounting Office study. This one, handed last week
conveniently just before a key vote in House Appropriations
to reporters (some of them reliably anti-defense), claims the
B-2 hasn’t performed as claimed. Yet [General] Charles
Horner, who ran air operations in the Gulf War before he
retired, has written that the B-2s already delivered have
been ‘performing even better than expected.’ The GAO gambit
was used routinely by Congressional liberals in the 1980’s
against the very weapons that worked so well in the Gulf
War.”Will (Newsweek edition dated 24 July 1995):
“The case for continuing the B-2 program…rests on
three facts. The B-2 is not as expensive as critics contend.
The B-2 economizes other material assets, and economizes
lives, too. And given the age of the B-52s (the youngest is
33 years old) and the time and cost required to design
another bomber (at least 15 years and scores of billions from
design to deployment), the B-2 force is going to be the only
U.S. bomber force for many decades. Who wants to wager that
in, say, the year 2030 the nation will not need a bomber
better than a 70-year old B-52?”
Krauthammer (13 July 1995): “…The dollar
cost of a weapon is too narrow a calculation of its utility.
The more important calculation is cost in American lives. The
reasons are not sentimental but practical. Weapons cheap in
dollars but costly in lives are, in the current and coming
environment, literally useless: We will not use them. A
country that so values the life of every Capt. O’Grady is a
country that cannot keep blindly relying on non-stealthy
aircraft over enemy territory.”
The Bottom Line
The facts clearly contest the GAO’s preliminary findings and
should be reflected in a corrected final document. They also
confirm the Center for Security Policy’s longstanding view: The
B-2, with its intercontinental range, large payload capacity and
stealth-enhanced survivability, is one of the most valuable
assets for preserving the national security of the United States.
It would be the height of folly to terminate its production at
just 20 aircraft.
The Center renews its call for the New York Times to
give equal treatment to the follow-up articles that
effectively correct Tim Weiner’s initial reporting if it must
retain him in its employ and publish his poorly researched,
slanted and ideologically motivated products. Of course, it would
be preferable if such adjustments were no longer necessary. After
all, the Times affords ample space for left-wing
anti-defense ax-grinding on its editorial pages; it should
not call into further question its claim to be the Nation’s
newspaper of record by pretending that such material produced by
one of its reporters can legitimately be passed off as
“news.”
(1) Those concerned with the Nation’s
security are no strangers to Tim Weiner’s brand of high-brow
tabloid journalism. They also know too well the unwillingness of
his newspaper — which frequently accords his sensationalist
anti-defense/intelligence articles front-page placement — to
give comparable prominence to information published subsequently
that corrects or discredits the original story. For example, in
August 1993, Weiner published a highly defamatory article
alleging that the Strategic Defense Initiative had
“rigged” experiments to deceive Congress and the
Russians about the program’s progress. Weiner’s article was
subsequently emphatically disputed by then-Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin (who was no fan of SDI), a fact scarcely acknowledged
by the Times. For further background on this scandalous
affair, see the Center for Security Policy’s Decision Briefs
entitled: All the ‘News’ That Fits the Times’ Political
Agenda: Latest Assault on SDI Unfounded, Indefensible, (
Trail’ Confirms New York Times’ Agenda, Sloppy Reporting on
Recent SDI Conspiracy Allegations, (
to New York Times: How About an Apology Now That the Pentagon Has
Debunked False Claims About SDI Test?, (
- Frank Gaffney departs CSP after 36 years - September 27, 2024
- LIVE NOW – Weaponization of US Government Symposium - April 9, 2024
- CSP author of “Big Intel” is American Thought Leaders guest on Epoch TV - February 23, 2024