Heed Not Clinton’s Reckless ‘Call to Arms Control’

(Washington, D.C.): Much of what is wrong with Bill Clinton’s foreign and defense policy was
on display in a speech given yesterday by his National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, to a
convocation of international arms controllers: In pursuit of a negotiating objective of dubious
value — the permanent extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — Dr. Lake
amply demonstrated the Administration’s propensity to pander to all comers. Worse yet, the
wheeling and dealing threatens to foreclose, or otherwise compromise, vital American defense
capabilities which will be all the more needed in the event U.S. diplomacy once again delivers
more promises than security.

The aim of Dr. Lake’s remarks — and a prominent theme of the two-day event sponsored by the
leftish Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at which they occurred — was to persuade
representatives of nations who are signatories of the NPT that the United States is earnestly
engaged in a wide array of ambitious disarmament ventures. By so doing, the Clinton
Administration hopes to induce such countries not only to “re-up” when the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference is held in April. It seeks, in addition, their agreement to change the
accord from one which requires such renewals every five years to a treaty of indefinite duration as
what Dr. Lake calls a demonstration of “the international community’s resolve” to fight nuclear
proliferation.

A Defective Strategy

Clearly, there are several problems with this strategy. First of all, the NPT has not precluded
nations determined to acquire nuclear weapons from doing so. It may have made such efforts
more complex, expensive and time-consuming than would otherwise have been the case, but
signatories like Iraq and North Korea, that wanted to pursue military nuclear programs proved
adept at doing so despite International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

In fact, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has principally served as a rationale that nations
which did not want to “go nuclear” could cite to justify their policy. A number of these nations
have, nonetheless, acquired sufficient nuclear technology and infrastructure to permit them to
obtain some nuclear weapons capability in short order should they feel the need to become
members of the “nuclear club.”

Second, as Dr. Lake himself acknowledged yesterday, nations interested in obtaining nuclear
weapons or fissile materials with which to fabricate them no longer need to produce these items
themselves. The National Security Advisor described as “a new and deeply disturbing
phenomenon” the practice of “nuclear smuggling, with the greatest threat coming from the
stockpiles of the former Soviet Union.” If the effort to stem drug-trafficking is any guide, the
number of arrests of those smuggling nuclear weapons-grade materials is but a fraction of those
successfully transferring such deadly commodities to willing buyers.

Third, the price the United States is determined to pay in the hope of inducing others to agree to
the extension of the NPT is exceedingly high. Dr. Lake used the occasion of his remarks to affirm
the Administration’s commitment to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban (CAB) in 1995 by
unveiling several new U.S. concessions. These include: perpetuating a unilateral moratorium on
underground nuclear testing until a CAB enters into force; a proposal to keep the relevant
negotiations in session through the summer; and abandoning a U.S. demand that it have the right
to withdraw from a CAB ten years after it enters into force.

Displaying the internal illogic of the Clinton Administration’s position on nuclear weapons,
however, Dr. Lake hastily added that “the President considers the maintenance of a safe and
reliable nuclear stockpfle to be in the supreme national interest of the United States.”
Either Mr. Clinton is unaware that the main point of a Comprehensive Test Ban is to produce
unsafe and/or unreliable nuclear stockpiles — leading ultimately to their complete elimination — or
he is being disingenuous about his commitment to maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal in such a
condition.

The Rest of the U.S. Arms Control Agenda is No Better

In the hope of impressing upon his audience the seriousness of President Clinton’s commitment to
disarmament, Anthony Lake proceeded to describe an ambitious arms control agenda beyond the
NPT. The common denominator of most — if not all — of the Clinton initiatives appears to be that
the Administration is completely untroubled by the impracticality, unverifiability or asymmetrical
effect of such treaties. The rationale evidently is that the mere act of reaching an agreement,
however flawed, creates an “international norm” which then gives the United States and other
members of the international community standing to complain about others’ infractions.

Unfortunately, the history of arms control is replete with instances in which the “family of
nations” either refused to address non-compliance with such international norms — or did so in a
completely ineffectual manner. It is predictable that the same will be true of the arrangements Mr.
Clinton wants to add to the international lawbooks:

• START II: Secretary of State Warren Christopher will urge the Senate today quickly to
  advise and consent to the START II Treaty signed with Russia in January 1993. Such haste is
  clearly unwise in light of the serious concerns that now exist about Russian compliance with
  existing arms control agreements (notably, treaties governing Intermediate-range Nuclear
  Forces, Conventional Forces in Europe, and chemical and biological weapons) and uncertainty
  about the future direction of Russia. Perhaps because a rigorous congressional review would
  raise hard questions about the extent to which the Administration has already been unilaterally
  implementing the START 11 Treaty, the Clinton team hopes that a prospective signing
  ceremony at the May summit with Boris Yeltsin will effectively truncate unwanted Senate
  deliberations.
• The ABM Treaty: Dr. Lake reported that the Administration is hoping to conclude this year
  negotiations that will “preserve the viability” of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, while
  clarifying the distinction between theater missile defenses (not currently limited by the Treaty)
  and strategic defenses that are. In fact, the Administration is pursuing changes to the ABM
  Treaty that would greatly expand its scope, foreclosing a number of promising anti-missile
  defense technologies and making it more difficult for the United States to protect its troops
  and allies overseas, to say nothing of its own people. Such “viability” is clearly at cross-purposes with the desires of the newly elected Republican majority in Congress and —
  according to recent polling data made public last week by the Coalition to Defend America —
  the wishes of most Americans.
• The Chemical Weapons Convention: According to Dr. Lake, the Clinton Administration is
  also determined to push for ratification of the CWC, despite: the obvious futility of trying to
  eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the earth; the likelihood that such a treaty will
  exacerbate already serious shortfalls in U.S. chemical defensive capabilities; and the substantial
  costs that individual American corporations will be obliged to incur to comply with the CWC’s
  intrusive inspection and monitoring requirements.
• The Biological Weapons Convention: The United States hopes to adopt the intrusive and
  expensive verification regime negotiated for the Chemical Weapons Convention as a model for
  “fixing” the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. These arrangements will, of course,
  prove no more effective in the latter case than they would be in the former. If adopted,
  however, they will assuredly serve to compromise the competitive posture of the U.S.
  biotechnology industry by exposing it — in the name of arms control verification — to
  widespread commercial espionage.
• The Convention on Conventional Weapons: Dr. Lake announced that the United States will
  also push for ratification of a convention that will “advance President Clinton’s initiative to
  eliminate the most deadly of land mines.” Like so many other utopian arms control schemes
  being pursued by the Clinton Administration, this initiative will not end the menace posed to
  innocent civilians by easily and cheaply manufactured land mines. It may, however, compel
  U.S. and allied military personnel to end their use of a valuable defensive measure, resulting in
  unnecessary casualties in future combat situations.

‘Year of Indecision’

Yet another hallmark of the Clinton Administration was on display as Anthony Lake was laying
out his ambitious arms control agenda for 1995 — which he repeatedly called the “year of
decision”: Even as Dr. Lake was saying that “there are no more important negotiations before us”
than those concerning the permanent extension of the NPT, U.S. officials were putting out the
word that the United States would be willing to accept a 15-year review. According to today’s
Washington Times, “the Administration is privately explaining its plan to have the NPT opened
for review every 15 years instead of never allowing reviews.”

Such indecisiveness can only reinforce the impression that if one does not like the Clinton
position, just wait: It will change momentarily. What is more, as the truculent North Koreans
demonstrated, under the present Administration, the United States will probably reward — rather
than seek to punish — those who resist its policies.

The Bottom Line

The risks to U.S. security and foreign policy interests arising from the misbegotten Clinton arms
control agenda should not be underestimated. Among other things, the United States is in danger
of destroying the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. The Administration
could exacerbate America’s present vulnerability to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons —
whether delivered by ballistic missiles or otherwise. In the name of advancing the NPT, the
Administration could even play into the hands of those seeking to weaken one of its most
important regional allies, Israel (which is not a signatory of the NPT and which wisely has
maintained a studied ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities).

The Center for Security Policy believes that the new Republican-led Congress ought to
demand a “time-out” on further Clinton Administration arms control initiatives. The
premises that animate these initiatives — and the concessions being offered to sell them —
warrant a close adult supervision that is not in evidence from Dr. Lake and his colleagues.

An important first step in this direction has come in the form of letters signed by virtually every
member of the House and Senate Republican leadership (including relevant committee and
subcommittee chairmen) calling upon the Administration to suspend its efforts to renegotiate the
ABM Treaty. As the Clinton team seems determined to defy the will of Congress in this regard⁽¹⁾,
legislation is in order preventing such negotiations until legislators have had an opportunity to
consider whether they are more interested in protecting the people of the United States against
missile attack or “preserving the viability of the ABM Treaty.” At the very least, a similar shot
across the bow should be fired with regard to the other elements of the Clinton arms control
agenda.

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1. See in this regard the front-page story in today’s Washington Times, entitled, ‘Missile Pact With
Russia on Fast Track.’