In the Wake of Clinton’s Policy-Meltdown On Iraq, Jim Hoagland, Abe Rosenthal Spell Out Do’s and Don’ts

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(Washington, D.C.): President Clinton’s four-day air campaign against Iraq was supposed to
“degrade” Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it now seems clear that
the
only real effect of this dog-wagging exercise has been to eviscerate what passed for the
American strategy for dealing with the Iraqi despot.

That conclusion seems particularly inescapable in the wake of the debacle involving
accusations
that the United States government might have had the temerity to operate a two-way street
concerning intelligence-sharing — instead of the one-way version demanded by
sanctimonious
diplo-bureaucrats at the United Nations, and their comrades-in-multilateralism populating top
policy and intelligence positions in the Clinton Administration. 1

Fortunately, two of the Nation’s leading newspapers feature on their op.ed. Pages today
urgently
needed advice to President Clinton about what to do — and what not to do — to
salvage U.S.
interests, and those of its friends and allies, in the face of an ever-more-unconstrained and
emboldened Saddam Hussein.

Do: Act Unilaterally and Effectively to Bring Down Saddam’s
Regime

In the Washington Post (see attached), columnist
Jim Hoagland argues that the time has come to
abandon the Administration’s cherished multilateralist fantasies and begin to fashion a unilateral
approach toward Iraq. Such a strategy cannot rely upon a “quick fix” (e.g. attempting to get
Saddam’s brother or some other clone in mufti to mount a palace coup) and must, instead, involve
a sustained, creative and competent effort to forge a Free Iraq. 2 As Mr. Hoagland puts it:

    “The need now is to lead, not to persuade. Other nations will follow an American
    president who makes clear he will protect U.S. national interests in the Gulf or
    elsewhere by any means necessary….Kofi Annan, Kurdish guerrillas and Saddam’s
    relatives will join in pushing the dictator out only when they are convinced that
    Saddam’s fate is sealed and that continuing to keep a foot in his camp will do
    significant damage to them. They should no longer be given the choice of seeming not
    to choose.”

Don’t: Rely on the U.N.

In his column in today’s New York Times (see
attached
), the paper’s former editor, A.M.
Rosenthal,
warned against believing that things can, let alone will, get better
as long as the
United States defers to the United Nations to manage the confrontation with Saddam. As Mr.
Rosenthal observes:

    “Power voids are filled, quickly. Mr. Annan moved into the emptiness created by the
    failure of American leadership against Saddam Hussein. He brought into his expanding
    role great charm and wit, and a clear concept of how to handle Saddam — with diligent
    appeasement. By himself, he has become Saddam’s greatest single asset at the U.N.
    And with Russia, China, France and other countries ‘sympathetic to Iraqi sentiments,’
    as it is put at the U.N., he is part of an active coalition, along with selected top
    members of the huge U.N. bureaucracy.”

    “The coalition is determined to whittle U.N. arms inspection down to a useless
    splinter and lift U.N. economic sanctions on Iraq. That would open the road for
    Saddam to reach this goal of chemical, nuclear and biological weapons.”

The Bottom Line

Mr. Clinton could not receive better advice than that offered today by these two influential
commentators. It is advice that has previously been supplied to him — and, for that matter, to his
predecessor — by, among others, the Center for Security Policy. 3 The Persian Gulf and the
world at large would have been better off had he long since adopted these do’s and don’ts. With
the abject failure of his own dismal policy toward Iraq, he now has no good alternative but to take
these steps at last.

1For more on the noblesse oblige approach the
Administration has taken towards the sharing of
sensitive U.S. intelligence with the United Nations, the Russians, the PLO and other dubious
actors, see the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled The New Arms
Control Gambit: Unilateral
U.S. Disarmament That Masquerades As Noblesse Oblige
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_84″>No. 97-D 84, 23 June 1997), The
Anti-Landmine Campaign Begs The Question: How Much More Arms Abolitionism Can The
U.S. Military Afford?
(No. 97-D 108, 31
July 1997), and Unilateral Disarmament By Any
Other Name Is Still Recklessly Irresponsible
(No.
98-D 6
, 13 January 1998).

2See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
‘Serious Consequences’: If Clinton Means It,
Here’s The Alternative To His Failed Strategy of ‘Containing’ Saddam
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_33″>No. 98-D 33, 24
February 1998), Sen. Lott Shows How and Secures Means To Topple Saddam
Containment
‘Strategy’
(No. 98-D 168, 1 October 1998).

3See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Read Our Lips: It’s Not The Weapons, Stupid —
It’s The Regime
(No. 98-D 183, 12
November 1998), The Handwriting On The Iraqi Wall
(No. 98-D 65, 20 April 1998), Father Of A
Free Iraq? Iraqi National Congress’ Chalabi
Details A Program For Liberating His Country From Saddam
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-P_39″>No. 98-P 39, 4 March 1998),
This Is The Time To ‘Bash’ — Or At Least Repudiate — The UN; Bipartisan,
Bicameral
Consensus Emerges That Saddam Must Go
(No.
98-D 36
, 26 February 1998) and ‘Serious
Consequences’: If Clinton Means It, Here’s The Alternative To His Failed Strategy Of
‘Containing’ Saddam
(No. 98-D 33, 24
March 1998).

Center for Security Policy

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