Japan’s Next Five Year Defense Plan: Whither The 1000-Mile Mission Commitment?

Introduction

As key elements of Japan’s next Medium-Term Defense Plan (MTDP) become public for the first time, Japan’s continued hesitancy to fulfill its nine-year-old commitment to defend its airspace and sea-lanes out to 1000-nautical miles is becoming apparent. Nowhere is this more apparent, according to press reports, than with respect to the cornerstone of such a defense capability: the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft required for effective command and control of land, air and sea forces.

Defense experts on both sides of the Pacific believe that the minimum quantities of such assets for comprehensive coverage of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) would be between twelve and fourteen AWACS and in excess of twenty air-refueling tankers required to extend the vital time-on-station (i.e., mission effectiveness) of both surveillance and fighter aircraft.

Yet, senior Japan Defense Agency (JDA) officials told Defense News last May that only threeincreased — but to just fourthe acquisition of the tankers has reportedly been eliminated altogether. AWACS aircraft were slated for procurement from the United States in the next MTDP together with a small but unspecified number of tankers. The Center has now learned, moreover, that the number of AWACS to be acquired has subsequently been aircraft — while

Ironically, Japan is pursuing the acquisition of significant numbers of F-15s and several Aegis cruisers. It has also expressed a commitment to the deployment of an Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar. In order to derive the full force-multiplier benefits envisioned in these multi-billion dollar investments, however, the appropriate complement of airborne command and control platforms must be available, as well.

History of the 1000-Mile Commitment

In May 1981, then-Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki formally announced that his country would assume responsibility for defense of its sea-lanes and airspace out to 1000-nautical miles. This commitment has never been modified or abandoned.

For its part, the United States government has repeatedly emphasized the importance that it attaches to the fulfillment of this Japanese commitment. The Reagan Administration, in particular, was at pains to stress the 1000-mile mission pledge as hard evidence of Japan’s willingness to share the burden of the common defense in the Pacific. Unfortunately, in recent years, in seemingly endless deference to various Japanese domestic political considerations, the executive branch has been willing to live with one postponement after another of the requisite system acquisitions.

In contrast, the U.S. Congress has grown increasingly insistent that Japan end its slow-rolling of these purchases from one defense plan to another, losing years with each decision. For example, in August 1988, the House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Defense Burden-Sharing Panel published a report which said:

Given the substantial limits on what Japan is willing to do for defense, the Panel believes it imperative that the Japanese government, at a minimum, accelerate its ability to perform the self-defense "1000-mile" and "closing of the straits" missions and prepare to carry out these missions if needed without direct U.S. assistance. (Emphasis added.)

 

Moreover, in November 1989, the Congress adopted the FY1990 Defense Authorization bill which, in Section 913, found that:

Japan should…make a contribution to the common defense that is more commensurate with its economic status by…acquiring off-the-shelf equipment from the United States (including completely equipped, long-range early warning aircraft… refueling aircraft [and other systems] in developing the capabilities called for in Japan’s current and subsequent five-year defense programs.

 

If anything, this congressional concern is likely to intensify greatly in the near future as news that Tokyo is deferring yet again action on key elements of the MTDP — which will soon be described as an "immutable" document, reflecting an "unalterable" consensus within the Japanese government — is coupled with U.S. legislators’ considerable frustration over Japan’s lackluster performance on sharing the burden of the Persian Gulf crisis.

The Burgeoning Requirement for the 1000-Mile Mission

Many in the West have erroneously concluded that the Soviet threat in the Far East region has diminished. For example, an editorial by the New York Times which appeared on 27 March 1990 averred that President Gorbachev: had "agreed" to remove 400 medium-range missiles from Soviet Asia; had "promised" to withdraw 200,000 troops from the Far East; had "brought" his troops home from Afghanistan; and was in the process of "reducing his Pacific fleet by a third and withdrawing all forces in Asia based outside Soviet borders…."

Fortunately, the most recent Japanese Defense Agency white paper, entitled Defense of Japan 1989, makes it clear that the Soviet forces in the Western Pacific remain at ominous levels — and is likely to become more formidable in the future. The following are cited in the JDA report and other Western analyses as evidence of Moscow’s ever improving power-projection capabilities in the region:

• The total Soviet fighter force in the Far East is now estimated at 2,430 aircraft — roughly one-quarter of the USSR’s total fleet. From 1985-89, this fighter force has been continuously upgraded qualitatively with the addition of over 200 fourth-generation fighters (MiG-31s, Su-25s and -27s). For example, MIG-31s operating from the Soviet base at Dolinsk Sokol have combat radiuses that cover all the main Japanese islands.

 

• The Soviet arsenal of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles has been improved markedly in recent years. As no part of Japan’s landmass is more than 75 miles from the sea, this country is especially vulnerable to the latter launched from surface and subsurface platforms.

 

• Since 1985, large-scale Soviet naval exercises around Japan have more than doubled (from eight to nineteen).

 

• Total naval tonnage of the Soviet Pacific fleet now exceeds over 1 million tons comprised of 100 major surface combatants and 140 submarines. Since 1985, the tonnage of major surface ships alone has increased from 300,000 to 400,000 tons. Production of a new class of large-deck carriers has begun, promising a far more potent Soviet naval presence in the Pacific in the future.

 

• Forty-three Soviet divisions remain deployed east of Lake Baikal. No Soviet troop withdrawals are even "promised" from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin and the Northern territories where the USSR’s principal threat to Japan resides.

 

• Moscow continues to pump some $300 million per month into Afghanistan, fueling the armed conflict there.

In addition to portentous and potentially long-term developments in the Persian Gulf, politico-economic turmoil in North Korea, China, the Philippines and Vietnam and in the USSR itself is exacerbating regional instability and uncertainties with which Japan must be prepared to contend. Highlights of these growing concerns include:

• North Korea: The Soviets have supplied the dangerous leadership of North Korea with many of the most lethal weapons in its inventory, including MiG-29s, SU-25 fighter bombers, SA-5 surface to air missiles and SCUD short-range missiles. Western military intelligence has confirmed that North Korea is actively developing nuclear weapons capabilities and already possesses suitable delivery systems. The anticipated change in the megalomaniacal leadership of North Korea has heightened — not diminished — regional anxieties.

 

• China: The repressive Beijing regime has demonstrated a frightening willingness to use violent means to maintain power. As it has become increasingly estranged from the Chinese people in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, the PRC government’s legitimacy is continuing to erode, increasing the potential for turmoil in China’s domestic situation and foreign relations.

 

• The Philippines: The Aquino regime’s popularity continues to plummet, with increasingly anti-American overtones. The negotiations over base rights over Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base are in jeopardy with the prospect of a major disengagement and/or relocation of U.S. security assets from the region.

 

• Vietnam: There is substantial evidence that the entrenched communist leadership of Vietnam may remain committed to its longstanding goal of obtaining hegemony over Indochina — and not, as it would have the West believe, to significant political and economic reform. What is more, the Soviets retain a military presence at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay which improve Moscow’s ability to interdict Japan’s sea lines of communications.

 

• USSR: Coupled with the persistent Soviet military threat to the region, the implications of the unraveling of the Soviet economy and possible repressive measures taken by the Gorbachev regime to preserve political control take on particular urgency. Given Gorbachev’s penchant for merely tinkering with the existing, failed command economic system, the Kremlin may well see a resort to violence within the USSR — and possibly outside its borders — as a necessity if political control is to be maintained.

Japan’s Domestic Gridlock

Within the Japan Defense Agency, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is reportedly locked in a "turf battle" with the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) regarding roles and missions for sea lane defense, versus air defense of the SLOCs. Each of these organizations within JDA hopes to secure resources for pet programs on the grounds that its parochial concept for defending the sea lines of communication is superior to the other’s. The Japanese government’s inability or unwillingness to date to resolve this fundamental policy bottleneck has contributed significantly to further postponement of required aircraft acquisitions from the United States.

Another system which has fallen victim to the same internal policy dispute is the Over-The-Horizon radar. In this case, at issue appears to be whether or not OTH will be used primarily for sea or air surveillance. As the situation now stands, OTH may be canceled altogether due to its high cost and new technical risk considerations.

The net effect of these two protracted delays — if not outright program cancellations — is to ensure that an economic giant will continue to rely inordinately, if not indefinitely, on the United States for the preponderance of its security requirements.

The domestic political scene in Japan is also contributing to programmatic gridlock. The recent Recruit scandal — involving leading Japanese politicians of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — was largely responsible for catapulting the Japanese Socialist Party into a majority in the Upper House of Japan’s Diet. The Socialist Party’s traditional opposition to most defense issues, combined with a popular misperception that the Soviet threat has actually diminished substantially, have eroded the LDP’s political will to realize its commitments to perform the 1000-mile mission. The visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan, now scheduled for April 1991, evidently is also being used by some to reduce the robustness of the Medium Term Defense Plan lest it be viewed as "provocative" to the Soviet leader.

Consequences of Further Delays

Should the Japanese government’s decision to defer the acquisition of an adequate number (i.e., at minimum 10-12 aircraft) of AWACS and aerial-refueling tankers become permanently embodied in the next MTDP, Japan would be unable to meet its full responsibilities until after the turn of the century. It is difficult to imagine that such a development could be viewed as acceptable performance by Tokyo by the Bush Administration and the Congress.

After all, this further lapse in Japanese performance would perpetuate the present, entirely unnecessary vulnerability of U.S. and Japanese security interests in the region. It would also have other, indirect — but very harmful — effects: For one, the relevant U.S. manufacturing capability to produce AWACS and tanker aircraft would, all other things being equal, almost certainly be terminated by the end of 1990. Such a termination has the potential permanently to foreclose the option of the United States, NATO, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and France acquiring new AWACS or replace those already in their inventories. If production continued at all, the per-unit cost of aircraft would rise to unsupportable levels leading inevitably to further erosion in the American defense industrial base.

Discounting Otherwise Praiseworthy Japanese Contributions

It is particularly unfortunate that this controversy comes at a time when the Japanese are, in other areas, displaying rather more sense than the U.S. government about actions that would add to the common defense burden. They are also exhibiting somewhat heightened sensitivity to the need to ease certain other U.S. taxpayer burdens.

Concerning the former, Japan has steadily increased its defense spending to the point that it now boasts the third largest defense budget in the world, exceeding even that of the United Kingdom. What is more, fully 35-40 percent of the total costs associated with deploying U.S. forces in Japan are absorbed by Tokyo; that percentage is expected to increase further in the future, particularly in light of the Gulf crisis.

Tokyo has also strengthened its domestic export controls and improved its coordination within COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), importantly at a time when the reverse is taking place in Western Europe. This action helps deny Moscow militarily relevant technology that would degrade the West’s technological advantages and add to its defense costs.

Japan has — in part in response to American urging — greatly increased its overseas development assistance, now in excess of $6 billion, making Tokyo the world’s largest foreign aid donor for the third consecutive year on a dollar basis. The bulk of this aid is directed to other states in Asia, but other beneficiaries include countries in the Middle East, and Central and South America.

Earlier this year, Japan firmly resisted Soviet membership and borrowing privileges in the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the interest of ensuring that precious taxpayer-supplied bank resources would not be diverted from the fledgling new governments in Eastern Europe to benefit Moscow. Tokyo also stood firm in opposing Soviet observer status in the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, citing the incompatibility of the Soviet economic system with — and potential disruptiveness of the Soviets’ presence in — this market-oriented organization. Moreover, Japan was only one of two allies (the other being the United Kingdom) to join the United States at the July Economic Summit in Houston on the subject of resisting premature financial assistance to Moscow.

Although Japan’s opposition was overridden on both EBRD and GATT thanks to an irresponsible consensus among West European countries — which eventually came to include the United States — the fact that the Japanese government was willing to stand for such sound and principled positions is noteworthy. It is to be hoped that these policy actions will inspire more prudent approaches by other Western nations in the future, especially with respect to greater discipline and transparency in economic, financial, technology and energy relationships with Moscow.

Recommendations

Regrettably, Tokyo’s twin miscalculations in balking at an adequate contribution to sharing the Persian Gulf defense burden and in deferring yet again the necessary procurement decisions on 1000-mile mission-related aspects of the MTDP threatens to dissipate the goodwill generated by positive Japanese steps like those mentioned above. Worse yet, it also reinforces the widespread view in the United States that, unless important bilateral issues become acrimonious crises in U.S.-Japanese relations, Tokyo will remain indifferent to pressing American and collective security interests.

If, on the other hand, forceful U.S. objections are communicated, there is every reason to believe that the more visionary elements within the Japanese leadership will recognize that implementation of these crucial responsibilities cannot be avoided or further postponed.

The Center for Security Policy believes that the unacceptability of this "double whammy" should be stressed by Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady during his current visit to Tokyo dealing with burden-sharing in the Gulf crisis. It should also be impressed unequivocally upon a delegation of prominent Liberal Democratic Party members of the lower house of the Japanese Diet visiting Washington early next week. Moreover, the Center recommends that congressional hearings be held forthwith on the adequacy of Japan’s next Medium-Term Defense Plan, especially with regard to the provisions made in the MTDP for the 1000-mile SLOC mission.