Robert A. Pape’s 2005 book, "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," presents a comprehensive survey of the phenomena of suicide terrorism, one that has become increasingly prevalent in the past few years. Pape and his fellow researchers gathered an all-inclusive data set of suicide bombings since the inception of the modern form of the tactic in 1980. Additionally, extensive information was gathered on the backgrounds of the perpetrators of these incidents. Pape attempts to overturn much of the conventional wisdom regarding suicide bombing, mainly, that suicide terrorism is an outgrowth of Islamic fundamentalism. In doing so, Pape ignores the brutal truth in front of him.

After analyzing the data on suicide terrorist incidents, Pape sets forth a theory of suicide terrorism in an effort to explain why it has occurred in the past and under what circumstances it is likely to occur in the future. Pape claims that suicide terrorist incidents take place in a coordinated campaign by terrorist organizations in order to garner concessions from the targeted audience or government and that the use of such tactics is a strategic choice made by the organization. As a result, to truly explain the phenomena of suicide terrorism, it is necessary to understand the circumstances under which these campaigns emerge. After looking at the empirical data regarding various suicide bombing campaigns, Pape finds the tactic is used as a coercive tool to end a foreign occupation. Additionally, the targets of attacks were democracies, which, due to considerations of that style of government, are deemed particularly vulnerable to this form of violent coercion. Finally, suicide bombing campaigns have occurred where the religion of the occupier is different from the religion practiced by the terrorist group.

Pape’s book appears to be a very extensive and well researched account of the phenomena of suicide terrorism, at first glance. He follows the long academic tradition of overturning the conventional wisdom on a topic, showing that previously unknown or unanticipated factors contribute to the issue in question. It is also hard to argue with the empirical data that has been compiled, which seems quite comprehensive. However, he ultimately reaches the wrong conclusions with the right data.

In the attempt to develop a theory to explain and predict suicide terrorism, Pape sets forth several concrete conditions that must be present for such tactics to occur. At the time of his writing, Pape’s explanation appeared somewhat sound. However, it seems that the phenomenon of suicide terrorism has moved above and beyond the strict circumstances Pape presents. The suicide bombing has become part of the modus operandi of the Islamist terrorist, a necessary component of every terrorist attack. These terrorists do not care if they are targeting a democracy, if there is an occupation, or whether or not their victims are Muslims, Christians, Jews, or members of any other religion. The suicide bombing is simply a means to kill and strike fear, a tool in the Islamist struggle for power which has been justified through rhetoric of martyrdom and jihad.

Several examples have occurred since the publication of "Dying to Win" that defy Pape’s conception of suicide bombing. For instance, look at the dual suicide bombings carried out by the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb in Algiers, Algeria on April 11, 2007 in which at least 23 people were killed. In this particular circumstance, none of the three main prerequisites for suicide terrorism according to Pape was present. First, Algeria is not a democracy. Second, Algeria is not occupied by a foreign power, and the targets, the prime minister’s office and a police station, were in no way connected to any occupation. Finally, those killed in the bombings were presumably Muslims, coreligionists of the perpetrators in the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.

Not surprisingly, this is far from the only case where Pape’s criteria do not hold. Recently, a suicide bomber attacked a group of Spanish tourists visiting an ancient temple in Yemen. Seven Spaniards and two locals were killed in the attack. Al Qaeda was suspected of being behind the bombing. These people were targeted for the sole crime of being Western tourists. Spain is not occupying Yemen. Pape’s standard of religious difference does carry weight here, as does the democracy requirement, at least regarding the Spaniards, but the same cannot be said for the Yemeni government. However, in all truth, what is the offense of these tourists that deserved a death sentence?

Further, suicide bombings have in recent days occurred at a frightening clip in Pakistan. A dual suicide operation struck a military convoy in Matta, a town of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province on July 15. Sixteen soldiers and five civilians were killed. Later the same day, a suicide bomber infiltrated a police compound, detonating his explosives among a crowd of police recruits. Twelve policemen and sixteen recruits were killed in this attack in Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan. In these instances, occupation is not an issue, as Pakistani troops cannot be said to be occupying Pakistani territory. Further, Pakistan is far from a democracy, and those killed were most likely all Muslim, practitioners of the same religion as the bombers.

Finally, in his desire to emphasize occupation as an instigator for suicide bombing and deemphasize Islamic fundamentalism, Pape’s explanation for 9/11 takes things too far, as he deems the American presence in Saudi Arabia a highly contributing factor. He states that it is important to look through the perpetrators’ eyes to determine an occupation, but calling the American presence in Saudi Arabia an occupation seems such a stretch of the imagination that it might be more useful to consider what in the Islamic fundamentalist mindset caused al Qaeda to perceive an occupation that justified killing some 3,000 civilians in no way related to the American presence. Of course, as Pape makes clear, extremist interpretations of Islam cannot be the sole factor behind suicide bombings, as the nominally Hindu group the Tamil Tigers aptly demonstrates. Islam itself is not responsible, but a fanatical devotion to an extremist brand of the religion is. The Tamil Tigers and al Qaeda may not have religion in common, but they do share a dangerous worldview that justifies the killing of innocents, regardless of the circumstances.

The above incidents prove that those who employ suicide bombings do not need an occupation, a democracy, or even a religious difference to maim and kill. Along the same lines, the United States had no direct role in any of the circumstances surrounding these incidents, which provides definitive evidence that American foreign policy is simply not to blame for the current struggle in which we find ourselves, as many on the left and in academia like to claim. The Islamists have no shortage of issues for which they can justify killing. In answering that perpetual question of why they hate us, to put it succinctly, it’s "them," not "us," that is the problem.

Despite these clear refutations, this line of argument refuses to die. During the Republican presidential debate in Columbia, South Carolina on May 15, Representative Ron Paul, in so many words, blamed the foreign policy of the United States for the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC. Rudy Giuliani rightfully countered, calling Paul’s comments an "extraordinary statement" and compared this argument to other "absurd explanations for September 11." Video of this exchange can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AD7dnFDdwu0.

Congressman Paul, in response, called a press conference deemed "Educating Rudy" in Washington on May 24. Paul suggested four books Giuliani should read in order to better inform himself on foreign policy issues and terrorism. These books were "Imperial Hubris" by Michael Scheuer, "Blowback" by Chalmers Johnson, the 9/11 Commission Report, and not surprisingly, the previously discussed "Dying to Win" by Robert Pape. As Pape’s thesis has become increasingly discredited with each new suicide bombing, it might be in Ron Paul’s own best interest to go back to school.

Clay Varney
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