It’s About Time: Increase in Defense Budget Should Be Matched by Course Corrections on Tech Transfer, Missile Defense

(Washington, D.C.): According to today’s Wall Street Journal, Secretary of
Defense William
Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are going to ask President Clinton to add as much as $15
billion to the defense budget during each of the next few years to counter the effects of the
“hollow” military that has been among his most dangerous legacies to date. The funds would
reportedly go to address plummeting morale and quality of life in the military, correcting
increasingly grave readiness shortfalls and the procurement of weapon systems dangerously
deferred due to past spending shortfalls.

‘This is No Drill’

The urgent need for such actions was dramatically underscored by a memorandum authored
by
the Commanding General of the U.S. Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM), Gen.
David A.
Bramlett.
FORSCOM has responsibility for all stateside Army units and, therefore, a
unique
perspective on the overall condition of the troops and materiel that would be called upon to
support forward-deployed elements in the event of a major conflict. Among the highlights of
Gen. Bramlett’s 20 August 1998 memo as excerpted in the Washington Times on 10
September,
were the following:

  • “We can no longer train and sustain the force [under current defense spending].
    This
    threatens our ability to mobilize, deploy, fight and win.”
  • “My assessment is not good news. Funding has fallen below the survival level in [Fiscal
    Year]1999….Current funding levels place FORSCOM’s ability to accomplish its mission
    at an unacceptable risk.”
  • “We can no longer train and sustain the force, stop infrastructure degradation, and
    provide our soldiers the [quality-of-life] programs critical to long-term readiness of the
    force.”
  • “We must have additional funding for FY99 and beyond.” (Emphasis
    added throughout.)

Of course, General Bramlett’s memo was but the latest in a series of warning indicators.
These include: a recent report by the Commander-in-Chief of Atlantic Command,
Admiral Paul
Reasoner
(USN); ominous congressional testimony from military personnel; anecdotal
evidence
in the press citing growing dissatisfaction and alarm about the condition of the armed forces on
the part of many serving in uniform; and calls from Senator Trent Lott, House Speaker
Newt
Gingrich
and other leaders on Capitol Hill for increases in the Defense Department’s
“top line.”(1)
Prompt action is clearly warranted. The question is: How fast can the damage of 14 years of
sustained downsizing be undone — assuming it can be rectified at all? href=”#N_2_”>(2)

While You’re At It

Two other agenda items cry out for urgent course corrections by the President and his senior
military subordinates — both civilian and uniformed:

  • Abandon the “reorganization” (read, dismantling) of the Defense
    Technology Security
    Administration (DTSA).
    This organization has in the past played a critical role in
    preventing
    or slowing the dangerous transfers of dual-use technologies into the hands of potential U.S.
    adversaries. As the Center has warned repeatedly in recent months, href=”#N_3_”>(3) the Clinton
    Administration has not taken this responsibility seriously — a matter that is now under intensive
    investigation by a select committee in the House of Representatives chaired by Rep. Chris Cox
    (R-CA) and a number of standing committees of the Senate. href=”#N_4_”>(4)
  • Incredibly, matters are about to be made substantially worse if the remnants of a
    reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense unveiled with much fanfare last
    fall go forward as planned. Although many of the other dubious aspects of this
    rewiring exercise have been deferred or dispensed with, the Administration still plans
    to relocate the Defense Technology Security Administration from Pentagon City
    to Dulles — the physical equivalent of Siberia — and to have it report through
    third tier officials in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition’s shop,
    an
    organization that has more closely reflected the proclivities of the Commerce
    Department than the necessary concern about preventing ill-advised, albeit lucrative,
    technology transfers.

    This crippling reorganization must be stopped — lest the Defense
    Department find itself substantially offsetting the benefits of increased
    funding
    by unintentionally contributing to the intensification of the threat posed
    by adversaries armed with U.S. and/or Western technology, a phenomenon that is
    already eroding the qualitative edge upon which America’s military critically
    depends.

  • Deploy effective anti-missile systems at sea as soon as technologically
    possible.
    North
    Korea’s overflight of Japan with its new Taepo Dong 1 missile was a wake-up call to Japan —
    and should be no less so to the United States. It is past time that the means to prevent such
    missiles from threatening U.S. forces and allies in Asia be deployed. In fact, it is nearly three
    years since the then-Commander of UN forces in Korea, Gen. Gary Luck (USA) pleaded for
    the expeditious deployment of Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) assets on the
    peninsula.
  • In addition to proceeding as aggressively as possible to complete the development and
    initiate deployment of THAAD,(5) the U.S. needs to make
    an intensive effort to field
    highly capable anti-missile defenses aboard the Navy’s AEGIS fleet air defense ships.
    The flexibility inherent in the mobility of such vessels and the large areas their weapon
    systems can defend — if optimized to do so — are natural complements to the
    THAAD
    system and an invaluable force multiplier in facing today’s threats from North Korea,
    China, etc., and tomorrow’s.

    As it happens, there is a golden opportunity to advance this initiative with
    the nation that is among the most immediately at risk: Japan.
    Thanks to
    their own fleet of AEGIS vessels, built under license from the United States, the
    Japanese are natural candidates for cooperating in the development and early
    fielding of capable sea-based missile defenses. The United States must seize the
    moment, going beyond open-ended conversations about collaborative R&D
    programs to ensure that the Japanese government makes the necessary budget
    allocation as part of its Mid-Term Defense Plan. By so doing, an Aegis-based
    anti-missile system for Japan could provide a national missile defense for our
    principal regional ally and contribute to the base for interoperable capabilities that
    will, of necessity and over time, be optimized to provide national missile defense
    systems for the United States,
    as well.

The Bottom Line

The foregoing is hardly an all-inclusive list of course corrections this Administration’s security
policies demand. But it is a start. Let’s hope that such a start is made in each of these areas by
President Clinton in his meeting tomorrow with his top Defense Department advisors.

– 30 –

1. For more on these warnings, see the Center’s Decision
Briefs
entitled: Clinton Legacy Watch
#22: More Evidence Of A Hallow Military
(No. 98-D
62
, 7 April 1998); Clinton Legacy Watch
#2: The Re-Emergence Of A Hallow U.S. Military
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_105″>No. 97-D 105, 25 July 1997); The True
Costs of the ‘Peace Dividend’: American Lives and National Treasure
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_41″>No. 98-D 41, 9 March
1998) and Clinton’s Reversal On Defense Spending Clears Way For Real, Needed
Increases,
Redirection
(No. 94-T 118, 2 December
1994). See the Center’s Press Release entitled In Cato
Institute Debate, Center’s Gaffney Joins Speaker Gingrich’s Call For Increased Investment
In Defenses
(No. 97-P 177, 24 November
1997).

2. Some areas, such as the decline in nuclear weapons-related
expertise may be very difficult to
undo. In this connection, see an excellent report recently issued by the National Defense
University and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory entitled, U.S. Nuclear Policy in the
21st Century — A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements
(July
1998).

3. See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Critical Mass # 2: Senator Lott, Rumsfeld
Commission Add Fresh Impetus to Case for Beginning Deployment of Missile Defenses
(No.
98-D 133
, 15 July 1998), Clinton Legacy Watch # 27: A Counterculture
Assault On The U.S.
Military and The National Sovereignty It Safeguards
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_121″>No. 98-D 121, 29 June 1998) and
Broadening the Lens: Peter Leitner’s Revelations on ’60 Minutes,’ Capitol Hill
Indict Clinton
Technology Insecurity
(No. 98-D 101, 6 June
1998).

4. See Clinton Legacy Watch #21: Efforts To Help
Chinese Missile Program Reek Of
Corruption, Betrayal of U.S. Interests
(No. 98-D
61
, 6 April 1998); Anatomy Of A Failed
Policy: Clinton’s ‘Engagement’ Of China Amounts To Appeasement, Is Not Working And Is
Unworthy Of U.S.
(No. 98-D 107, 12 June 1998);
‘See No Evil’: China’s Proliferation
Continues Apace; Clinton Dissembles/Ignores This Reality, Seeks To Reward The
PRC
(No.
98-D 115
, 19 June 1998).

5. See Only The Clinton Team Could Respond To
North Korean, Other Emerging Missile
Threats By Canceling Near-Term T.H.A.A.D.
(No.
98-D 159
, 3 September 1998).

Center for Security Policy

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