In Lake’s Wake, A Higher Standard For D.C.I.

(Washington, D.C.): The Center for
Security Policy welcomes the announcement
last night that Anthony Lake has asked
President Clinton to withdraw his name
from further consideration for the
position of Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). This decision brings
to an end the critical Senate review of
Mr. Lake’s judgment, record of dealings
with Congress and the intelligence
community and trustworthiness that had,
if anything, become even more
necessary following the nominee’s
three days of testimony last week. (See
the attached
column by the Center’s Director,
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., which appears in
today’s Washington Times.)

What’s At Stake

Far more importantly, Lake’s
withdrawal spares the U.S. Intelligence
Community a DCI virtually certain to compound,
rather than correct, the serious problems
confronting the Central Intelligence
Agency and its sister organizations.
Indeed, as President Clinton considers
his choices for a new nominee as Director
of Central Intelligence, he would be well
advised to avoid any individuals saddled
with some or all of Tony Lake’s baggage.

The Senate also has an interest in
avoiding another bruising confirmation
fight, if at all possible. It should not
— and surely will not — shrink,
however, from challenging future Clinton
nominees who are poorly equipped to
perform important duties. The
fact that Senators did so in this case is
evidence that the constitutionally
mandated advice-and-consent process is working,
not as Mr. Lake has suggested, that
Washington is going “haywire.”

A New Standard

Accordingly, the Senate should impress
upon the President the need to select
someone with the following personal
qualities and professional record:

• A Distinguished
  American: The
  Intelligence Community at this
  point needs as its leader someone
  of unimpeachable
  integrity and independent spirit,
  who will, from Day One command
  the respect of Congress, his
  counterparts in the executive
  branch, the public, foreign
  interlocutors and the press.
  Such an individual should be
  disinterested in further personal
  advancement and be committed to
  restoring the capabilities of the
  CIA, its sister agencies and
  especially the organizations
  responsible for
  counter-intelligence to perform
  the priority missions assigned to
  them. These missions are
  becoming, after all, more
  complex and demanding in the
  “post-Cold War world”
  than ever they were during the
  “Twilight Struggle.”
• An Intelligence
  ‘Professional’:
  Previous DCIs have generally had
  some first-hand experience with
  the business of collecting and
  analyzing intelligence. This is,
  in and of itself, no guarantee
  that the Intelligence Community’s
  leader will be competent and
  effective in overseeing its work.
  Such a background does generally
  preclude, however, the
  appointment to that post of
  someone who has either a)
  exhibited in the past
  considerable hostility toward
  (not to say contempt for) the CIA
  and its work or b) is personally
  disposed toward the
  politicization of intelligence.

Ensuring that the nominee has a
record of visionary leadership
and a capacity for innovation can
mitigate against the obvious
down-side risk, namely that a
person with ties to the
Intelligence Community will be
unwilling and/or unable to effect
necessary reforms. Such
an individual is likely,
moreover, to err on the side of
“speaking truth to
power,” rather than
viscerally seeking to make
intelligence “serve”
its consumers by conforming to
their policy requirements.

• An Individual of
  Independent, Sound Judgment:
  The next DCI should not have been
  associated with the Clinton
  Administration’s myriad, dubious
  intelligence practices and its
  dismal conduct of security policy
  more generally. In particular,
  he or she must have no
  association with the
  Administration’s odious conduct
  with respect to personnel and
  information security — conduct
  at the heart of a number of the
  scandals now afflicting this
  Presidency.⁽¹⁾

This would preclude from
consideration, for example,
anyone involved in drafting and
promoting products like Director
of Central Intelligence Directive
(DCID) 1/7-1. This Directive,
which was circulated for comment
on April 16, 1996 by then-DCI
John Deutch, aimed to revise
“Security Controls on the
Dissemination of Intelligence
Information.” DCID 1/7-1 was
intended to institutionalize the
widespread sharing of sensitive
U.S. intelligence material —
much of it collected at enormous
cost to the American taxpayer and
often at considerable risk to
personnel working for or with the
United States government — with
the U.N. and other multilateral
organizations, with foreign
governments and their nationals.
The result of such sharing could
well have been to jeopardize the
often fragile, and sometimes
irreplaceable, sources and
methods by which it was obtained.⁽²⁾

• As-Yet-Unindicted
  Co-conspirators Need Not Apply:
  It should go without
  saying that the next DCI should
  not be anyone saddled with the
  sort of baggage Tony Lake carried
  with respect to one or more
  breaking Clinton scandals. Only
  by reaching outside of the
  Administration can the President
  be assured that he is not
  subjecting either the nominee or
  the Intelligence Community to
  present or future controversies
  over that individual’s conduct.
• A Competent Manager:
  The next DCI faces truly heroic
  challenges in stanching the
  hemorrhage of talented, committed
  professionals from the U.S.
  Intelligence Community and
  restoring its esprit de corps
  and effectiveness. Experience
  managing a large, diversified and
  often fractious organizational
  structure is an essential
  prerequisite. It would be highly
  desirable, if not absolutely
  necessary, if the individual had
  demonstrated an ability to
  weather serious turbulence and
  periodic crises affecting his or
  her organization — as there will
  surely be more of those in the
  CIA’s future, if only as a result
  of the proverbial
  “chickens” loosed by
  the Clinton Administration coming
  home to roost.

Wanted: James Schlesinger

An individual who would eminently fill
this bill would be a former
Director of Central Intelligence, James
Schlesinger. While Dr.
Schlesinger has performed more than his
share of public service — including
stints as Secretary of Defense during the
Nixon and Ford administrations and as
Secretary of Energy under President
Carter — he may be willing to come once
again to the aid of his country at a time
of considerable need. If so, his high
standing with Members of Congress should
assure swift confirmation by the Senate,
something that cannot be expected of
anyone who fails to meet the foregoing
criteria. More important still, his
record of commitment to robust U.S.
intelligence and a vigorous national
security posture would send an immediate
and highly therapeutic signal throughout
Washington — and to the Nation’s friends
and foes abroad — that the period of
American decline is over.

In the event Dr. Schlesinger cannot be
prevailed upon to serve once again, the
President would be well-advised to find,
if he can, someone of comparable
intellectual ability, experience,
integrity and personal fortitude.

The Bottom Line

The transitional period from the Cold
War era should, by now, be considered to
be behind us. Yet the U.S. Intelligence
Community, which ought to be at the
forefront of identifying the threats to
and protecting American interests in the
post-Cold War era, is still floundering.
Indeed, it is in grave danger of foundering.
President Clinton has nominated
successive candidates for DCI — only two
of whom have been confirmed — but the
most serious shortfall remains with him
and his leadership. Even a Jim
Schlesinger would be hard pressed to
revitalize and reform the Intelligence
Community without Mr. Clinton’s strong,
committed and responsible support.

It is high time, therefore,
for the President to take seriously his
own responsibilities with respect to
American intelligence — first by
nominating a Director of Central
Intelligence that meets the foregoing
criteria and then by affording that
individual routine and timely access and
unwavering encouragement and support in
the job of speaking truth to power.

– 30 –

1. In this
connection, see such Center products as The
Clinton Security Clearance Melt-Down:
‘No-Gate’ Demonstrates ‘It’s The People,
Stupid’ ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-D_32″>No. 94-D 32,
25 March 1994), ‘High Crimes
And Misdemeanors’? The Huang Caper
Reinforces Concerns About Clinton
Malfeasance On Security Matters
(No. 96-D
109, 1 November 1996) and Fiddling
While The Nation’s Nuclear Weapons
Complex ‘Burns’ Down: O’Leary’s Last
Denuclearization Shot? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-D_120″>No. 96-D 120,
29 November 1996).

2. For more on
DCID 1/7-1, see the Center’s Decision
Brief entitled Before
U.S. Intelligence Can Be Reformed, The
Clinton Administration Must Stop
Deforming It ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-D_44″>No. 96-D 44,
6 May 1996).