Iraq Update: Saddam Is Getting Out of His ‘Box’: Is America Going to Stand Idly By As He Does So?

(Washington, D.C.): On Wednesday 23 June , the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South
Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened an important hearing to
examine U.S. policy toward Iraq. Subcommittee Chairman Sam Brownback (R-KS) is to be
commended for trying to give the necessary, sustained attention — in the face of myriad
distractions — to the alarming possibility that Saddam Hussein will outlast the remaining
vestiges of the UN sanctions regime control. This is an especially serious danger insofar as it
appears that the Clinton Administration is reconciled to that prospect.

Dr. Laurie Mylroie — a best-selling author of a book about Saddam Hussein, one of the
Nation’s
leading scholars on Iraq and Middle East affairs and a long-time member of the
Center’s Board
of Advisors — published an important precis and analysis of the Brownback hearing in her very
valuable on-line newsletter, “Iraq News.”

Excerpts from Iraq News
(Emphasis Added Throughout)

Dr. Laurie Mylroie

June 25, 1999

On Wednesday, June 23^rd, Beth Jones, Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near East Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a hearing on “US Policy Toward Iraq:
Mobilizing the Opposition.” Ahmad Chalabi, of the INC’s provisional
leadership council and
its representative to Washington, also testified, along with Patrick Clawson of
The Washington
Institute and Rend Francke of the Iraq Foundation.

Subcommittee chairman Sen. Sam Brownback presided. Sen Paul
Wellstone also attended.
Both senators were critical of administration policy. In response to a question
from Sen.
Brownback, Jones clarified the limited nature of the US commitment to protecting Kurdish-held
Northern Iraq or to helping insure that the Iraqi opposition will be able to operate there.
Brownback asked how firm the US commitment to protect Northern Iraq was. Would the
administration propose declaring it a no-drive zone, so that if Saddam Hussein moved troops
against the North, we would stop them? Jones replied that an Iraqi attack on the North was
indeed a “red-line.” But she then said, “We will respond at a time and place of our own
choosing. We would like to leave that vague.” In other words, Saddam could attack in the
North and the US might retaliate in the South, as it did in Sept, 96. Brownback replied
that
the US vagueness “would make me hesitate” if I were a member of the opposition. “I
would
encourage the government to be clearer. We weren’t so vague in Kosovo.” Brownback
also
suggested that hesitancy on the administration’s part would encourage hesitancy on the part of
the Iraqi opposition.

Brownback began the session by praising the recent visit to Washington of the INC
interim
leadership. He described their meeting in the Senate as “excellent” and explained that
the
senators and the INC leadership had held a “frank discussion about what the US needs to do.” He
also said that the opposition “needs to see tangible support on the ground,”
even as he
welcomed the Administration’s announcement that it would begin the drawdown, called for in
the ILA. He also criticized the administration’s characterization of the Iraqi opposition as the
“day-after people,” as an “unnecessary insult.” And he asked, “The day after what?” asserting
that we cannot rely on a “magical bullet” to eliminate Saddam. Brownback also said, “I’m
interested in knowing what concrete steps the Administration will be taking to help the
opposition,” not just holding conferences and providing fax machines. He suggested
there
was a need for lethal aid, as well as non-lethal aid. He concluded his opening remarks,
addressing Jones, “The last time you were here you talked about the need for being patient.
We’ve been patient long enough.”

Jones’ testimony was essentially the same as the talk that Asst Sec State for NEA Martin
Indyk
gave to the Council on Foreign Relations on April 22^nd and Indyk’s testimony on
June 8^th to the
House International Relations Committee. On June 23^rd, Jones said, “Our policy
rests on three
pillars. First, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both to
Iraq’s neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost
to the Iraqi people of containment. Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as
well as Iraq’s neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community of nations.” On
June 8^th and April 22^nd, Martin Indyk first laid out this policy’s
foundation. said. Notably,
however, Jones was instructed to reword her closing iteration of the general architecture of U.S.
policy and remove a specific reference to the removal of Saddam. Consider in comparison
Indyk’s final remarks on April 22^nd: “Finally, we will work with forces inside and
outside Iraq,
as well as Iraq’s neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community of nations
when
the departure of Saddam Hussein makes this possible.”

On June 23^rd, Jones said, “Our policy of containment plus regime change is
designed to help
protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions
DIMINISH the ability of Saddam Hussein to reconstitute his military and WMD capabilities.”
That marked a slight shift from Indyk, who said, June 8^th and April
22^nd, “Our policy of
containment plus regime change is designed to help protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors
from an aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions PREVENT Saddam Hussein from
reconstituting his military or WMD capabilities.”

***

Jones’ statement added a paragraph to Indyk’s text, clarifying the US position in light of the
UK/Dutch draft UNSC resolution. Jones said, “As long as the current Baghdad regime is in
defiance of the UNSC resolutions, we will never allow it to regain control of Iraq’s oil revenues.
They will continue to be escrowed by the UN and their uses controlled by the UN sanctions
committee. This same approach underpins the British/Dutch draft Security Council resolution
currently under consideration in New York.

“The draft would allow for the suspension of sanctions on Iraqi exports in return for full
compliance by Baghdad with a roadmap of key disarmament tasks. Imports would continue to be
controlled and effective financial controls would remain in place. These provisions are coupled
with an effective, intrusive arms control regime that preserves UNSCOM’s mandate and
prerogatives.” That is at odds with what NSC adviser on the Middle East Bruce Reidell said June
18^th,
“After two years of repeated crises and broken Iraqi promises, it is clear the inspectors cannot do
their job the way it needs to be done. Inspectors without access, without required documents,
without a cooperating partner, can only do so much. A Potemkin inspection process is
worse
than no inspection process….We will not be a party to a phony arms control regime.”

Jones also said, repeating Indyk’s language, “If it is to be successful, change must come from
within, from the Iraqis themselves. In particular, the security forces and the people must stand on
the same side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active opposition, along [sic]
the neighboring states, however, is indispensable; the captive Iraqis need a voice….Finally, there
is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides discretionary authority to the President to direct up to
$97 million in Defense Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi opposition
groups. We are in the process of drawing down this account for the provision of
equipment
[N.B. Here, on June 8^th Indyk said “provision of non-lethal
equipment]. Many have called on
the President to use this authority to arm the Iraqi opposition and support armed insurrection
against Saddam Hussein. We believe such action is premature.” In other words, keep the
opposition a talk shop.

Brownback responded to Jones’ testimony by noting with “displeasure” that the drawdown
seemed to be intended for things like fax machines and asked, “When will the military equipment
start?” Jones responded that the plan was to identify things that would develop “the
political
outreach” of the opposition and give the Iraqi people a “voice.” Brownback asked if the
Administration opposed the supply of military equipment. Jones responded by saying no, but
we
don’t see an effective use for military equipment. There are plenty of weapons in Iraq
now,
she said. Brownback asked, if you see a rational use for military equipment, would the
Administration support supplying it to the Iraqi opposition? After a long pause, Jones replied,
yes, but the problem was fear of reprisals, i.e. if opposition activity stepped up against the
regime, Saddam’s repression of the population would become more ruthless. Brownback
concluded his questioning on this subject by saying “I don’t understand your hesitancy” in
providing arms. “There are virtually daily press reports of unrest in Iraq. One would derive from
that that we should press forward with all means. . . . I hope you will consider military support.
This is going to have to be a first order.”

***

Brownback noted that Saddam had already outlasted one US president and asked, “Will
Saddam
outlast Clinton?” Jones replied, “I don’t know.” Brownback responded, “Is the Administration
serious?”Jones replied, “Yes, Frank Ricciardone (Special NSC Coordinator for
Transition
in Iraq) is hastening the end of Saddam Hussein.” Brownback concluded, “There seems
to be
a great hesitancy in the face of a lot of factors that would seem to suggest faster action” is
needed. He cited 1) reports of unrest in Iraq and 2) the INC pulling together and being prepared
for a meeting in Northern Iraq. Brownback said one would think that this is the time for
more aggressiveness. But it looked like the US was not going to act in Iraq with the same
aggressiveness as we did in Kosovo.

***

The second panel began with the testimony of Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi noted, “Last summer
it
was proven that Saddam had ballistic missile warheads loaded with deadly VX nerve gas, an
active biological weapons program, and the potential for nuclear weapons in less than a year.
Since Operation Desert Fox, over six months ago, a virtual state of war has existed between
[Iraq] and the United States and her allies….On the fifth of this month, Iraqi Foreign Minister
Sahaf formally protested to the United Nations on behalf of Saddam, that the Iraq Liberation Act
was illegal and that relations with the Iraqi National Congress constituted ‘aggression against a
sovereign state.'” Chalabi called on the US (1) to “protect the Iraqi people from
Saddam’s
massive repression… through a large-scale program of direct humanitarian assistance that
bypasses the regime”; (2) to “broaden the rules of engagement for US aircraft
enforcing the
no-fly zones over much of Iraq to make all of Saddam’s military forces targets” (3)
“help
the Iraqi National Congress to develop an alternative to the regime and assist us,
including
all the brave Iraqis fighting Saddam inside the country”; and (4) to the establishment of
UN
human rights monitors in Iraq.”

Brownback thanked Chalabi for his testimony and praised his “courage, commitment and
hard
work.” He said, “I am impressed with the details of the plan you are presenting . . . and I look
forward to working with you.”

Patrick Clawson then testified. Clawson said, “By publicly identifying regime
change as a
policy objective, the United States has already put its prestige on the line. From now
on, the
world will use a simple test to judge the success or failure of US policy towards Iraq,
namely
is Saddam still in power?….

“The policy of promoting regime change is not one that should be done
half-way: it should
either be quietly buried or put at the center of all US actions towards Iraq. And the simple fact is
that success depends on the vigor with which the policy is pursued….The US government should
therefore devote vigorous effort to regime change, rather than presenting regime change as a
long-term aim-with the implication that in the short run, little will be done to promote
it….Support for the opposition is the clearest expression of America’s commitment to
regime change….The more the United States supports the opposition, the more regional
governments will be confident that Saddam will in fact go and that therefore they can assist the
opposition without facing eventual Iraqi retaliation.” Clawson also testified, “Some see support
for the opposition as the only element necessary to achieve success in Iraq. This approach is
unrealistic. The opposition is unlikely anytime soon to create a military force capable of
defeating Saddam Hussein, even if supported with American airpower.”…

Rend Francke then testified. Francke said, “The situation in Iraq is more volatile
now that it
has been since March 1991. The Iraqi people are resisting Saddam’s rule everyday
throughout
the country without external help and at enormous cost to their lives and the lives of their
families….Does this widespread and sustained dissent mean that a military coup or a popular
uprising is about to overturn the regime? I don’t believe so.

“The odds are overwhelmingly against a military coup. Since 1991, there
have been at least
six verified military plots, and rumors of many more. In every case, the plot was uncovered in its
embryonic stage through a ubiquitous system of intelligence and security organs….A
unified
Iraqi opposition that operates inside Iraq but outside Saddam’s control is an indispensable
component of an integrated strategic solution because it can serve as the political and
organizational framework for confronting the regime of Saddam Hussein. To be effective, such
an opposition needs a credible presence inside Iraq….The United States has so far
neglected
the forces inside Iraqi territory….” Chalabi noted that he had been in northern Iraq
until
Saddam’s assault on Irbil and “in Northern Iraq we were in fact coordinating events in
real time. We had contacts with military and tribal groups opposing Saddam. This is what
has to be done.”