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(Washington, D.C.): With the third successful “hit-to-kill” intercept of a simulated ballistic missile warhead high over the Pacific Ocean last night, the question is no longer “Can U.S. technology provide protection for the American people against missile-delivered attacks?” To its credit, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) has once again demonstrated that it can produce and put into space exo-atmospheric kill vehicles (EKVs) capable of discriminating between realistic targets and a decoy — and completely destroying the former.

Moving Right Along

Rather, the relevant question now is: “What is the most efficient, cost-effective and expeditious way in which to bring this and related technology to bear in an operational missile defense system?”

There is nothing academic about this new characterization of the challenge we face. In fact, the law of the land requires that it be answered. The Missile Defense Act of 1999 established that it is the “the policy of the United States to deploy, as soon as is technologically possible, an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.” (Emphasis added.)

Faithful implementation of that policy will require the Bush Administration to seize upon the opportunity afforded by last night’s success to adopt a much more aggressive approach to the development, testing and deployment of missile defenses. Absent such a change, it will be at least three more years before even a rudimentary anti-missile system will be brought on-line.

To realize the maximum effect from a redoubled effort, however, President Bush will have to end U.S. adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed in 1972 with the Soviet Union — a nation that ceased to exist a decade ago. The ABM Treaty’s first article prohibited altogether the fielding of a territorial defense of the United States against long- range ballistic missiles. Other articles either barred outright or grievously impeded activities required to bring the most flexible and cost-effective anti-missile technologies to bear (e.g., sea-, air- and space-based sensors and kill-vehicles). For these reasons, among others, Mr. Bush has rightly called the Treaty “outdated,” “obsolete” and “dangerous” and promised to “move beyond it.”

The Bottom Line

Importantly, one other article — Article XV — grants either party the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on six-months’ notice. As a result, even if President Bush were to act immediately and provide such notice, missile defense tests and developmental activities would continue to be made less valuable than they otherwise could — and should — be until at the earliest June 2002. For example, the $100 million test conducted last night was unable to make use of sea- and land-based sensors that could have enabled BMDO to acquire additional, valuable data, data that might enhance the effectiveness of any systems deployed in the future. If Mr. Bush is serious about defending the country, and acting in conformity with the law, he must minimize to the greatest degree possible any further penalties associated with the ABM Treaty.

In addition to withdrawing from the ABM Treaty forthwith, President Bush should advise Congress that he will veto the Fiscal Year 2002 defense spending bill if it is sent to his desk without restoring the funding he requested for the missile defense program’s “top-line,” and in particular for the Space-Based Infrared Sensor (Low) program, sea-based boost-phase experiments and the space-based laser development effort. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has already indicated that he would recommend “that [the President] veto” the 2002 defense authorization bill if it did not include a go- ahead for the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program. Ensuring that the United States is defended against ballistic missile attack “at the earliest possible time” is at least as worthy of a presidential veto as efforts to dismantle military infrastructure deemed excess to present and foreseeable needs.

Center for Security Policy

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