Letter from Sen. Bill Bradley to the President

BILL BRADLEY
NEW JERSEY

United States
Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3001

May 15, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that you have decided to send an agricultural advisory mission headed by Under
Secretary of Agriculture Richard Crowder to the Soviet Union to help improve the Soviet
agricultural production and distribution systems.

While technical improvements are an important element in reducing the hardships created by
food
shortages, I hope that the team will also examine the underlying causes of those shortages. In
particular, in order to guide you and the Congress about appropriate U.S. actions, I believe it is
important to address the following questions:

• How extensive and intensive are the food shortages in the Soviet Union? Are they limited to
  Moscow, Leningrad and other major cities, or do they extend throughout the country? Is there
  real deprivation or just a crisis mentality created by shortages and uncertainty about the future?
  Do shortages in urban areas indicate far worse problems in rural regions, or are the residents of
  rural regions more self-sufficient and therefore comparatively better able to meet their
  nutritional requirements?
• How much of Soviet grain production is ultimately available in the form of consumer goods,
  and how much is lost to waste, technical shortcomings and corruption? I understand that of
  last year’s total harvest of 235 million metric tons, less than 90 MMTs ultimately entered the
  Soviet procurement and distribution system and even less reached store shelves.
• What role do prices play in Soviet agriculture? Are there appropriate incentives to
  production
  and efficient distribution? Can technical changes make a significant difference in the absence of
  a market system that allocates resources efficiently?
• What is the role of private and “black” markets in the Soviet Union? Do they provide for the
  needs of a significant percentage of the population? Why are prices on these markets so high?
  How closely are these markets linked to corruption and illegal activities? Do Soviet policies
  encourage or discourage the growth of unofficial markets?
• Are there differences in agricultural policies among the Republics? For example, Armenian
  President Levon Ter-Petrossyan has claimed that while food prices are rising in the Soviet
  Union, privatization of agriculture has kept prices stable in Armenia. Have economic policy
  changes made by the governments of the Baltic states and constituent Republics like the
  Ukraine and Georgia had any impact on agricultural productivity?
• Has the centralized Soviet food distribution system been used to coerce Republic
  governments? Armenia claims that it received only 30% of anticipated food supplies from
  Moscow in the first three months of 1991, and that supplies had deteriorated even further in
  the past month. Lithuanian and Moldovan officials have said that food and feed grain supplies
  provided through the central distribution system have been significantly reduced in time of
  political tension.
• Does the United States have the ability to monitor distribution within the Soviet Union and
  verify adherence to an agreed-to distribution schedule?

Hunger and poverty in the Soviet Union stem more from political and structural flaws
than
technological shortcomings, and efforts to relieve hunger will not be successful unless they are
addressed. I hope the mission will be able to explore these questions in addition to strictly
technical ones. I look forward to your reply.

Respectfully,

/signed/

Bill Bradley