Letter to the Honorable James M. Inhofe

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
7701 TAMPA POINT BLVD.
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

September 13, 1997

The Honorable James M. Inhofe
United States Senate
453 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Inhofe:

Thank you for your letter of 12 September in which you state your concerns about the compatibility of the emerging Oslo treaty on anti-personnel landmines (APL) with the military’s requirements today and for the foreseeable future. I appreciate the opportunity to express my views on these issues as Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command.

Your first question asked for my view on the importance of retaining the Korean exemption, limiting the systems covered by the treaty to those “primarily designed” for anti-personnel purposes, and ensuring that we are able to continue using self-destructing/self-deactivating APL when packaged with anti-tank landmines.

In my view, each of those positions is critical. Anti-personnel landmines are integral to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and as long as there is risk of aggression in Korea and we do not have suitable alternatives fielded, we must ensure the best protection of our forces and those of our allies. I also believe that an accurate definition of anti-personnel (AP) landmines is essential to prevent the banning of mixed munitions under the treaty. Finally, I firmly believe that our anti-tank (AT) and anti-vehicle (AV) munitions – which are mixed systems composed entirely of smart AT and AP mines that self-destruct or self-deactivate in a relatively short period of time – are vital to the protection of our men and women in the field.

Your second question asked whether I thought a landmine ban that did not accommodate these positions would be in the national security interest of the United States. I do not. I believe that any treaty to which the United States agrees must ensure that these valid national security concerns are adequately addressed.

In your third question, you noted that General Norman Schwarzkopf – who has been widely portrayed as a supporter of a complete ban on anti-personnel landmines – has been quoted in an interview with the Baltimore Sun as saying: “I favor a ban on the dumb ones; those are the ones that are causing the humanitarian problem. I think the smart ones are a military capability we can use.” you asked whether I agree with this assessment.

My view, again is that our smart, mixed AT/AV munitions are critical to our efforts to protect our men and women in the field. As I noted earlier, these systems are composed entirely of smart mines that self-destruct or self-deactivate in a relatively short period of time. The military utility of these systems is, in my mind, unquestionable. Beyond that, however, I do want to reiterate that, because of the unique situation on the Korean peninsula, non-self-destructing (NSD) or “dumb” mines are essential to our commanders in the Republic of Korea as long as there is risk of aggression and we have not fielded suitable alternatives to the NSD mines used in Korea.

In your final question, you asked whether I will work to ensure that this capability is protected in any landmine treaty the U.S. signs. In response, let me state again that I firmly believe that any landmine treaty to which the United States becomes party must ensure protection of “smart” mixed systems.

As always, I appreciate your support of our men and women in uniform. With all best wishes from Tampa,

Sincerely,

/Signed/

Henry H. Shelton
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief