‘LE MOMENT ZHIRINOVSKY’: THE WEST CAN NO LONGER AFFORD ILLUSIONS OF AN ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA

(Washington, D.C.): The outcome of
last weekend’s elections in Russia should
make one thing perfectly clear to the
Clinton Administration: Its policies
toward Moscow and the successors to the
Soviet empire must be immediately
reexamined — and, for the most part,
radically overhauled.

The problem is not simply that a
strong and cohesive parliamentary bloc
will emerge from the present, frantic
coalition-building — a
“red-brown” faction strenuously
opposed to systemic reform along
democratic and free market lines. The
operational nexus for this faction will
be in the areas of: relations with the
“near-abroad”; the perceived
need for a powerful, modernizing
military-industrial complex; and an
“independent” (read,
imperialist) foreign policy. Needless to
say, such a convergence bodes ill for
U.S. and Western interests; it is,
moreover, a living nightmare for the
Baltic States, Ukraine, Central Europe
and the Transcaucasus.

No less problematic, though, is the
new constitution, whose adoption has been
effusively praised by President Clinton. href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾
In the hands of an individual bent on
pursuing an agenda antithetical to free
enterprise and democratic
institution-building at home and
anti-Western foreign policy agendas
abroad, the powers conferred upon the
Russian president by the new constitution
could be formidable tools. This will be
true whether the President is a
chastened, more nationalistic Boris
Yeltsin or an unabashedly revanchist
Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Whether the greatest problem emerges
from the Russian executive or legislative
branches, there should be little
doubt that the United States and its
allies will shortly be confronted with a
slew of serious new challenges from
Moscow — and must adjust its policies and
personnel accordingly. The
departure of Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin this afternoon should set in train
a wholesale housecleaning of a singularly
inept foreign policy and national
security team.

Expand NATO — or Help
Ukraine Pick Up the Deterrent Slack

An obvious place to start retooling
American security policy is to abandon
the effort to appease Moscow by proposing
a self-defeating “Partnership for
Peace” — in lieu of meaningful
security guarantees for the democratic
states of Eastern Europe (i.e., Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary). href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾
This arrangement simply invites the sorts
of hegemonic tendencies already
disturbingly evident in Moscow’s
international behavior in the months
leading up to the Russian elections and
in the rhetoric of Vladimir Zhirinovsky
and the emerging red-brown coalition.

Poland and other East European states
have been traumatized by the West’s
acquiescence to what amounts to a Russian
veto concerning their entry into NATO. At
least until such time as the Atlantic
Alliance is prepared to extend full
security guarantees to these fragile,
pro-Western democracies, the
United States and its allies should cease
all further efforts to coerce Ukraine to
eliminate the nuclear arms it inherited
upon the demise of the Soviet Union.

An interim security structure
predicated upon a Ukrainian nuclear
deterrent should appeal not only to the
Eastern European democracies but also the
Baltic States and, arguably, even to some
of their sponsors among the Scandinavian
states who are becoming increasingly
apprehensive about the direction of
events in Russia. A proper
appreciation of the positive role Ukraine
might play could also help catalyze
efforts to end the economic meltdown Kiev
is currently experiencing — and, by its
misguided recentralizing policies,
needlessly exacerbating — before
the temptation to Moscow to fill this
destabilizing vacuum of power becomes
irresistible.

Other Course Corrections
That Are In Order:

It has long been obvious to the Center
for Security Policy that the following
adjustments — among others — were
urgently needed. It believes, however,
that with the latest developments in
Moscow these steps are no longer simply
prudent, but imperative.

The Clinton Administration should:

• Halt the free-fall in U.S.
  defense spending and the reckless
  dismantling of the American
  defense industrial base
  (including its nuclear weapons
  complex).
• Pursue a crash program to
  complete development and initiate
  deployment of effective strategic
  air and missile defenses.
• Revaluate the wisdom of making
  the future of the U.S. space
  station contingent upon Russian
  cooperation and involvement.
• Reverse the decision to scrap
  East-West multilateral export
  controls so long as the
  hemorrhage of sophisticated
  military technology to the
  Russian military-industrial
  complex — to say nothing of
  dangerous third parties — is
  virtually assured.
• Reexamine the prudence of major
  new U.S. Export-Import Bank loan
  guarantees to accelerate
  development of the strategic
  Russian energy sector (a function
  of the World Bank’s recent waiver
  of its “negative
  pledge” provision) —
  guarantees which may well wind up
  funding increasingly belligerent
  Russian international behavior
  and military modernization.

Bottom Line

The silver lining to these clouds
could be that a clear appreciation of
Moscow’s designs will prevent further,
debilitating mistakes now in the offing
from being made. The perception that
close trans-Atlantic relations continue
to be essential to international security
may already have contributed to
the completion of a GATT trade deal. If
that perception can now translate into a
reinvigorated — and expanded — NATO, it
may help secure for the foreseeable
future the Cold War triumph that the West
has, until recently, been squandering so
wantonly.

– 30 –

1. Efforts
by the President’s spin-doctors to make
him appear in control and well-briefed by
asserting that he was “not
surprised” by the shocking outcome
of the elections are, of course, silly.
The Center has learned that Embassy
Moscow — and the Administration more
generally — was caught flat-footed by
the force of the anti-reform dynamic in
Russia. A more accurate depiction can be
found in the Washington Post’s report
that senior U.S. officials (like Strobe
Talbott) accompanying Vice President Gore
to Moscow “were left dazed and
largely speechless by the weekend
balloting.”

2. For a fuller
treatment of the problems with this
“Partnership for Peace,” see
the Center’s recent Decision Brief
entitled Yalta II: Western
Moscow-centrism Invites New Instability
in Former Soviet Empire href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_101″> (No. 93-D 101, 3
December 1993).